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Abstract  
Inclusion, understood as all children receiving their education in their local regular 
school, is promoted almost universally as both a moral and a political imperative. 
From this perspective inclusion, and only inclusion, is equated with just educational 
provision for disabled children and young people. But at the same time, special school 
provision is a feature of many, if not most, education systems. In a policy climate in 
which inclusion is the dominant motif, the special school sector is an anomaly and 
special schools inevitably occupy an uncertain and somewhat invidious position. This 
situation raises a number of questions concerning matters of justice and fairness with 
respect to its impact on special schools and their communities. It also raises questions 
about the validity of the view that inclusion, and only inclusion, can represent justice 
in education for all disabled children and young people.  
This thesis explores these matters from a philosophical perspective and with 
particular reference to the turn to inclusion in New Zealand’s education policy context 
in the years 1987-2005. It examines the realities of the development of the policy 
Special Education 2000 (SE2000) and the experience of special schools under that 
policy. It also presents a philosophically based examination and critique of the notion 
of justice with respect to location that underpins inclusion and inclusive education 
policies such as SE2000. Drawing on the work of I.M. Young (1990), the thesis 
argues that the privileging of inclusion in SE2000 positioned special school provision 
as a lesser and undesirable alternative, and resulted in a state of affairs in which some 
disabled children and their families experienced, or were more likely to experience, 
injustice.  
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 The examination of the New Zealand setting provides the context from which 
the broader philosophical concerns of the thesis emanate. These centre on the broader 
question of what, with respect to where they go to school, might constitute a just state 
of affairs in education for disabled children. The thesis presents a critique of the 
notion that inclusion is the only educational arrangement that constitutes a just state of 
affairs for disabled children. It argues that the availability of special school provision 
rather than being a barrier can be a factor that contributes to a just state of affairs in 
the educational arrangements for disabled children. The thesis concludes that as 
regards the matter of location, what is required to achieve a just state of affairs for 
disabled children and their families is a nuanced approach that will mitigate injustice 
in their daily lives and reflect the multiple views, values and aspirations they hold.  
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Prologue- My Interest in the Topic 
Harry was a six-year-old boy with a shock of blonde hair, blue eyes, and a ready 
smile. I met him when he joined the New Entrant class I was teaching. When he 
started school Harry could talk in sentences, recognise his own name and some basic 
sight words, and walk. He loved stories, music and food. By the time he was seven 
years old Harry could no longer talk in sentences or recognise any basic words and he 
was losing other faculties. Harry had a neurological condition that affected both his 
physical and intellectual functioning and ultimately his lifespan. As Harry’s peers’ 
skills and faculties developed and grew, Harry lost his. As Harry’s peers became more 
articulate and physically able, Harry lost his words and became less physically able. 
As Harry’s peers’ intellectual capacity developed, Harry’s began to reduce and he 
experienced short-term memory loss.  
Harry’s parents believed absolutely in his right to an education and in his right 
to attend the local school with his peers, but as his condition developed they felt that 
Harry needed a differently focused education than was provided in our school and so 
they looked for an alternative setting for him. The option they ultimately chose was a 
special school; they believed that the education and environment provided by a 
special school would be best for Harry and in addition would provide the best support 
for them. This belief about the appropriateness and efficacy of special schools was 
common at the time; these schools were seen as a necessary and good alternative to 
the regular school. The people who worked in these schools were also seen as 
valuable and were recognised for their commitment to and knowledge about disabled 
children. Harry attended the special school for seven years until his early death at the 
age of 14. Harry’s brother, who had the same condition as Harry, also attended the 
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school.  At the school Harry and his brother experienced an education that was 
attuned to their very particular needs. Harry was able to remain with familiar teachers, 
therapists and aides over the seven years, his health and physical needs were attended 
to with dignity and respect, and he was able to participate in activities such as music 
therapy and swimming as part of a very fluid and responsive curriculum.  
Harry’s brother Jack died, as Harry had, prematurely. At Jack’s funeral, their 
mother gave a eulogy in which she talked with deep feeling of her gratitude that Harry 
and his brother were able to attend a special school. She described how the special 
school had provided a warm, accepting and safe educational haven not only for Harry 
and his brother but also for the whole family. Here they were welcomed, supported 
and celebrated.  Interestingly, and revealingly, parents still describe special schools in 
these ways. For Harry’s parents the availability of a special school placement for 
Harry and his brother constituted justice in education for both their children and 
themselves.  
However, in the nearly thirty years since I first met Harry, the educational 
policy environment with respect to disabled children has changed substantially both at 
the national and international level. The rights of disabled children to attend their 
local regular school have, quite properly, been enshrined in the legislation of many 
countries. The goal of inclusive education, whereby all disabled children will receive 
their education in regular school settings, has been agreed to and promoted in 
international agreements and conventions. Implicit in inclusive education policy in 
many jurisdictions is the notion that just educational provision for disabled children 
equates to all disabled children attending the regular school and the ultimate goal of 
such policy must be to achieve this outcome. Correspondingly, special school 
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provision, by implication at least, is positioned as contrary to that goal and constituted 
as synonymous with exclusion and thus injustice. Once considered a social good, now, 
in an almost universal inclusive education policy context, special school provision has 
come to be characterised in some circles as an anathema and antithetical to achieving 
the rights of disabled children to access their education in a local regular state school 
(IHC, 2009).  
 For me this view of special schooling is perplexing because it conflicts with 
the realities of my own experiences of special schooling. Prior to meeting Harry and 
his family, I knew nothing about special schools; my first introduction was going with 
Harry’s mother as she visited a variety of different settings before deciding on what 
option to take. However it was not to be my last. Only a few years later I took a 
position as a teacher in a special school and began what was nearly twenty years of 
involvement in this area of the education system. For about thirteen years I worked in 
two different schools in a variety of teaching roles and subsequently served on a 
Board of Trustees of a local special school for five years, three of them as the Board 
Chairperson. In my roles both as teacher and as board member I was frequently 
confronted with the difficult realities that children with the most complex needs and 
their parents and families faced not only in relation to education but also to daily life 
itself. For many of these families the special school was a positive choice that enabled 
them to manage these challenges and difficulties. My work in special schools sparked 
an enduring interest in that sector for me. It also engendered a great respect for the 
educational work done in these schools, for the children and their families who make 
up their communities, and for the teachers and other professionals who work in the 
schools. My involvement in the sector led me to the belief that special schools play an 
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important and necessary role in our education system and provide a valuable option 
for many disabled children and their families. But it was also very apparent to me that 
the view I held was not one that was commonly shared by those responsible for the 
management and direction of special education at that time. During the nearly twenty 
years that I was involved in the sector I witnessed first-hand attitudes and actions of 
Special Education Services, and later Special Education in the Ministry of Education, 
that demonstrated not just a lack of support for special school provision but that also 
seemed at times to be actively working against such schools. Similarly, I have found 
in more recent academic publications and other education commentary in New 
Zealand, that what little there is written about special schooling, tends to be 
disparaging and to equate the presence of special school provision with the failure of 
inclusive education and thus injustice for disabled children.  
These circumstances present a conundrum for me, for while I support the right 
of disabled children to receive their education in the local common school and also 
many of the principles that inform inclusive education more generally, I find it 
impossible to reconcile the view that special schools are inherently bad and that 
special school provision represents an injustice to disabled children with either the 
reality of my own experience of special schooling or with the views expressed by 
parents such as Harry’s mother. Rather it would seem to me that it is special schools 
and their communities who have experienced unfairness and injustice both through 
the actions and attitudes of bureaucrats and through the way they have been vilified in 
much academic writing and educational commentary. It is this that has prompted the 
work of this thesis as an attempt to redress the imbalance in the literature, to give 
voice to an alternative perspective on special school provision and to explore what we 
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as a society owe to children like Harry and his brother if we are to genuinely meet the 
goal of just educational provision for all disabled children. When Harry came into my 
class all those years ago, I little realised the influence and impact meeting him and his 
family would have on me, and how the experience would shape the rest of my 
professional life. As I write this thesis, they are always there in my mind’s eye, 
guiding my thoughts and perceptions and encouraging me, as are the many families, 
teachers, teacher-aides and others with whom I worked in my time in the special 
school community. I dedicate this thesis to them.  
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Chapter One  
Introduction and Background 
This thesis examines matters to do with special schools, inclusion and the education 
of disabled children and young people from a philosophical perspective that centres 
on issues of justice and injustice. The thesis explores these issues with particular 
reference to the experiences of the New Zealand special school sector and the 
development and implementation of inclusive education policy in New Zealand. 
There is a dearth of research related to the special school sector in New Zealand and 
none that explores the nexus between inclusive education policy, justice and special 
schools from the perspective taken here. This chapter sets out the scope and focus of 
the thesis, and introduces the problem that troubles the thesis and the approach that 
will be taken in examining this problem. The situation with respect to special schools 
in the context of an inclusive education policy environment is explained, an overview 
of special school provision is outlined and a description of special schooling in New 
Zealand detailed. Following this there is a review of literature that examines material 
specifically pertaining to special school provision in the New Zealand context, and 
also that pertaining more generally to the issue of special schools in an inclusive 
policy context. Prior to the conclusion, which outlines the structure and shape of the 
thesis, some matters of terminology are addressed. 
Scope and Focus of the Thesis 
The scope and focus of this thesis are bound within quite specific limits. At one level 
the thesis provides an examination and analysis of the realities of the development of 
the policy Special Education 2000 (SE2000) and the experience of the special school 
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sector under that policy. At the same time the thesis also provides a philosophically 
based examination and critique of the particular notion of justice with respect to 
location that is inherent to and underpins inclusion and inclusive education policies 
such as SE2000. This particular notion, I will argue, unjustly represents special school 
provision as a barrier to achieving just educational provision for disabled children and 
young people when it may actually represent exactly that for some of them. Matters of 
justice and injustice in relation to education and more specifically the education of 
disabled children and young people are complex and can pertain to many different 
facets of education provision. This work is specifically concerned with examining the 
matter of the position of special school provision in an inclusive policy environment 
and the particular issues of justice and injustice that stem from this. The focus here is 
to draw on philosophical thinking and analysis to interrogate the way in which special 
school provision is constituted in the context of inclusion and to explore the impact 
and implications of that. 
The thesis also entails an analysis and critique of the particular understanding 
of justice represented by full inclusion. However inclusion is a broad and wide-
ranging concept that can have a much wider application and ambit than simply a 
concern with location. Inclusion can refer to a radical programme of education reform 
concerned with improving education systems for all children not just disabled 
children. It can also refer to pedagogical practices, policies, and philosophies that are 
particularly focused on improving and enhancing the educational experiences in 
schools and other educational settings for all children and young people. Core to all of 
this work is a focus on identifying and challenging exclusion and exclusionary 
practices so as to achieve a more just state of affairs for everyone. The argument 
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made in this thesis is in no way intended to be a critique of these conceptualisations, 
practices and bodies of work. I acknowledge and respect the importance and value of 
that work. I also acknowledge and respect the commitment of those working in these 
areas; I count myself among them.  
Setting Out the Problem 
Over the last twenty years inclusion/inclusive education has become the pervasive 
motif of progressive educational thinking with respect to disabled children and young 
people. Around the world governments have moved to implement policies of 
inclusion and inclusive education which, while shaped by the different characteristics 
of the political and social environments of each country or jurisdiction, are all similar 
in their concern for realising the rights of disabled children and young people to 
education and, more particularly, their right to receive that education at their local 
school with their non-disabled peers. With respect to location or setting, the question 
of what constitutes just educational provision for disabled children and young people 
seems, in terms of policy thinking at least, to have been resolved as “inclusion”, 
understood as all children receiving their education in the common school. 
International policy statements such as the Salamanca Statement (1994), the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Disabled (2006) and others, all proclaim the 
goal of achieving inclusion for all disabled children in the common or regular school 
setting. Similarly many national education policy statements, such as Special 
Education 2000 (SE2000) in New Zealand, proclaim the aim of achieving full 
inclusion.  
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Nevertheless special school provision of some sort remains a feature of many 
education systems and has endured despite national and international moves to 
inclusive education policies and despite criticism from commentators and academics 
(McMenamin, 2011; Terzi, 2010). Even in Italy and some Canadian states, which are 
described as being “fully inclusive” and held up as exemplars of inclusive education, 
there are still some children receiving their education in separate special schools 
(Begeny & Martens, 2007; D’Alessio &Watkins, 2009). However, while  special 
schools remain a feature of many education systems they occupy a somewhat 
invidious position (McMenamin, 2011). In many policy and educational environments 
the accepted orthodoxy asserts the moral probity of regular school provision and, thus, 
by implication at least, the corresponding iniquity of special school provision. The 
view that separate provision is by definition unjust and an affront to the rights of 
disabled people in general, and disabled children and young people in particular, 
would seem to have been accepted as a core and fundamental principle by many 
policymakers and commentators at both national and international levels. The 
measure of just educational provision for disabled children and young people under 
this regime is constituted as that which obtains when all are educated in regular 
school settings alongside their peers and special schools are no longer available, a 
situation that has been referred to by some as “full inclusion” (Cigman, 2007a). For 
those who support full inclusion, the continued presence of separate special school 
provision marks the failure of policies of inclusion and represents continuing injustice 
for disabled children and young people, hereafter referred to as disabled children. But 
is this in fact a true representation of the situation or could it be that the continued 
presence of special school provision simply represents a more nuanced interpretation 
of what is required to achieve just educational provision for disabled children? In this 
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alternative interpretation, far from representing injustice, continued special school 
provision could, arguably, represent the material enactment of one aspect of justice in 
education for some disabled children.  
This thesis is an examination of this question with particular reference to the 
New Zealand context. Intrinsic to the work is the understanding that questions of 
justice and fairness in educational provision for disabled children are complex and 
that the issue of location, or more specifically the role of special schools, explored 
herein constitutes only one aspect of that complexity. However while it may be only 
one aspect of the issue, it is an aspect that is pivotal in a policy environment in which 
inclusion is the dominant paradigm with respect to just educational provision for 
disabled children.  
The Context of the Argument   
The argument presented in the thesis is grounded on policy and practice in relation to 
inclusive education and special schools in New Zealand, particularly in the period 
1989-2005. It is this that provides the real world context from which a broader 
philosophical examination of issues of justice and the question of location emanate.   
Special Education 2000 (SE2000) was introduced in 1996 with the stated aim of 
achieving “over the next decade, a world class inclusive education system” (Ministry 
of Education, 1996, p. 5). In stating a goal of achieving a “world class inclusive 
education system”, SE2000 articulated a particular position and policy intention under 
which special school provision was problematic. For at that time, a common 
understanding of inclusion  was the idea of “every student accessing the curriculum as 
a fulltime member of an ordinary classroom alongside other students of a similar 
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chronological age” (Ballard, 1996. p.33). By implication at least then a world class 
inclusive education system could be understood to mean an education system in 
which there would be no place for special schools. From a practical perspective, if the 
policy intention is that all children should attend regular state primary or secondary 
schools then the presence of special schools provides a state-funded alternative that 
contradicts and undermines that intention. From a philosophical perspective, if 
inclusion, defined as “all children attending, local, regular, state primary or secondary 
schools” is the driving philosophy of the policy then the presence of special schools 
runs counter to that. Viewed from either perspective, in a policy context that has 
affirmed inclusive education as its goal, special school provision is an anachronism; a 
veritable spanner in the works.    
Regardless of the move to inclusion signalled in SE2000, special school 
provision maintained a place in the New Zealand system as many parents of disabled 
children continued to opt for special school provision for their sons and daughters. 
The resilience of this type of provision suggests that there is a tension between the 
policy direction as defined in SE2000 and the application of that in practice.  
This tension reflects wider debates and controversies about the education of disabled 
children and the different discourses, ideologies and philosophical views about what 
constitutes just educational provision for these children. It also reflects the dilemmas 
that occur when a policy for all is applied to meet individual difference. 
Thinking Philosophically: A Response to Puzzlement  
Thinking philosophically often begins with puzzlement… It requires 
further explanation, often where others find no grounds for 
puzzlement.                                                            (Pring, 2015, p.14) 
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It was with just such a feeling of puzzlement as Pring describes, that my interest in the 
topic at hand was prompted. I was puzzled by the divergence between my observation 
and experience of the special school sector and the criticism of this sector in academic 
and other commentary. I was puzzled by the way in which the bureaucratic sector 
seemed intent on restricting special school provision when many families valued it. I 
was puzzled by what seemed to be the unquestioning belief that the local common 
school was the best place for all children to receive their education when it was 
patently obvious that this was not true. But most of all, I was puzzled by the lack of 
attention to what seemed to me to be the unjust situation in which New Zealand 
special school communities found themselves in the wake of the introduction of 
SE2000 and the move to inclusive education as the policy goal. So I began, then, 
thinking and puzzling philosophically and sought “further explanation” of a situation 
about which it seemed, in New Zealand at least, few others found “grounds for 
puzzlement”.   
Carr (2001) suggests that “ethical and philosophical analysis emerges as the 
key tool for understanding and clarifying educational questions” (p.472). This view 
seems particularly apposite to this study which both explores issues that are inherently 
ethical and philosophical and also “examines the values, assumptions and social 
theories underpinning the policy process” (Codd, 1995, p.449 as cited in McLaughlin, 
2000). But as Ball (1990) points out, “values do not float free of their social context” 
(p.3). So in this thesis, in what Pring describes as “that ‘struggle to make sense’ ” 
(p.206) of the situation, I draw on a melding of approaches, that includes both 
philosophical and historical perspectives and some policy analysis, in order to throw 
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light on the “many complex and interrelated factors and influences” (McLaughlin, 
2008, p.14) that make up and define the context for the concerns addressed here.  
Ozga (2000) argues that “the study of history of education policy ” is 
important so as to understand “how patterns of educational provision established in 
the past remain as factors influencing the shape of current policies ”(p.12). Dyson 
(2001) similarly argues for the value of an historical focus when examining the field 
of special education:    
The past is not simply a failed precursor of the present; neither is the 
present simply a recycling of the failure of the past. Instead, the past 
is a time in which our counterparts – and ourselves in our earlier 
incarnations – have faced and responded to precisely the same 
dilemmas and contradictions which we face now. There are, 
therefore, things which we can learn from the past.                  (p.24) 
A historical focus forms part of this study which not only examines the position of 
special schools within the recent educational policy context but also explores the 
history of the development of inclusive education policy in New Zealand and, more 
specifically, the development of SE2000 and its impact on special schools. This 
historical examination of the development of inclusive education policy in New 
Zealand provides for a deeper understanding of the factors that influenced the shape 
of SE2000 and affected the approach to special school provision in the policy. As 
Taylor, Rizvi, Lingard, and Henry (1997) point out, analysis of policy requires a 
broad view:	  
If the values of justice and participation are central to education, 
then critical policy analysis must pay attention not only to the 
content of the policy but also to the processes of policy development 
and implementation. In relation to the processes of policy making, 
we need to observe politics in action, tracing how economic and 
social forces, institutions, people, interests, events and chance 
interact. Issues of power and interests need to be investigated. (p.19) 
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Codd (1987) suggests that “rationales for policy and practice in special education 
must incorporate critical perspectives drawn from such disciplines as philosophy, 
sociology and history” ( p.71). This study draws on critical perspectives from such 
disciplines to examine inclusive and special education policies and practices. The 
special school sector provides a “critical case” through which to examine the 
development of concepts and policies of inclusion in the New Zealand educational 
context, and in turn the New Zealand education policy context provides a critical case 
through which to examine and interrogate conceptions of justice underpinning the 
philosophy of inclusion. 
Special School Provision: A Critical Case 
Evans and Vincent (1997) argue that “special education should not be perceived as 
something closed off and apart from the rest of educational policy-making, but rather 
as a critical case, a particularly informative lens through which to examine changes in 
the education system as a whole” (Evans & Vincent, 1997, p. 102). It could be 
similarly argued that special schools “should not be perceived as something closed off 
and apart from” special education-policymaking; in this thesis the special school 
sector provides “a critical case, a particularly informative lens through which to 
examine” inclusive/ special education policy and provision and the discourse, theories 
and philosophical principles underpinning the policy. 
 As noted previously, special school provision forms part of many, if not most, 
education systems in countries similar to New Zealand. Mitchell (2010) suggests that 
internationally the percentage of children in special schools ranges between 0.5-6.0% 
although he puts a caveat on that figure given different classifications of special needs 
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employed by individual countries. D’Alessio and Watkins (2009) cite comparable 
figures that they suggest have remained relatively constant over time, however they, 
like Mitchell, warn that there may be some distortions in the data used to make 
comparisons across countries. In New Zealand, special schools serve a very small part 
of the school population, approximately 1%. The type of educational provision made 
for disabled and other children with special needs and the way in which these are 
allocated reflect, as Cline and Frederickson (2014) point out, particular “traditions of 
education in a society”, and the social and cultural contexts of different countries. 
Thus the nature of special school provision varies across different jurisdictions as 
does the demographic of the children served by these schools. Some schools are 
residential, some non-residential. Some are targeted to particular groups of children 
such as those who are Deaf or Hearing Impaired, those on the Autism Spectrum or 
those with behavioural challenges, while others are more catholic in their 
demographic. In many countries there is a mixture of state and non-state funded 
schools. Access to these schools is also differently managed in different jurisdictions. 
In New Zealand for example, enrolment in a special school requires that the 
parents/whanau of the child actively seek that option whereas in some other 
jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, enrolment in a special school occurs as the 
result of a direction by an education authority on the basis of some broader 
assessment of eligibility for special education support.  
New Zealand Special Schools  
New Zealand has twenty-eight state-funded, non-residential special schools. The 
population of these schools is largely made up of children who have complex multiple 
needs with intellectual and physical impairment; these are children who are described 
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as having high or very high needs for educational support under the categorisation 
system used. There is quite considerable variation among the twenty-eight schools 
both in terms of their size and the way they operate. School rolls range from under 
twenty students to over 150. Some schools consist of a single school facility, while 
others have a base facility and additional classes, known as “satellite units”, which are 
located at local regular schools but are managed, governed and staffed by the special 
school. In addition some schools provide an itinerant service that supports eligible 
students and their teachers in local school settings. New Zealand special schools are 
funded and governed in essentially the same way as any other state-funded school and 
are subject to the same legislative and regulatory requirements in relation to 
curriculum, organisation and management. The schools have an elected Board of 
Trustees comprised of parent representatives, the school principal, and an elected staff 
representative and, in some cases, an elected student representative. Under this system 
the board acts as the governing body while the principal is seen as the executive 
manager and is responsible for the day-to-day management of the school. Staffing and 
management within these schools are determined on the basis of student roll numbers 
as in all other state-funded schools and, as with other state-funded schools, the general 
running costs of the schools are funded by the Ministry of Education through 
“operational funding” (McMenamin, 2008). One notable area of difference between 
special schools and other stated-funded schools is in the process for enrolment. While 
the decision to opt for a special school setting in the New Zealand context rests, in the 
majority of cases, with parents, actual enrolment is contingent on the approval of the 
Ministry of Education; this is not the case for enrolment in other state-funded schools 
(McMenamin, 2008, 2011).  
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The special school sector is an under researched area in New Zealand. I was 
able to locate only two studies (Gasson, 2008; Pickering & Wilton, 1996) that 
specifically examine special school provision in New Zealand. Pickering and Wilton 
(1996) conducted what was essentially a demographic survey of a number of 
residential and non-residential special schools. This project was commissioned by the 
Boards of Trustees of twenty-nine Special Schools through the agency of the New 
Zealand Special Schools Principals’ Association and, as might be expected, the 
project was generally favourable to special school provision. The authors make the 
point that much of the debate about inclusion versus segregation had, at that time, 
happened at an “academic level with the protagonists arguing various ideological 
positions” (p.26). In an insight into how times and attitudes have changed, Pickering 
and Wilton assert that “a case of some substance would need to be argued” to remove 
special school provision and they further suggested that “it is doubtful if such a case 
could be mounted” (p.26). 
Gasson (2008) examined the views and perspectives of parents of children 
enrolled in one small New Zealand special school. She was interested in exploring the 
reasons why the families had enrolled their children at that particular special school 
and why they supported special school provision. She also examined the question of 
“whether, and to what extent, inclusion has, or could, evolve to meet the needs of the 
families investigated in this study” (p.124). Gasson’s findings reflected those reported 
by Pickering and Wilton; parents’ reasons and support for special schooling were very 
much located in their concern for the needs of their child or children and their views 
about the quality of special school provision. Gasson reported that while the parents 
understood and accepted inclusive education as “an ideal” (p.123), they were adamant 
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that special school provision was necessary as an option and alternative for some 
children and families. These two studies appear to constitute the complete body of 
work that specifically examines special school provision in New Zealand thus 
confirming the point noted by MacArthur, Kelly, and Higgins (2005, p.51), that “there 
is … an imbalance in the research literature” with respect to this sector.  
The limited research attention in New Zealand to the special school sector 
generally is paralled in relation to the more specific issue of special school provision 
in the inclusive policy context. Research or commentary that examines this question 
explicitly is conspicuous by its relative absence. What attention there is to the issue 
can be found in literature examining and critiquing inclusive education policy and 
practices more broadly. Among this New Zealand work, the references to special 
schools are largely implicit rather than overtly stated and are to be found couched in 
debates that refer to exclusion and segregation as a counterpoint to inclusion. 
References to special school provision are made within the context of critique of New 
Zealand’s progress towards inclusion and tend to be made to support arguments 
concerning the failure of special education policies to achieve that ideal (Higgins, 
MacArthur, & Morton, 2007; Inclusive Education Action Group, 2012; IHC, 2009; 
Kearney & Kane, 2006; MacArthur, 2009; Matthews, 2009; Wills, 2006) rather than 
specifically examining the question of special school provision. Among this work the 
prevailing view would appear to be that special schools should not and, in fact, cannot 
be part of an “inclusive” education system (Gordon & Morton, 2008; Higgins et al., 
2007; IHC, 2009; Kearney & Kane, 2006; MacArthur, 2009). There appear to be no 
studies that argue a position in support of special school provision. Nor does there 
appear to be any that examine the question from a critical perspective other than that 
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described above or that suggests that there is anything to debate at all in respect of 
special school provision.  
Special Schools: At the Nub of the Controversy  
Nonetheless, although not widely researched or examined in New Zealand, special 
school provision is arguably at the nub of much controversy to do with inclusion.  
Baker (2007) makes the very pertinent and succinct point that “any examination of 
policies relating to the future role of special schools inevitably and directly involves 
some debate and discourse on special educational needs in general and inclusion in 
particular” (p.73). The converse similarly applies; any examination relating to 
inclusion  “inevitably and directly involves some debate” either implicit or explicit on 
special school provision particularly where special school provision is seen as a proxy 
for exclusion.  
Thus, in contrast to the relative silence in the New Zealand context around 
questions concerning special school provision and inclusion, in other jurisdictions 
such as the United Kingdom and Australia the question of the position and role of 
special schooling is in itself significant and is also part of a much broader and more 
extensive debate about exclusion, inclusion and special education(Allan & Brown, 
2001; Forbes, 2007; Head & Pirrie, 2007; Hunter & O'Connor, 2006; Lindsay, 2003; 
Norwich, 2008; Norwich & Gray, 2007). In some quarters there is a clear and strongly 
held view that special schools have a position within an inclusive education system 
(Cigman, 2007a; Croll & Moses, 2000; Head & Pirrie, 2007; Hornby, 1999; Hunter & 
O'Connor, 2006; Lindsay, 2003; Lindsay & Dockrell, 2004; Norwich, 2008; Norwich 
& Gray, 2007; Pirrie & Head, 2007). In other quarters the contrary view that these 
schools should not be part of an inclusive education system prevails and the argument 
 15 
made that their presence represents the failure of inclusive education policies (Dyson, 
2001; Slee, 2006, 2009; Slee & Allan, 2001). In the work that explores special school 
provision from a sympathetic perspective there are some themes that have particular 
pertinence to the matter explored in this thesis: the uncomfortable and difficult 
position of special schools in the inclusive policy context; the changing role of special 
schools; the impact of inclusive education policy and the role of the bureaucratic 
sector.   
Norwich and Gray (2007) report that the move towards inclusion in England 
left special schools feeling that they “were being ‘excluded’ from developments and 
undervalued in a system that exhorted inclusion”(p.87). They suggest that the position 
of special schools “remains confused” (p.87). Allan and Brown (2001) similarly 
describe how “special schools have often been ignored or denigrated but there is little 
understanding of what they do in practice” (p.199). These authors report that the 
special schools had undergone a transformation and that the pupils’ experiences of 
schooling “were characterised by achievements, progress and independence rather 
than isolation and depression” (p.206). This notion of the schools having undergone a 
transformation corresponds to Wylie’s (2000) description of the revival of special 
schools in New Zealand in the years following the introduction of SE2000. Allan and 
Brown argue that special schools need to be brought into the inclusion debate, and 
suggest that there should be less preoccupation with where pupils learn, and more 
with what they learn and achieve. 
Head and Pirrie (2007) address the question of the “place of special schools in 
a policy climate of inclusion” (p.90). In their study they report the results of an 
evaluation of the impact of the “presumption of mainstreaming” on special schools. 
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They had hypothesised that the inclusion policy would lead over time to a decrease in 
special school enrolment but they found that this was not the case. This finding 
concurs with the experience in New Zealand after the introduction of SE2000 when 
special schools’ rolls grew. Head and Pirrie also report changes in the nature of the 
special school population and an increase in the range and complexity of needs that 
the schools were addressing. Their findings, they suggest, indicate that the role of 
special schools could be changing but they do not indicate exactly what they mean by 
this. They also assert that there is a clear role for special schools in the provision of 
advice and guidance to regular schools that are supporting children with an 
increasingly diverse range of needs.  
Forbes (2007) sets out the views of the Australian Special Education 
Principals’ Association(ASEPA) on inclusion. She reports that ASEPA supported 
special school provision and held the view that “some students’ needs are not best 
served in mainstream schools” (p. 68). Forbes’ perspective, with respect to the matter, 
is that an inclusive school is one in which the learning of all students is valued. She 
argues that special schools can be inclusive in nature and are “schools not ‘institutions’ 
in a Goffmanesque fashion” (p.68). Forbes supports the position that “inclusion 
should mean being involved in a common enterprise of learning, rather than being 
necessarily under the same roof” (p.68), and sees special schools as being part of a 
continuum of services. She argues that parents should have the right to choose the 
most appropriate education for their children and that special school provision should 
be an available choice.  
Croll and Moses (2000) examined local policymaking in England with respect 
to special schools through the 1980s and 1990s. They describe “the sharp contrast 
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between a prevalent set of policy proposals and educational and social ideals which 
support the inclusion of all students in mainstream schools, and the continued 
maintenance, and in some cases, expansion, of segregated special school provision” 
(p.178); they note that special school provision has proved resilient in the face of 
moves to inclusion. The features described by Croll and Moses resonate with those 
demonstrated in the New Zealand context during the period studied in this thesis. 
Baker (2007) examines the implication of the British Government’s strategy 
for special education needs for the special school sector. He notes that while the 
strategy explicitly referred to the need to support parents seeking regular school 
enrolment for their child, there was no mention of any similar such support for parents 
seeking a special school enrolment. Baker also reports that the “policy document 
affirms without equivocation that ‘a small number of children have such severe and 
complex needs that they will continue to require special provision’…” and that “… 
‘successful special schools have an important contribution to make in preparing 
mainstream schools to support their inclusion’...”(p.75). As shall be discussed in more 
detail later there was no such similar affirmation of special school provision in 
SE2000.   
Redressing the Imbalance 
Gallagher (2007) has described “the conflict over ‘place’ or where students 
understood to have disabilities or ‘special needs’ should receive instruction” as the 
“possibly most discordant of all” debates in special education, and yet this issue has 
not attracted any significant and careful debate or examination in the New Zealand 
context. Issues and matters of concern such as those identified in the research reported 
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above can similarly be found in the New Zealand context, but curiously there is no 
work that debates or addresses these concerns. The one-sided nature of the debate and 
the relative silence in relation to special school provision in this country are curious 
and raise the question as to why it should be thus. What has happened to the voices of 
those who dissent from the view espoused under the policy of inclusion? The 
continued enrolment of children in special schools would suggest that there are 
divergent opinions in New Zealand even if these voices are somewhat muted. 
Whatever the reason for the lack of attention in the New Zealand context, the issue 
raised in this thesis is one worthy of consideration and this study will go some small 
way towards redressing the current imbalance in the New Zealand literature.  
Matters of Terminology  
Inclusion  
The term inclusion as it is used in this thesis refers to an understanding of inclusion 
that aligns with Ballard’s (1996) definition of inclusion as the situation in which every 
student accesses “the curriculum as a fulltime member of an ordinary classroom 
alongside other students of a similar chronological age” (Ballard, 1996. p.33). I refer 
to this concept as universal inclusion or inclusion but with the caveat that this use of 
the term reflects a particular concept of inclusion pertinent to this study and is not 
intended to reflect, represent or deny broader conceptions concerned with the reform 
and “transformation of entire educational systems” (Artiles, Kozleski, Dorn, & 
Christensen, p.65) which can also be denoted by the word inclusion.  
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Disabled Children and Young People 
In this thesis the term disabled children and young people refers to those children and 
young people around whom the matters discussed are centred. The form of the term 
used here follows the convention assumed in the New Zealand Disability Strategy 
(2001) and is the form preferred by the New Zealand Disabled Persons’ Assembly. In 
this thesis the term refers specifically to persons of school age, that is aged between  
5-19 years who have complex multiple needs with intellectual and physical 
impairment and who are described in some contexts as people with profound and 
multiple learning disabilities. In the New Zealand educational context these children 
and young people are described as having “high” or “very high” needs for educational 
support. Examples given by the Ministry of Education (MOE) (2015) of the type of 
characteristics that might be seen in children and young people with high or very high 
needs include, “extremely delayed cognitive development”; “extreme physical 
disabilities” and fragility; “difficulties with eating, speaking and swallowing”; unable 
on their own to “move, change position, sit, eat, dress, grasp or release or manipulate 
objects”; “extremely unusual and inappropriate” ways of communicating and 
interacting socially and “extreme difficulties” in these areas; and some “rigid, 
repetitive behaviours that appear to be meaningless” (MOE 2015). Kittay (2005), in 
her description of her daughter Sesha, provides an alternative way to look at the 
characteristics of such children and young people that powerfully draws our attention 
to qualities that are overlooked in the characteristics outlined above. She describes 
Sesha as:  
an individual whose rational capacities are difficult to determine 
because she lacks speech but who has the capacity to enjoy life, to 
share her joy through her smiles and laughter, to embrace those who 
show her love and care, and to bring joy to all whose lives she 
touches — an individual who, through her warmth, her serene and 
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harmonious spirit, and her infectious love of life enriches the lives 
of others and who has never acted maliciously or tried to harm 
anyone. Whether or not she would know what it means to determine 
her own good may be in doubt, but the good she brings into the 
world is not.                                                                              (p.123)  
Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of an examination in which matters of both a philosophical and 
practical nature are intertwined, and together inform and illuminate the argument 
presented. This is reflected in the broad shape and structure of the thesis in which the 
discussion moves from the examination of practical matters to more philosophical and 
theoretical concerns and back again both within and across chapters. Chapter One 
provides the background to both the philosophical and practical concerns of the thesis. 
Chapters Two and Three are predominantly theoretical and philosophical in nature 
and establish the theoretical and philosophical position that underpins the argument 
and discussion in the thesis. Chapters Four to Six address matters to do with the real 
world context of the turn to inclusion in New Zealand and the experiences of the 
special school sector. These chapters examine the practical realities and provide an 
analysis from both a historical and a philosophical perspective. In the light of the 
discussion and analysis of the preceding three chapters, Chapter Seven returns to a 
more theoretical and philosophical examination of the matters of concern and presents 
an argument with respect to these that reflects insights from both philosophical and 
practical perspectives. Chapter Eight proposes conclusions drawn from the study 
overall. 
The thesis proceeds in the following way. This chapter has provided an 
introduction and background to the question that is at the core of the work and to the 
scope of the discussion. Chapter Two discusses and analyses the development of 
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inclusion. It examines the theories and principles that underpin the concept of 
inclusion, its development as a pervasive principle in education policy internationally 
and its position with respect to special schools. The discussion of inclusion is 
included in an early chapter of the thesis because an understanding of both the 
complexity of the concept and the development of it as a movement are fundamental 
to an understanding of the core argument presented in this work. Chapter Three sets 
out the theoretical perspective from which the argument proceeds. The case is made 
that the question pursued in this thesis is one that lends itself to analysis of a 
philosophical kind and a critique of universal inclusion is proposed and defended. 
Chapters Four, Five and Six turn to an exposition of the more practical subject of the 
move to inclusion in the New Zealand policy context. Chapter Four presents a brief 
historical description of the New Zealand context as regards the education of disabled 
children and young people before chronicling the turn to inclusion in New Zealand’s 
education policy during the 1980s and 1990s. Chapter Five centres on the policy 
SE2000 itself, and includes a brief description of relevant features of the structure and 
framework of the policy. The major focus of the chapter is the examination and 
critique of the policy particularly with reference to the factors in the policy context 
that shaped and influenced it and to the matter of special school provision. In this 
chapter the argument is developed and defended that injustice and unfairness were 
inherent to the policy. Chapter Six is concerned with the experiences of the special 
school sector in the inclusive education policy environment during the early years of 
the implementation of SE2000. The first part of the chapter sets out a detailed 
description and analysis of the impact of SE2000 on special schools and the changes 
and challenges that resulted. The second part of the chapter turns to an exposition and 
critique of the impact of the policy on the special school sector drawing on Young’s 
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(1990) analysis of justice and oppression. Chapter Seven returns to the question of 
what might constitute just educational provision for disabled children and their 
families and how this might be understood. This chapter proposes and defends the 
argument that special school provision can contribute to a state of affairs and 
educational arrangements that are just for all disabled children. Chapter Eight draws 
the threads of the thesis together. In this final chapter, some tentative conclusions are 
drawn and attention brought back to the real matter of concern, that is, the children 
themselves.  
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Chapter Two  
Inclusion  
Inclusion is a concept that has been the subject of continuing inquiry, analysis and 
theorising. In relation to education, the concept has multiple meanings, interpretations 
and concerns. Research and theorising in the field of inclusion and inclusive 
education can variously pertain, among other things, to the education of disabled 
children in their local school, particular school and classroom practices, policy 
developments, or transformative and radical educational reform. Inclusion is then a 
large area. Given the constraints of space this work cannot encompass all the broad 
expanse that is inclusion. Accordingly, the focus here is on those matters and aspects 
that have particular relevance to the issue of education provision for disabled children 
and special schools. The chapter begins by describing the development of the concept 
and the theories and principles inherent to it including the critique of special 
schooling and special education more generally. Following this, the expansion of the 
concept as the dominant orthodoxy and principle with respect to the education is 
outlined. The focus of the final section of the chapter is an examination of the debates 
and controversy in relation to inclusion and its instantiation in policy. 
Theories and Principles 
Inclusion/inclusive education developed as a response to perceived injustices and 
inadequacies stemming from the way in which the education of disabled children and 
young people and others was organised and delivered under the banner of special 
education in many Western countries (Armstrong, Armstrong, & Spandegou, 2010; 
Jenkinson, 1997; Slee 2005). Growing out of the civil rights movements of the 1960s 
(Hodkinson, 2010) and the movement for disability rights into the 1970s (Thomas, 
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Walker, & Webb, 2005) and distilled through ideas such as mainstreaming and 
integration, the theories underpinning inclusion were strongly influenced and 
informed by the views and critiques of the disabled people’s movement and the 
burgeoning disability studies movement (Armstrong, Armstrong, & Spandegou, 2010). 
During the 1970s and 1980s disability activists and scholars reconceptualised the 
notion of disability and drew “crucially… an important distinction between 
impairment and disability” (Hodkinson & Vickerman, 2009, p. 38). Key to this 
distinction was the understanding or view that disability was not a characteristic 
inherent to an individual but rather that individuals who had impairments were 
disabled and experienced disability as a consequence of social attitudes and actions 
that isolated them and restricted their full participation in society. This conception of 
disability as something created and constructed by social attitudes and arrangements, 
known as the “social model of disability”, informed and underpinned inclusion (Slee, 
2005).  
The social model was set in contrast to the “medical model of disability” 
which, it was argued, underpinned special education practices and policies, and 
conceived of disability as an individual issue and as something located within an 
individual; a deficit caused by or synonymous with impairment. Slee (2005) describes 
what he calls the “epistemological incubus” for inclusive education, as being “formed 
from the work of sociologists and disability studies scholars and activists” who,  
“collectively challenged the conceptual foundations of a defectiveness-based medical 
model upon which special education was built and practised” (p.146).  
Coming as a rejection of traditional special education discursive 
practices and a struggle to insert the social model of disability 
(Tomlinson, 1982; Barton, 1987; Oliver, 1990) into new accounts of 
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educational failure and disablement, inclusive education provided a 
bridge to the growing critical sociology of schooling. (Slee, 2005, p. 141) 
 Inclusion represented a critique of earlier policies and practices of “mainstreaming” 
and “integration” which, it was claimed, failed to address the inherent flaws in special 
education thinking and practices and simply constituted the transference of these to 
mainstream settings. Inclusion, it was argued, differed from mainstreaming or 
integration in its assertion of the fundamental and absolute right of disabled children 
and young people to belong unconditionally in regular schools (Antia, Stinson, & 
Gaustad, 2002; Thomas, Walker, & Webb, 2005), in its rejection of special education 
and in its focus on the removal or at least severe attenuation of any form of separate 
provision for disabled children and young people (Dyson, 1999; Jenkinson, 1997; 
Thomas, Walker, & Webb, 2005). From this perspective the onus was on schools and 
school systems to make changes so as to meet the needs of all the children 
irrespective of their particular personal attributes (Clark, Dyson, Millward, & Robson, 
1999; Pijl, Meijer, & Hegarty, 1997; Thomas, Walker, & Webb, 2005). As Thomas, 
Walker, and Webb (2005) put it, the “new notion central to inclusion is that 
exceptional students belong in the mainstream”(p. 22). Admission and attendance in 
the local regular school was seen as an inalienable right not as something dependent 
on the child attaining some prerequisite standard of acceptability. These views were 
based on a strong moral conviction that grew out of the rights agenda and reflected 
the demands of disabled people for equal rights and recognition in society more 
widely (Florian, 2005). A key aspect of this perspective is that it turned away from the 
notion that disabled children needed to be integrated and become like others. As 
Barton (1999) explained, “inclusive education is not integration and it is not 
concerned with the assimilation or accommodation of discriminated groups or 
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individuals… It is not about making people as normal as possible” (p.58). Rather, it 
was claimed, inclusion espoused recognition, acceptance and celebration of human 
difference (Corbett, 2000; Florian, 2005).  
A Slippery Concept 
From its very beginning, both semantically and conceptually, inclusion was a 
“slippery” concept (Booth, 1995, Topping & Maloney, 2005) characterised by 
confusion and, some argued, “delusion” (Hornby,1999). So while inclusion/inclusive 
education may have become a dominant ideology or orthodoxy in educational 
thinking (Hodkinson & Vikerman, 2009; Winzer, 2007) and a moral imperative in 
education policy, an agreed understanding of these terms was, and remains, elusive 
(Ballard, 2004; Lindsay, 2003; Slee, 1999).  
According to Dyson, there were (1999) different views and understandings of 
the concept of inclusion even among its proponents. These differences were evident in 
the international agreement known as the Salamanca Statement which Dyson claims 
was a “deeply ambiguous document”(p. 36) that “reflected underlying ambiguities 
within the inclusion movement” itself (p. 38). Mitchell (2005) describes inclusive 
education as “a site of conflicting paradigms that centre on two different 
conceptualisation of special needs: (a) a psycho-medical model and (b) a socio-
political model”(p. 6). The theme of conflict is also noted by Lindsay (2003) who 
describes inclusion as a “complex and contested concept’ whose “manifestations in 
practice are many and various” (p. 3), and Norwich (2008), who explains that there 
are “different and sometimes conflicting notions” (p. 137) of the concept.  
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Artiles and Dyson (2005) also identify the eclectic nature of the concept and 
suggest that inclusion “means different things in different systemic, socio-economic 
and cultural concepts” (p.43). Slee (1999) describes inclusive education as a “broad 
church of social theory and educational policy interest” (p.195) and argues that it is “a 
reaction against educational discourses that exclude on the basis of a range of student 
characteristics including class, race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexuality, perceived 
level of ability or disability, or age” (p.195). Booth (1999), in his definition, similarly 
refers to exclusion which he considers is inextricably linked to inclusion; he also 
introduces the idea of inclusion as a process. Inclusive education is thus defined as  
“the process of increasing the participation of learners within and reducing their 
exclusion from the cultures, curricula and communities of neighbourhood centres of 
learning” (Booth, 1999, p. 77). Mitchell (2001) sidesteps the issue of location by 
siting his conception of inclusion within the context of schools rather than education 
systems. He proposes that there is a common understanding of inclusion that 
encompasses a wide set of characteristics so that inclusion is: 
commonly taken to mean that schools: (i) accept the rights of all 
students to enrol and receive education, to be treated with respect, to 
have dignity and independence, to have access to a fair share of 
available general and special education resources and not to be 
directly or indirect discriminated against; (ii) reduce barriers to 
learning; (iii) have a philosophy of providing education for all 
students, including those with special educational needs; (iv) 
recognise and respond to the diversity of their populations; (v) 
accommodate to students’ different styles and rates of learning;(vi) 
ensure equality of educational opportunity through appropriate 
curriculum, school organisation, use of resources and partnerships 
with their communities.                                                           (p. 330) 
Although this definition is particularly focused on inclusion within the context of its 
application at the school level, the expansive nature of what Mitchell suggests is 
“commonly” understood, indicates some of the breadth and multiplicity of the aspects 
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of education in which inclusion was implicated, and the ambit of its potential 
influence. At the same time it suggests that the concept was in some senses a catch-all 
within which to contain everything that should or could be thought to be necessary to 
achieve the best for all children in terms of their education. 
Inclusion or Inclusions?  
Dyson (1999) moves away from the search for a unifying concept of inclusion and 
suggests that given the “significant ambiguities in the concept of inclusion itself… it 
makes sense to talk about different inclusions” (p. 36). Dyson’s explication of this 
idea of “different ‘inclusions’ ” (p. 36), and his analysis of the ambiguities of 
inclusion provide a useful insight into the complexity of the concept and the theories, 
discourses, and principles that underpin it, and into the tensions and confusions that 
abound in relation to it. Dyson describes two intersecting “dimensions” of inclusion, 
the rationale dimension and the realisation dimension. He makes a distinction 
between rationales for inclusion that are based on discourses to do with efficacy, and 
those based on discourses to do with rights and ethics. The rationale for inclusion 
under the efficacy discourse, he suggests, is based on claims about the comparative 
effectiveness of special education practices in terms of specialised teaching, separate 
provision and financial efficiency. But the rationale for inclusion under the rights and 
ethics discourse is, he argues, based on a strong moral conviction about the “rights of 
children to ‘an education’ ” (p.39) which is “supported by a critical analysis of 
traditional (i.e. segregated) forms of special education” (p. 39). The assertion that 
special education, rather than working for the benefit of disabled children, works to 
marginalise those children and to maintain the privilege and power of special 
education professionals and experts is characteristic of this discourse. From this it 
 29 
follows that issues concerned with special education provision are “inseparable from 
issues of rights and justice” as special education by definition must result in 
marginalisation of the child.  
Similar complexity can be found in what Dyson terms the “realisation” 
dimension which he describes as including a political discourse and a pragmatic 
discourse. The political discourse is framed around the notion of “struggle”, 
conceived according to Dyson, as a “Manichaean one between the forces of exclusion 
and the forces of inclusion” (p.42). The pragmatic discourse is concerned with the 
shape and form of inclusive education, how it can be achieved in practical terms and 
what defines the characteristics of inclusive pedagogies and schools. What are 
particularly pertinent to the discussion and argument here are the aspects pertaining to 
what Dyson calls the “discourses of rights and ethics” and the “discourse of politics” 
These, as he describes them, are consistent in their antipathy to “segregationist 
practices” and similar in their conception of separate schooling as the epitome of 
exclusion so that “maintaining segregated special schooling is incompatible with the 
establishment of an equitable education system” (p.40). While there may have been 
ambiguities in the concept of inclusion, the core belief that defined special schooling 
as the very face of exclusion was a consistent feature of what Dyson refers to as the 
“inclusion movement”. 
Inclusion as Critique: The Positioning of Special Schools  
The ideas from which inclusion emanated were thus concerned with justice, human 
rights and ethics, and with changing structures and practices that were seen as barriers 
to the participation of disabled people in education and in society more broadly 
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(Barton, 1999). Included among these ideas were trenchant criticisms and the 
rejection of policies and practices of special education (Armstrong, Armstrong, & 
Spangadou, 2010; Slee, 1999; Slee, 2005) and of the discourse of “special educational 
needs”. Special educational needs was described as both a “euphemism for the failure 
of schooling to meet the needs of all children” (Barton 1987, as cited in Slee & Allan, 
2001) and “as a categorical status signifying deficit and failure in students, directing 
attention away from problems in teaching and school organization” (Fulcher as cited 
in Slee & Allan, 2001, p. 169). Fundamental to this perspective is the tenet that 
special education acts as a form of social control used for the management of disabled 
and troublesome pupils; thus it is argued that while “ the rhetoric of special needs may 
be humanitarian the practice is control and vested interests” (Tomlinson, 1982, p. 75). 
Claims that “special education professionals act on their own rather than their ‘clients’ 
interests” and that special education was  “a mechanism whereby some groups 
exercise power over others” (Dyson & Millward, 2000 p. 22) were typical of some of 
the criticisms that were being made at that time. From this perspective, special 
provision of any sort is, of course, seen as contrary to the principles of inclusion and 
constituted as a form of exclusion; it follows that special school provision was seen as 
representing the most extreme example of this (Barton, 1999; Enslin & Hedge, 2010; 
Tomlinson, 1982).  
In a context in which policies and practices that promoted separation were 
being questioned by the disabled people’s movement (Armstrong, Armstrong, & 
Spangadou, 2010, p. 6), special school provision was challenged on the basis that it 
was implicated in prejudice and discrimination against disabled people more widely 
and could, “be seen as representing the disabling barriers within a society” (Barton, 
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1999, p. 59). Special school provision became the target of much derision and 
vehement criticism from those committed to achieving full inclusion and was seen to 
stand for everything that was wrong with special education. Special schools were 
characterised as institutions of incarceration and any role for this type of provision 
was unequivocally rejected: “The twenty-first century will see the struggle of disabled 
people go from strength to strength. In such a struggle, special segregated education 
has no role to play” (Oliver, 2009, p.281). While special school provision did endure 
into the twentieth century, the ideal of universal inclusion in which special schools 
would have no place gained strength during the 1990s and was widely adopted in the 
policy arena to which I now turn. 
Inclusion: A Pervasive Policy Principle 
When the New Zealand government announced the goal of “achieving over the next 
decade, a world class inclusive education system” (Ministry of Education, 1996, p. 3), 
it signalled that New Zealand had joined many other similar countries, such as the 
United Kingdom and Australia, in espousing inclusion as the guiding policy principle 
in relation to the education of disabled children and young people. During the latter 
part of the twentieth century, the concept of inclusion proved to be an irresistible 
force. Inclusion was a significant influence on education policy in many national 
jurisdictions and a growing agenda in the international context. This influence 
reflected the growing international concern with and awareness of the rights of 
disabled people in society more generally and growing pressure from the disabled 
community, and some parents, educators and scholars for the full inclusion of all 
disabled children in local neighbourhood schools (Artiles, Kozleski, Dorn, & 
Christensen, 2006).  
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The second half of the twentieth century saw the proclamation of a number of 
key United Nations declarations and conventions focused on the rights of children and 
disabled people that laid what were, arguably, important foundations for the 
movement towards inclusion in the international policy context. The following were 
of particular significance: the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Persons with 
Mental Retardation (1971), the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons (1975), 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) the World 
Declaration on Education for All (1990) and UN Standard Rules on the Equalisation 
of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (1993). While these documents were 
different in their focus and tenor, they all put human rights and the rights agenda with 
respect to disabled people and children clearly to the fore. Though not all were legally 
binding they were, as Mittler (2005) explains, “useful as a catalyst for the 
development of national policies and have provided a global framework for the local 
advocacy and lobbying” (p.23); certainly this proved to be the case with respect to 
education policy and to the rights of children worldwide, disabled or not, to education.  
During this period, the educational rights of disabled children were the subject 
of increasingly strong attention in the policy contexts of a number of countries such as 
the United States, the United Kingdom and others (Evans & Lunt, 2002). This 
attention was gradually translated into legislation beginning with the United States 
(Evans & Lunt, 2002) in 1975, when The Education for All Handicapped Act, or 
Public Law 94-102 (PL94-120) as it was more commonly known, was signed into law 
(Winzer, 2009). This piece of legislation introduced the notion of the “least restrictive 
environment” as a requirement and “expressed a strong presumption that students 
with disabilities be placed in regular classes wherever possible” (Gartner & Lipsky, 
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2009). In 1978 the Warnock Report was published in the United Kingdom. This report 
introduced the notion of special educational needs (SEN) and recommended that a 
child’s needs “should be met through a continuum of integrated provision that would 
be mainly delivered in ordinary schools” (Hodkinson & Vickerman, 2009, p. 67).  
According to Hodkinson and Vickerman much of what was recommended in the 
Warnock Report was brought into legislation in the form of the 1981 Education Act 
which included the mandate that children with SEN should “wherever possible, be 
educated alongside their peers within mainstream educational settings” (Hodkinson & 
Vickerman, p. 68). These were significant developments in relation to the 
introduction of inclusion into the policy contexts of the United States and the United 
Kingdom and they paved the way for similar legislation in many other countries, 
including New Zealand, during the 1980s.   
Inclusion: A World Agenda 
While pressure for the inclusion of disabled children and young people in regular 
education settings had been growing through the latter part of the twentieth century 
with some legislative change achieved in a number of countries, it was the agreement 
known as the Salamanca Statement that gave inclusion its status as an international 
project and commitment. In 1994, representatives of 92 countries and 25 international 
organisations, a total of 300 people in all, formed the World Conference on Special 
Needs Education. This group which was meeting in Spain under the aegis of the 
Spanish government and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO), unanimously adopted the Salamanca Statement and 
Framework for Action on Special Needs Education (Salamanca Statement). The 
signing of this agreement, usually known simply as the Salamanca Statement, marked 
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a significant moment in time with respect to educational provision for disabled 
children and young people, and the policies and practices related to that provision. 
This document, described by Ainscow as “arguably the most significant international 
document that has ever appeared in the special needs field” (2005, p.109), set out an 
international declaration and assertion of the rights of all disabled children to be 
included in regular education and the responsibility of national governments to make 
provision for this. The statement and framework called upon and all governments to 
“adopt as a matter of law or policy the principle of inclusive education, enrolling all 
children in regular schools, unless there are compelling reasons for doing otherwise” 
(UNESCO, 1994, p. ix). The following strong assertions of both the moral and 
economic importance and value of inclusive education were also made in the 
document:  
Those with special educational needs must have access to regular 
schools which should accommodate them within a child-centred 
pedagogy capable of meeting these needs.  (p. viii),  
and  
Regular schools with this inclusive orientation are the most effective 
means of combating discriminatory attitudes, creating welcoming 
communities, building an inclusive society and achieving education 
for all; moreover, they provide an effective education to the 
majority of children and improve the efficiency and ultimately cost-
effectiveness of the entire education system.                            (p. ix) 
 
As these statements demonstrate, the Salamanca Statement proclaimed an unflinching 
commitment to inclusion and inclusive education as key to social improvement and, 
as befitted the neoliberal context of the times, supported this by asserting the 
economic benefits as well. It should be noted that the second point above contains a 
caveat in that it falls short of claiming that regular schools can provide effective 
education for all and makes that claim with reference to only the “majority of 
children”. This of course begs the question what is to happen to the rest? 
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Dyson described the Salamanca Statement as “proving extremely powerful as 
a means of stimulating educational change” (Dyson, 1999, p. 37). Certainly the 
proclamation of this international agreement was of key importance in terms of the 
movement to inclusion. Although by the 1990s a number of countries had already 
enshrined disabled children’s rights to education in legislation, the significance of the 
Salamanca Statement was that it asserted the right to education in the regular school 
and also put the issue firmly on the international agenda (Artiles & Dyson, 2005). The 
statement formalised and realised the notion of the primacy of the regular school as 
the way forward with respect to the education not only of disabled children but of all 
children, and also with respect to the realisation of an inclusive society.    
Regular schools with this inclusive orientation are the most effective 
means of combating discriminatory attitudes, creating welcoming 
communities, building an inclusive society. 
 (UNESCO, 1994, p. ix) 
From this point inclusion, understood essentially as the goal of “enrolling all children 
in regular schools” and more particularly disabled children, was in principle at least a 
moral imperative that would have to be accounted for and considered in the education 
policy agendas of countries, including New Zealand, that had signed the agreement 
and had thus agreed that:  
Educational policies at all levels, from the national to the local, 
should stipulate that a child with a disability should attend the 
neighbourhood school, that is the school that would be attended if 
the child did not have a disability.   
(UNESCO, 1994, p 17) 
By the mid 1990s then a strong turn to inclusion in the policy rhetoric both at the 
national and international levels was evident, however the concept was still 
characterised by some confusion and controversy in terms of both practice and theory. 
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Debate and Controversy 
The strength and surety of the convictions asserted in the Salamanca Statement would 
suggest that there was a common understanding and consensus globally with respect 
to inclusion and to the shape and form that inclusive education should take but this 
was not the case. Certainly in many countries the principle that all children should be 
entitled to education, and more particularly education in the regular school, had 
already been enshrined in legislation and so perhaps there was some consensus with 
respect to that aspect of inclusion. But it would be difficult to argue that there was 
consensus with respect to any understanding of what was meant by inclusion and 
inclusive education, or what they might look like in practice. Similarly it would be 
hard to argue that there was unqualified agreement with the view that special school 
provision stood in the way of achieving inclusion or with the critique of special 
education. These matters were, in many jurisdictions and within the field 
internationally, the subject of debate and argument which ranged across a number of 
areas including for example, categorisation, curriculum and, of course, location which 
is the particular focus of the discussion here.   
These tensions, debates and confusions around inclusion have been described 
and analysed in a variety of ways. Norwich (2007) draws on Minnow’s (1985) idea of 
the “dilemma of difference”, that is the “desire to treat all children the same while 
also treating them as different” (Norwich, 2007, p.72) to conceptualise these tensions 
and confusions. He argues that there are three basic areas of dilemma: identification, 
curricula, and location. Norwich’s way of explaining the issue was descibed by 
Wedell (2008) as “very helpful in that he shows that people are often not clear about 
which issues they are trying to reconcile” (p.128) which does, of course, typify the 
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whole debate. Clearly the matter is far more complex than that of simple agreement or 
disagreement with the concept of inclusion and yet much of the tension and dispute 
tends to be polarised around the premise that, as Cigman (2007a) puts it, “one is either 
for or against inclusion. The question ‘included or excluded?’ suggests that inclusion 
is an either /or matter” (p.xvii). Corbett (1997) similarly notes how inclusion and 
exclusion are defined as “polar opposites” (p.55). She also draws attention to the 
complexity of the issue in her description that the reality is probably “more a messy 
series of compromises, adjustments and individual preferences” (p.55). Norwich 
(2007) however suggests that it, “is rare to find arguments against inclusion, as it is 
rare to find arguments against democracy. Disagreement occurs, by and large, in 
regard to the extent and nature of inclusion” (p.71). This point is reflected in the 
distinctions made between different standpoints such as moderate or responsible 
inclusion, or full or radical inclusion (Cigman 2007a; Topping &  Maloney, 2005) 
which in relation to special school provision refer respectively to those who support 
its continuation and those who reject it altogether.  
Debates in New Zealand  
In many contexts inclusion was, as Brown and Thompson (2005, p. 163) explain, the 
subject of “frequently rancorous and acrimonious” debates. But, interestingly, this 
appears not to have been the case in New Zealand; there is no evidence of any such 
debate. Inclusion seems to have been a relatively unproblematic concept in the 
context of New Zealand scholarly work as well as in the policy arena. Issues to do 
with special education, inclusion, and the education of disabled children and others 
with special needs (Ballard, 1996; Ballard, 1997; Mitchell, 2001; Moore et al., 1999) 
are discussed and explored but mostly in the context of description, critique and 
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analysis of special education policy and practice. For the most part the views 
expressed in this work endorse inclusion, although some minor variations in the 
understanding or definition of inclusion and inclusive education are evident. Ballard 
(1997) argues that inclusion “involves all students in a community, with no 
exceptions and irrespective of their intellectual, physical, sensory or other differences, 
having equal rights to access the culturally valued curriculum of their society as full-
time valued members of age appropriate mainstream classrooms” (p.244). Moore, 
Anderson, Timperley, Glynn, Macfarlane, Brown, and Thomson (1999) however 
suggest that inclusion “does not mean that every child must receive all of his or her 
instruction in one regular class with one regular teacher” (p. 5). They maintain that for 
a “very small group of children formal instruction may take place outside a regular 
classroom” (p. 6) but the children must still “be included in the wider school 
environment” (p. 6). But these are relatively minor differences and, with the exception 
of Pickering and Wilton (1995) who voice support for special school provision, I was 
unable to find any scholarly work that would represent a substantive debate about 
inclusion and certainly nothing that could be described as “rancorous” or 
“acrimonious”. The absence of any evident debate lends supports to Mitchell’s (2001) 
claim that there was a “broad consensus as to” the meaning of inclusion “among 
educationists” (p.330) in New Zealand. At the same time this apparent consensus and 
lack of debate in the New Zealand context is somewhat curious.  
Regardless of the breadth and multiplicity of conceptions with respect to 
inclusion, and the debate and controversy about it, what is clear is that inclusion was 
concerned with improving the educational experiences of children and young people 
who were for some reason vulnerable to exclusion, discrimination, and 
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marginalisation within the educational context. There is no argument that this matter 
is one that warrants concern but there was a larger agenda at play here. Proponents of 
inclusion were ambitious in their expectations so that one could be forgiven for 
ascribing to them the belief that inclusion was not only the panacea for a great many 
educational ills but also for a great many social ones besides. For many the goal was 
much broader and grander than simply a concern with education or schooling, for 
inclusion was “not an end in itself, but a means to an end- the creation and 
maintenance of an inclusive society” (Barton, 1999, p. 58).  
While the ultimate goal in the minds of the early proponents of inclusion may 
have been the creation of an inclusive society, it is the impact of the ideas and 
precepts of inclusion in the education context that is the concern of the examination 
and analysis of this thesis. Within that context, universal inclusion, arguably, became 
the proxy for justice and fairness in education for disabled children; special school 
provision was correspondingly positioned as an undesirable option. The question of 
whether this represents a just state of affairs for all disabled children is a key concern 
of this thesis and it is to that I now turn. The following chapter will describe the 
approach taken to these concerns and sets out the theoretical principles and influences 
that form the framework that guides and shapes the analysis and critique.  
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Chapter Three 
 Theoretical and Philosophical Perspectives 
This chapter describes the theoretical influences and perspectives that inform the 
argument and analysis presented here, and that constitute the lens through which the 
issues will be examined. It introduces the proposed argument and presents a critique 
of universal inclusion in terms of justice and injustice. The chapter begins by making 
the case that the problem and issues raised in this thesis call for an enquiry that is 
philosophical in nature. Then the argument with respect to justice and universal 
inclusion is advanced and matters of justice established as a central concern of the 
work. This is followed by an explication of the theoretical influences and premises 
that permeate the work and inform the analysis and argument proposed. Finally, the 
chapter presents a critique of universal inclusion through the aforementioned 
theoretical lens.  
A Question Apt for Philosophical Reflection 
This work arises from a specific concern with the experiences of New Zealand special 
schools and their communities in the wake of the move to policies of inclusive 
education and the introduction of Special Education 2000. But an examination of this 
matter inevitably raises questions of a philosophical nature for, as McLaughlin (2000) 
explains, “many educational policies contain (to a greater or lesser extent) 
assumptions, concepts, beliefs, values and commitments, which, if not themselves of 
a directly philosophical kind are apt for philosophical attention” (p.444).  
Examination of policy and its impact necessarily leads to consideration of 
values, ideologies, and theories (Ball, 1993; Carr, 2001; Codd, 1988; Codd, 1995; 
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Gale, 1999; McLaughlin, 2000; Ozga, 2000) and so “discussions of educational 
policy inevitably move to the larger philosophical questions that prompt and inform 
them” (Oksenberg Rorty as cited in McLaughlin, 2000, p. 443). SE 2000 is 
underpinned by particular values, assumptions and beliefs with respect to the 
education of disabled children that call for reflection of a philosophical nature. But, as 
Scheffler (as cited in McLaughlin, 2000, p. 444) points out, “policy is made in the 
context of multiple human activities, experiences, purposes and needs”, and so while 
policy cannot be divorced from the influence of prevailing ideologies and 
philosophical premises neither can it be divorced from the contexts in which it is 
located, developed, enacted and played out. Accordingly, the reflection and 
examination here begins with “specific questions and problems”(McLaughlin, 2000, 
p.448) relating to education policy and just educational provision for disabled 
children, particularly in the New Zealand context, and uses what McLaughlin (2000) 
describes as “the resources of broader philosophical argument” (p.448) to examine 
and illuminate these.  
A Matter of Ethics 
The issue of just educational provision for disabled children at its core entails matters 
of ethics and justice. “Ethics relates to the moral justification for what we do or intend 
to do in situations which present alternatives for human action” (Warnock, 1971, p. 
13 as cited in Codd, 1987). The matter of just educational provision for disabled 
children is one in which there are “alternatives for human action”; inclusion 
represents one alternative, the provision of special schooling another.  
The aim of ethics is always ‘practical’ in Aristotle’s sense; that is, 
its aim is not just to know, explain or understand but to guide and 
influence action, to justify and prescribe a set of rules, principles or 
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ideals which will constitute criteria for making moral judgements 
and for deciding what ought to be done in practice. 
                                                                              (Codd, 1987, p. 70). 
 
With respect to just educational provision for disabled children, debates about 
inclusion and special school provision centre on the moral justification of a particular 
course of action and moral judgements about “what ought to be done in practice”. 
Codd (1987) argues that the justification for moral decisions is an ethical or normative 
matter and that where “ethical principles conflict”(p. 77), as arguably they do in the 
matter considered here, such matters cannot be resolved by “simply consulting 
research findings” (p. 77). In a policy climate of inclusion, special school provision is 
a vexed issue that raises a number of broader moral, philosophical, and political 
questions. At the nub of the issue are concerns with ethics, notions of what is just, and 
who it is that determines what is the just and morally correct way to proceed. It is a 
matter that raises issues about how the correctness of any particular course of action is 
determined as superior to any other and who it is who has the power to make or 
influence that determination. Why is attending the local regular school considered, by 
some, to be of greater moral probity than attending a special school? Why does the 
promotion of inclusion mean that special school provision is no longer accepted as a 
valued choice or even as a choice that should  be available at all?  
What this debate turns on is whether policies that take as their starting point 
the unquestioned premise that all disabled children and young people will be better 
served in local state-funded schools than in special schools, do in fact represent an 
ethically defensible and socially just approach to educational provision for all these 
children and young people, and if they do not, in what ways do they not?   
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The intention in examining these questions here is not to simply pit different 
views against each other or attempt to discredit inclusion. As Artiles and Dyson 
(2005) note, “to ask whether inclusive education is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, whether ‘it 
works’ or ‘does not work’, is … to miss the point” (p. 43). Rather, what should be 
asked is whether the prevailing conception of inclusion and the notion of justice in 
education inherent to it, do actually lead to policy and practices that are demonstrably 
just and fair to all disabled children, young people and their families. It is this 
question that underpins this thesis, however it is a question that is fraught with 
possibilities of misinterpretation and misconception for, as Pirie and Head (2007) 
succinctly explain:  
Inclusion is “a term that invokes notions of justice and compassion, 
of equality, fraternity and human rights. These are core values in 
modern democratic societies. To interrogate the notion of inclusion 
is thus to court the accusation that one is fundamentally opposed to 
these values”.                                                                              (p.21)   
To raise such questions in relation to New Zealand’s inclusive education policy and 
practices and the philosophy of inclusion more broadly, is to risk the danger of being 
misinterpreted as opposing these core values, and thus inclusion. Nevertheless, it is a 
fair and reasonable thing to interrogate policies and practices that promote inclusion 
and to examine the impact of these policies in terms of justice and fairness; policies of 
inclusion should not be considered untouchable or beyond question.  
Accordingly, in this thesis the argument is proposed that in its conception, 
development and implementation, SE2000, a policy founded on the principle of 
inclusion, created an environment in which occurrences of injustice and unfairness 
were experienced by some of those on whom the policy impacted; injustice and 
unfairness that should be examined and discussed. The examination presented here 
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interrogates and challenges the particular notion of justice that underpins SE2000, and 
is inherent to inclusion. But this is not to reject core values such as justice, equality, 
compassion and human rights with respect to the education of disabled children. 
Rather what is argued for here is a different notion of how these values can be 
achieved; a notion that may better represent a just and fair arrangement of educational 
provision for all disabled children certainly in the New Zealand context and possibly 
in other jurisdictions as well.  
A key concern in this thesis is to raise questions about the promotion in policy 
of a particular position that may in fact not truly represent just educational provision 
for all disabled children and may possibly result in injustice for some. It is 
questionable whether the pursuit in education policy of what is known as “full 
inclusion”, that is the situation in which there is no alternative provision available and 
all children attend the regular local school is an ethically defensible position, at least 
within the constraints of our current model of common schooling. It is also 
questionable whether this approach will lead to justice and fairness for all disabled 
children and young people without exception; it may, in fact, result in quite the 
opposite for some. It is unlikely, however, that those supporting “full inclusion” 
would concur with this view.  
A Matter of Justice  
Despite being a much studied concept, justice nevertheless remains in many ways a 
problematic notion open to differing interpretation and conceptualisation. 
Since the days of Socrates, philosophers have been concerned about 
the concept of justice and different views on justice give rise to 
different views on matters central to education such as equality and 
equity.  (Noddings, 2012, p. 177) 
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Theories of justice have been advanced from many different perspectives and reflect 
both the historical context in which they were developed and also the particular 
philosophical leanings of their creators. Justice and social justice are concepts which 
are contested; the notion of justice is of itself problematic and that of social justice no 
less so. Rizvi and Lingard (1996) point out that social justice does not have “one 
essential meaning - it represents discourses that are historically constituted and it is a 
site of conflicting and divergent political endeavours” (p. 11).  
Theories of justice are abstract. Nussbaum (2006) suggests that they need this 
feature in order to maintain their “theoretical power” (p.1). However the concerns of 
justice are not solely abstract; the examination of the justness or otherwise of any 
particular state of affairs is thus concerned with practical matters. In the context of 
policy, and more particularly in the context of education policy such as SE2000, “the 
idea of justice relates to something real. Policy prescriptions thus have practical 
consequences, reflecting particular values about how society ought to be organised 
and how education should contribute to individual and social improvement” (Taylor, 
Lingard, Rizvi, & Henry, 1997, p.128).  
The education of disabled children is one area in which questions of justice are 
certainly a matter of concern. Historically, disabled children have been poorly served 
in terms of their educational rights and continue to be so served. Justice, with respect 
to the educational rights of disabled children concerns something that is real and the 
values reflected in educational policies affecting these children have particular and 
practical consequences for them and their families. Winzer (2007) suggests that “in its 
philosophical guise, inclusive schooling for students with special needs is grounded in 
quite specific conceptions of social justice, ethics and rights” (p.30-31). This is, 
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however, no clear cut matter. Noddings(2012) points out, “different views of justice 
give rise to different views on matters central to education such as equality and 
equity”(p.177); so too are there “competing definitions of justice operating in special 
education” (Rizvi & Lingard, 1996, p. 11).  
Disabled children’s educational rights have often been conceived of in terms 
of equity of provision following what Christensen and Rizvi (1996) describe as a 
Rawlsian theory of justice “which sees social justice as being based on a fair and just 
distribution of a social good” (p. 3), in this case education. Under SE2000 and other 
national and international inclusive education policies, the idea of justice, with respect 
to setting, is embedded and embodied in the concept of inclusion understood as all 
children attending their local common schools; equitable and just provision, or a fair 
distribution of the social good, is thus equated with access to regular school 
environments. It is this particular view and its real impact that is the matter of justice 
under scrutiny here.  
Theoretical Influences 
The concerns of this thesis and the argument proposed centre then on matters of 
justice and injustice particularly as they play out in inclusive education policy. These 
matters are grounded in quite specific and real circumstances that demonstrate the 
complexities of achieving just arrangements. The argument and analysis set out here 
are not drawn from any single theory of justice nor does my analysis lead me to 
advance or defend any such theory or single idea of justice. Rather the matters at hand 
are illuminated through an argument that is supported and sustained by the 
intertwining of theoretical threads and principles that derive from various approaches 
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to justice. The theoretical influences that inform and frame the argument and analysis 
explicitly reflect the complexity of the matters considered here and shape what is a 
somewhat eclectic perspective. They derive from ideas proposed by an assemblage of 
theorists that includes Martha Nussbaum, Amatyra Sen, and others working within the 
context of what is know as the Capability Approach, as well as other theorists, 
including Michael Walzer, Iris Marion Young, Terence McLaughlin and Ruth 
Cigman, whose work with respect to matters of justice, education, philosophy, 
disability and inclusion is pertinent to the argument presented here. The work of 
Nussbaum and Cigman has particular resonance and relevance as both these scholars 
have written extensively in regard to matters pertaining to disability, justice and 
education including those related to education provision (Cigman, 2007a, 2007b; 
Nussbaum, 2006) and the issue of justice in relation to special school provision and 
inclusion (Cigman, 2007a, 2007b). 
Although the traditions and perspectives with which these theorists are aligned 
are different, and sometimes divergent, in their work there are common and 
complementary ideas that provide insights that are especially germane to the matters 
being examined here. Included among these ideas are: a conception of justice and 
injustice that moves beyond an abstract conceptualisation centred on distributive 
justice to a concern with justice and injustice as they are experienced in the concrete 
reality of peoples lives; an emphasis on democratic principles; a sensitivity to and 
interest in matters related to human diversity; and a recognition and concern with the 
plural and heterogeneous nature of society and the implications of this in terms of 
justice. These ideas work together to support a nuanced analysis of the problem and 
offer a useful lens or framework through which to examine and explicate the 
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questions of justice and injustice that are the focus of this thesis. The theoretical core 
of the argument presented in this thesis is drawn from these ideas, and organised 
around a number of key elements that I argue are particularly salient when 
considering matters of justice and injustice with respect to education policy, inclusion, 
and the education of disabled children. In the following section these elements will be 
discussed and set out in detail.  
A Perennial Question 
The question of “what should we look at, when evaluating whether one state of affairs 
is more or less just than another?” (Robeyns & Brighouse, 2010, p. 1) or what is a 
“proper metric of justice” (Robeyns & Brighouse, 2010, p.1) is a perennial question 
that continues to challenge philosophers and educational theorists. The question also 
challenges this thesis. What should be considered when evaluating matters of justice 
with respect to inclusive education policy and the values underpinning it? What 
factors should guide such judgement and inform any argument proposed? 
The approach to matters of justice, and the critique of universal inclusion and 
SE2000 presented here are guided and informed by four core ideas or elements:  
firstly, the understanding that as justice and injustice have their material expression in 
the realities of people’s lives then the justness or otherwise of any circumstance 
should be assessed and examined with reference to that lived reality; secondly the 
notion of the inviolability of persons and the ideas of respect and dignity that inhere to 
that; thirdly the recognition of the plural nature of society and the notion of a 
heterogeneous public; and fourthly the understanding that justice requires democracy 
in terms of participation and voice. The first of these elements provides the 
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overarching principle from which the argument proceeds, the others are qualities that 
one could reasonably expect to be observed or acknowledged in a principle, practice, 
policy or circumstance that claims to be just or to serve justice. These elements, 
which I will expand on below, are crucial qualities with respect to just education 
policy and practices in a society such as New Zealand and so form part of what we 
should look for when considering the justness or otherwise of values, policy and 
practices such as those examined here. 
The first element, that as justice and injustice have their material expression in 
the realities of people’s lives then the justness or otherwise of any circumstance 
should be assessed and examined with reference to that lived reality, points to the 
importance of looking at the lived realities of any circumstance when considering 
justice and injustice. As noted above theories of justice are abstract however the 
matters that call our attention to issues of justice are generally not. So in determining 
the justness or otherwise of any set of circumstances, policy or practice it is necessary 
to examine and interrogate it in terms of the real and actual impact it has on everyday 
human lives and situations. As Vincent (2003) explains it “justice is plural, diffused 
and differentiated” so that “abstract definitions need to be complemented by a more 
grounded understanding of the possibilities of enacting justice” (p. 22). Walzer 
(1983) similarly points to the need to examine matters of justice in terms of their real 
and actual impact and to this end, he frames his discussion of justice within the 
realities and structures of his own society arguing that, “justice and equality can 
conceivably be worked out as philosophical artefacts, but a just and egalitarian society 
cannot be” (p. xiv). What Walzer is indicating here is that whether the state of affairs 
that obtains in a society is just or egalitarian is not an abstract matter. It is something 
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that needs to be ascertained with reference to the circumstances that prevail and the 
way in which these impact on how people are able to live their lives; what they are 
able to be and to do. As Sen (2009) puts it “justice cannot be indifferent to the lives 
that people can actually live”(p. 18). The thrust of these points are echoed by Rizvi 
and Lingard (1996) who, in their remarks in relation to the material realities of 
injustice, explain that:  
it needs to be acknowledged that injustice does have a material 
reality that is readily recognised by those who are subjected to it. 
Those who are hungry or poor or homeless or physically impaired 
do not need abstract definitions in order to be able to recognise their 
plight.                                                                                        (p. 11) 
With reference to the questions raised in this thesis what these ideas point to is that 
although inclusion as a theory may appear to promote circumstances that are just, it is 
necessary to examine the impact of its application in policy to determine whether it 
does so in practice. The argument presented here reflects this and aligns with 
Gewirtz’s (2006) proposition that: 
it is not possible to resolve the question of what counts as justice in 
education at a purely abstract level, …what counts as justice can 
only be properly understood within specific contexts of 
interpretation and enactment.                                                    (p. 69) 
The second element that is salient to the analysis of the matters examined here is the 
notion of the inviolability and moral worth of each person as an end and never as the 
means to an end (Nussbaum, 2006, 2011b; Rawls, 2005; Sen, 2009) together with the 
respect and dignity that should attend to each person as an end. Nussbaum (2011b) 
describes the idea of respect in this sense as being a:  
way of regarding and treating persons, closely related to the Kantian 
idea of treating humanity as an end and never as a mere means. 
Respect is thus closely linked to the idea of dignity, to the idea that 
humanity has worth and not merely a price. Equal respect would 
then be respect that appropriately acknowledges the equal dignity 
and worth that persons have as ends. (p. 18) 
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Fundamental to this position is a concern for the individual so that in evaluating the 
justness or otherwise of any circumstances it is necessary to consider the impact on 
individual persons. Walker and Unterhalter (2007) explain this approach as “ethical 
individualism”, and explain that it differs from the “individualistic framework 
concerned with notions of self actualisation about all other goods” such as that 
associated with neoliberalism. Rather, they explain it as a “a normative approach that 
stresses that actions should be judged by their effects on individual human beings” 
(p.2) so that individuals should be the “primary objects of moral concern” (Brighouse 
& Swift as cited in Walker and Unterhalter, 2007).  
 
It may seem obvious that matters of justice must concern persons as moral 
ends, and that individuals should be the “primary objects of moral concern”, but this 
is not necessarily the case. In the context of evaluating policy and the values 
promoted therein often economic or wider social benefits are the subjects of 
consideration. As Noddings (2012) points out, “social policy is heavily influenced by 
utilitarian thought (p.162), and so policy imperatives and evaluation are likely to 
eschew concerns with the person qua person and focus on the “greatest good for the 
greatest number”. Arguably, universal inclusion presents such a view in its insistence 
that there should be only one school setting and that in the interests of the inclusion 
project special schools should be no more. Cigman (2007b) argues that with respect to 
the project of inclusion, there is “a worrying implication that parents have a duty to 
avoid sending their children to special schools” in order to advance the interests of 
other children; “to treat their children as means to the ends of other children’s 
wellbeing”(p. 782). In contrast to this perspective, Rawls (as cited in Noddings, 2012, 
p. 179) asserts the prior claim of the individual in matters of justice,   
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Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even 
the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason 
justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a 
greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices 
imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages 
enjoyed by the many.  
What this proposition points to is that in evaluating the justness of a particular state of 
affairs or whether a particular value promotes justice, what is of import is whether the 
particular circumstances uphold the dignity and moral worth of all those on whom 
they may impact and do not sacrifice some in the interests of what may advantage the 
many. That is that each person is respected as an end in herself and never as the mere 
means to the ends of others.  
The third element that informs the analysis presented here is recognition of the  
“fact of pluralism”(Rawls, 2005) or moral diversity (Nussbaum, 2006, 2011c), and the 
notion of a heterogeneous public. Pluralism is widely regarded as a fact of modern 
liberal societies that are characterised by a heterogeneous public (Young, 1990). In a 
context of pluralism a heterogeneous public consists of members who express and 
live by different values, make different life choices, have different understandings of 
what constitutes human flourishing and the good life, and correspondingly have 
differing conceptions of justice. Sen (2009) maintains that given this plurality 
“judgements about justice have to take on board the task of accommodating different 
kind of reasons and evaluative concerns (p, 395). Walzer (1983), in a similar vein, 
argues that the very “principles of justice are themselves pluralistic in form” (p. 6) so 
that “different social goods ought to be distributed for different reasons, in accordance 
with different procedures, by different agents; and that all these differences derive 
from different understandings of the social goods themselves” (p. 6). Given the fact of 
plurality, just arrangements need to not only reflect the fact that there are many 
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different and possibly divergent ways of living but also recognize and acknowledge 
that these are all “morally good and valuable” (Nussbaum, 2011b, p. 3); for “there are 
many ends that men may seek and still be fully rational”(Berlin as cited in Nussbaum, 
2011b, p. 9). With regard to the matter of educational provision for disabled children, 
the fact of pluralism signifies that just policies and practices are those that reflect, and 
thus in turn respect, the different views and values of disabled children and their 
families in regard to the educational arrangements best suited to their particular needs. 
As I will discuss later in the thesis, the notion of universal inclusion does not reflect 
all the different views and values that are held by parents, families and disabled 
children themselves with respect to just education provision, nor does it allow for 
these to be acknowledged in policy to be morally good and valuable. 
 The fourth element to be considered is the right to participation and to having 
a voice in decision-making processes. Young (1990) reminds us that “democracy is 
both an element and a condition of justice” (p. 91) and asserts that the “the only 
ground for a claim that a policy or decision is just is that it has been arrived at by a 
public which has truly promoted the free expression of all needs and points of 
view”(p. 91). Circumstances that are truly just, and so democratic, must reflect not 
only the opinions and views of the people who make and determine decisions and 
policy but also those of the persons who are affected by such decisions and policies 
(Young, 1990). Moreover the circumstances should be such that people are able to 
freely express their perspectives without fear of ridicule or censure but in a context in 
which there is openness to a variety of views and a willingness to listen to them. As I 
will argue in more detail later, the dominance of inclusion as an educational ideal or 
orthodoxy in the New Zealand context contributed to the situation in which the 
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expression of alternative views, such as support for special school provision, was 
made less possible and less acceptable.  
While I have separated out these four elements, they coalesce and intertwine 
around the fundamental dignity of individual persons and the respect owed to them. In 
considering whether a particular state of affairs, be it the mores of society, a policy or 
a practice, is just, or more or less just than another, there should be a concern with 
how that state of affairs impacts on individuals and the way in which it fosters or 
denies the dignity of the individual and the respect owed to her as an end. Particularly 
in regards to determining matters of policy, the principle of each person as an end 
should be the guide so that “the person not the group is the primary subject of 
political justice” (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 216). Respect is central to all of this because as 
Cigman (2007b) explains “to treat a human being purely as a means to an end is to 
fail to respect him or her in the most fundamental way” (p. 781). Nussbaum (2011c) 
similarly argues that: 
people are ends, have a dignity, have something about them that 
makes it wrong to violate them for the sake of overall well-being, or 
to use them as mere means. Respect is an attitude that recognizes 
that dignity, and the fact that it is equal.                                    (p. 2)  
She describes these as ideas that are familiar and “widely and deeply shared” in 
liberal democracies and, further, that they are ideas that sit “at the heart of the modern 
human rights movement” (Nussbaum, 2011c, p. 2). A discussion of the many theories 
of the ethics of human rights is beyond the scope of this work; it will suffice to note 
here that the argument for universal inclusion promotes a strong connection between 
inclusion as a human right, and human flourishing. But human flourishing 
encompasses many diverse possibilities (Nussbaum, 2006); with respect to education 
this may include the right to inclusion but this is not the only possibility there are 
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others, such as the right to make choices about schooling, that are of value. Nussbaum 
(2006) argues that, “human beings should have a chance to flourish in their own way 
provided they do no harm to others” (p.347). Respect for the dignity of each, entails a 
view that allows for the freedom of persons to choose and live according to their own 
particular understanding of the good life (Nussbaum, 2011c; Sandel, 2009). In 
circumstances that demonstrate respect for the dignity of each, different values are 
accorded equal weight, there is participation in decision-making, different voices are 
represented and there is choice and autonomy.  
These then are the theoretical elements and influences which permeate and 
inform the work of this thesis and which provide the threads with which the argument 
presented in this thesis is woven and constructed. In the light of these ideas the 
discussion in the following section examines the argument for inclusion and critiques 
the conception of justice inherent to it and the way it positions special school 
provision. 
The Certainty of Inclusion 
Let us return to the question of what it is we should look for when considering the 
justness or otherwise of a particular state of affairs and apply it to the matter of 
inclusion and special school provision. In answering this question proponents of 
inclusion would argue emphatically that an education system that includes special 
schools must by definition be unjust and that only universal inclusion can represent 
justice. The certainty of this position is striking, as is the strength of the moral 
conviction that inheres in it, as some of the statements in the previous chapter showed, 
and which is further demonstrated below.  
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Inclusion is different from any other fields of inquiry in that it is 
premised on an answer rather than a question? That answer, of 
course, is that inclusive education is superior in one or other way to 
non-inclusive education.  (Dyson, 1999, p .43) 
Dyson’s comment points to a key feature of inclusion, its certainty. In the writings of 
activists and academics, and in national and international policy statements, there 
would appear to be an unquestioning acceptance that the goal of all disabled children 
receiving their education at their local ordinary school which underpins inclusion, and 
only this goal, equates to just educational provision. Thomas, Walker, and Webb 
(1998), describing the turn away from special school provision, explain that, 
“inclusion won mainly because it is right that it should have done so. Arguments for 
inclusion are principled ones, stemming from concern for human rights.” (p. 5) Here 
we can see evidence of the certainty of the supposed moral rectitude of inclusion at 
play, arguments for inclusion are described as principled ones; the implication that 
hangs from this statement is that arguments that differ from this position are not. 
Cigman (2007b) argues that “the rights argument sometimes sounds like a duty 
argument, suggesting that all parents have a duty to send their children to the 
mainstream school irrespective of the nature or severity of the child’s difficulties or 
disabilities” (p. 780). Perhaps, with respect to the issue of location at least, it would 
not be unreasonable to agree with Corbett’s (1997) view that at its most extreme, 
there is a danger of inclusion becoming a form of “politically correct bullying” (p. 57).  
 “Special schools do not have a right to exist” (Dessent, 1987, p. 97 as cited in 
Barton, 1997, p. 235). This is the claim, albeit often more subtly stated, of those who 
argue against special school provision as an anathema and the epitome of exclusion in 
our educational systems. As explained earlier, concomitant with the move to inclusion 
has been a call for the closure and removal of any type of special school provision 
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(Barton, 1997; MacArthur, 2009) on the basis that special school provision is 
antithetical to inclusion and that the presence of special schools represents the failure 
of inclusion and thus the failure of justice in education for disabled children. For those 
promoting inclusion, special schools are perceived as the tangible representation of 
injustice in education for disabled children. For those who take this view, the presence 
of special schools is an indictment on the societies and education systems in which 
they endure.   
Troubling the Certainty of Inclusion 
Inclusion as a matter of human rights and ethics advances a considerable moral claim; 
the argument that in a democratic and just society all children and young people 
should be able to receive an education of high quality and fitted to their needs at a 
local regular school is unassailable. Similarly it would be difficult to disagree with the 
argument that justice requires that disabled children should be entitled to attend and 
receive their education in local state-funded schools alongside their non-disabled 
peers. However, the argument that special school provision is an offence to justice is 
less convincing and, despite the certainty of those who propose it, cannot claim the 
same moral veracity and worth. 
Walzer (1983) describes justice as “a human construction” and argues that, “it 
is doubtful that it can be made in only one way” (p. 5). He challenges the notion that 
with respect to justice “there is one and only one, distributive system that philosophy 
can rightly encompass” (p. 5). Universal inclusion proposes that there should be a 
single type of education provision for all children and argues for this as the realisation 
of justice in education for all disabled children. But this claim founders on its 
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certainty and its lack of acknowledgement of the possibility of any morally acceptable 
alternatives. 
The truth is that since educational controversies turn mostly upon 
different visions of human flourishing there will always be (indeed 
in a society like ours, there must and should be) room for 
disagreement concerning what are clearly inherently evaluative, 
ethical and philosophical issues.  (Carr, 2001, p. 471) 
The question of what constitutes just educational provision for all disabled is, I would 
argue, one such controversy that turns on “different visions of human flourishing” and 
is “inherently, evaluative, ethical and philosophical” in nature. With moral questions 
such as these, as Carr argues, “there must and should be room for disagreement”. But 
under the philosophy of inclusion, just educational provision with respect to location 
is constituted only as that which obtains when all disabled children attend and receive 
their education at their local school; no alternative is countenanced. Cigman (2007b) 
describes this  particular conception as a “universalist” argument and its proponents 
as “universalist inclusionists” who are in essence making claims about what is “best 
for every child without exception”(p.776). But this universalist position effectively 
allows no room for the accommodation of any alternative vision in relation to what 
might constitute just educational provision. At the same time the possibility of 
achieving universal inclusion and its associated benefits is asserted with absolute 
conviction: “The needs of all children will be met in inclusive environments” 
(Inclusive Education Action Group, 2015). In statements such as this, as Cigman 
points out, “the possibility of including everyone is asserted or assumed, and is in this 
sense essentially an article of faith. It is asserted in the face of a great deal of evidence 
to the contrary” (p.785). The strength of conviction and almost religious belief 
accorded by some to inclusion is similarly noted by Dyson (as cited in Allan & Slee, 
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2008), who explains how there is one view of inclusion that sees it as “a state of mind 
or a state of the soul, it’s a state of grace almost”(p.35). 
 Simple Equality  
 In relation to location, the single, limited vision of what constitutes just provision 
implied by universal inclusion corresponds with what Walzer (1983) describes as the 
notion of “simple equality”. Simple equality in education is, according to Walzer, 
demonstrated in Aristotle’s view that, “the system of education in a state must … be 
one and the same for all”(Aristotle as cited in Walzer, 1983, p. 202). This description 
seems apposite to the notion of justice advanced in universal inclusion with respect to 
the matter of location. Winzer (2007) explains how in the philosophy of inclusion, 
rights and equity were “translated into ‘sameness of treatment’ which immediately 
mutated into ‘sameness of experience’…”(p. 31). She further explains that as location 
was a central motif of inclusion, sameness of experience came to be “interpreted by 
many as physical place” (p. 31). Under this notion, justice and fairness in education 
for disabled children are constituted as the circumstance whereby, “everyone gets 
access to the same thing” (Walzer, as cited in Rizvi & Lingard, 1996, p. 22), or simple 
equality.  
But Walzer, as Rizvi and Lingard point out, argues that simple equality “is 
neither achievable or desirable. It is not achievable because people do not have the 
same means and capacities, and it is not desirable because people do not have the 
same needs” (p. 22). This view has particular resonance in the context of the 
argument being developed here. Disabled children are characterised by heterogeneity 
in their means, capacities and needs and it is unlikely that a regime of simple equality, 
such as that proposed under universal inclusion, will be able to accommodate this 
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heterogeneity. As Rizvi and Lingard (1996), suggest “centralised uniformity of 
educational provision” is likely to be “insufficient for achieving social justice” (p. 22) 
for all of these children without exception. But this is essentially what, in terms of 
location at least, inclusion promotes; a uniformity of provision that, as Cigman 
(2007b) suggests, fails to recognise the multiple realities that attend disability and its 
lived experience for those such as Harry and his family. 
From Theory to Policy 
Theories are a large part of our world framing the way issues are 
seen, shaping perceptions of salience, and thus slanting debate 
towards certain policies rather than others. (Nussbaum, 2011a, p. xi) 
The theory or philosophy of inclusion has come to shape what we perceive as salient 
in relation to what counts as justice in education for disabled children and slanted the 
debates about this towards educational policy which aims to achieve the full inclusion 
of all disabled children in the regular local school. If we consider policy statements 
such as the Salamanca Statement and SE2000 in New Zealand, we can see that full 
inclusion is heralded as the ultimate goal of these policies. Nussbaum (2011a) 
describes how, “in the narrative context of human lives”, the capability approach 
“makes a difference to what policy-makers notice in these lives, and, hence, to the 
ability of policy to construct meaningful interventions that show respect of and 
empower real people, rather than simply reflecting the biases of intellectual elites”(p. 
xi). Inclusion similarly has made a difference to what policy-makers have noticed in 
relation to the lives of disabled children and their educational needs. However, while 
undoubtedly this “noticing” has lead to “meaningful interventions that show respect 
of and empower real people” in some circumstances, in others it could be argued that 
it has not. In championing the rights of disabled children to receive their education 
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alongside their peers in their local regular schools, inclusion has certainly led to 
policy interventions that have improved and enhanced the lives of many disabled 
children and empowered them and their families. However that same theory, arguably, 
has led to policy interventions that have marginalised those disabled children, their 
families and the staff who make up special school communities. Justice is an abstract 
concept and while at the abstract level the philosophical ideal of inclusion may serve 
the cause of justice, I am arguing that at the level of practice, policies of inclusion 
may not.  
Nussbaum (2011b) argues that our respect for persons qua persons entails in 
turn that we think that their beliefs and values “deserve respectful, non derogatory 
treatment from government” (p. 33). Nussbaum is concerned here particularly with 
the issue of religious belief or doctrines but the claim is comparable in the context of 
different beliefs about special school provision. When universal inclusion is 
instantiated in policy this must by definition constitute a form of disrespect to those 
who support an alternative position and, at the same time, frame special schooling in a 
derogatory way. Nussbaum describes what she calls “expressive subordination” that is, 
“subordination that consists in being publicly ranked beneath others”. This she 
explains occurs in situations where “even if you are tolerated … government will state 
every day, that a different view, incompatible with yours, is the correct view and that 
yours is wrong” (p. 35). This is just such the experience that special school 
communities encounter under policies of universal inclusion. It is little wonder then 
that they have been reported as feeling  “… ‘excluded’ and ‘undervalued’ in a system 
that exhorted inclusion” (Norwich & Gray, 2007, p.87). Certainly, as will be 
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discussed in a later chapter, such a state of affairs is reflected in the experience of the 
New Zealand special school communities.  
This chapter has set out the theoretical influences and perspectives of the 
study and proposes a critique of universal inclusion centred on matters of justice. The 
next chapter takes a more practical orientation and examines the turn to inclusion in 
New Zealand during the years prior to the introduction of SE2000.  
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Chapter Four  
The Turn to Inclusion in New Zealand Education Policy 
1987-1996 
Chapter Four begins the section of work that focuses specifically on the turn to 
inclusion and its impact on special schools in New Zealand, the real world context 
from which the argument presented here emanates. This chapter is the first of three 
that explore respectively the turn to inclusion in New Zealand education policy, the 
gestation, development and characteristics of SE2000, and the experience of the 
special school sector with respect to the impact of SE2000. The focus in this chapter 
is on the significant moments and developments in the turn to inclusion in the New 
Zealand policy context prior to the introduction of SE2000 during the period 1987-
1996. The first section of the chapter consists of a brief historical outline of provision 
and attitudes to the education of disabled children in New Zealand in the years prior 
to 1987. The second section of the chapter sets out the developments in policy and the 
movement to inclusion through the late 1980s and up to 1996 when SE2000 was 
introduced.  
Setting the context: A Brief Historical Perspective. 
Policies related to education provision for disabled children reflect the prevailing 
views and beliefs of the times. From an historical perspective, the situation in New 
Zealand mirrors that of many other countries. In the earliest days of formal education 
the common view was that disabled children would not be able to benefit from 
education, so from the first institution of compulsory education under the Education 
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Act of 1877, “temporary or permanent infirmity” (Mitchell & Mitchell, 1985, p. 7) 
was given as grounds for exemption from school attendance. The Mental Defectives 
Act, 1911, and the Education Acts of 1910 and 1914, made mental hospitals, and later 
the psychopaedic hospitals established specifically for disabled children, responsible 
for the “education and training” of those who were considered as “mental defectives” 
(Callendar, 1972; Mitchell & Mitchell, 1985). The provisions in these Acts reflect a 
view of disability and impairment that conceived of the education, care and “training” 
of disabled children as more properly a concern of “Health” rather than of “Education” 
(Winterbourne, 1944; Callendar, 1972). 
The classification of “mental defectives” in the Mental Defectives Act, 1911 
gives a further insight into the way in which people with intellectual impairment were 
viewed in the early part of the twentieth century. Under the Act, people with 
intellectual impairment were classified into three groups as follows: “idiots” –“those 
who were so deficient from birth or from an early age, that they were unable to 
protect themselves against ordinary physical dangers, and needed the care and 
attention similar to that bestowed upon young children”; “imbeciles”- who “were 
capable of guarding themselves against physical dangers but were, or if of school age, 
would be incapable of supporting themselves because of deficiency arising from birth 
or from an early age; and “feeble-minded” - “those who were capable of earning a 
living under favourable circumstances, but …were not capable of competing on equal 
terms with others or managing themselves and their affairs with ordinary prudence” 
(as cited in Mitchell & Mitchell, 1985, p. 18). These classifications and the earlier 
cited comments reflect a deficit view of disabled people that at its most extreme 
underpinned the eugenics movement. In New Zealand, as elsewhere, in the early part 
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of the twentieth century such views held considerable sway, and were influential in 
policy; as Tomlinson (1982) argues it would seem that the eugenics movement 
“certainly influenced the type and provision of education for all handicapped children” 
(p. 41) and especially for those defined as “mentally defective”.  
During the same period as industrialisation proceeded there was, in New 
Zealand as in other parts of the world, an increasing emphasis on work and the 
production of a skilled workforce, and a growing belief in the moral virtue of work 
and employment (Mitchell, 1987). With respect to the education of disabled children, 
albeit not all disabled children, the view was that education should be geared to 
enabling individuals to, where possible, earn their own livelihood and be useful 
members of society and so, it was averred, avoid the trap of disorderly and 
troublesome behaviour that would otherwise be likely. The view that work would 
provide both a livelihood and also prevent the realisation of the typical predilections 
of “these unfortunates” would seem to have been commonplace amongst even the 
more enlightened thinkers at the time, thus: 
instruction should be very real concrete throughout beginning with 
familiar domestic subjects…and leading up to technical work likely 
to provide a means of livelihood,…it is infinitely better for one of 
these unfortunates to become the humblest kind of farm labourer 
than a hanger on in a town slum.  
(Hogben, as cited in Winterbourne, 1944, p. 30-31) 
Tomlinson (1982) discussing special education in the United Kingdom explains: 
Interests which particularly affected the provision of early forms of 
special education were the economic and commercial interests of a 
developing industrial society which required as many people as 
possible to be productive, and, political ruling class interests in 
maintaining order and control in society-since defective people have 
usually been identified with potentially troublesome groups. (p. 29) 
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Similar interests prevailed in New Zealand in the late nineteenth and early to mid 
twentieth century. Mitchell (1987) refers to the “flurry of interest in child welfare”  
being ascribed to, among other things, “efforts to strengthen the physical and moral 
qualities of a society” (p.31), and influenced by thinking such as that of Dr W.A 
Chapple in his 1903 book, The Fertility of the Unfit that “all those mental and moral 
defectives who are unable or unwilling to support themselves according to the 
recognised laws of human society” should be sterilised (as cited in Mitchell & 
Mitchell, 1985, p. 13). Comments such as the following made by the president of the 
New Zealand Educational Institute in his 1916 annual report are illustrative of what 
were commonly held beliefs at that time: 
insanity, idiocy, epilepsy, blindness, deaf mutism, predispositions to 
vice and crime, are some of the afflictions passed on by hereditary. 
The feeble-minded should be segregated; for these unfortunates, 
social detention is both effective and considerate and social 
prevention is better and more economical from every point of view 
than social cure.  (as cited in Mitchell & Mitchell, 1985, p. 19) 
These comments reflect both the rising interest at that time in protecting society from 
potential damage from people considered to be deviant, diabolical, and largely 
uneducable, and rising concerns and beliefs about the “possible hereditary nature of 
defect, which culminated in the eugenics movement” (Tomlinson, 1982, p. 40).  
The first half of the twentieth century thus saw policies and practices designed 
to manage and control what Butchers referred to as “discouraging and discouraged” 
children (Butchers, 1930, p. 479). Separate and segregated provision under the 
auspices of Health or Education was seen to be one way in which this could be 
achieved. In 1908 Otekaike, the first residential school for “mentally retarded boys”, 
was opened in Otago (Mitchell & Mitchell, 1985), followed in 1916 by the opening of 
the  Richmond residential school for girls. Around this time special classes were also 
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being introduced into public schools; the first was established in 1917 at the Auckland 
Normal School. At this stage there were no non-residential schools for disabled 
children but there is some evidence that provision of these had been considered in the 
1920s. In 1927 the Director of Education, T.B. Strong, had put forward a policy on 
special education that included  catering for “low grade subnormals” in special 
schools (Mitchell & Mitchell, 1985) and two years later, the New Zealand 
Educational Insititute is recorded as having asked the Department of Education to 
provide “separate day schools in large cities” (Mitchell & Mitchell, 1985, p. 24) for 
children of low-grade ability. Nothing seems to have come of either Strong’s  policy 
or the NZEI’s request (Winterbourne, 1944) but in the following years separate 
training settings described as “occupation centres” were established. The first of these, 
which appears to have been set up in 1931 in Auckland by a Miss E.F. Munro 
(Winterbourne, 1944), was described by Mitchell and Mitchell as a “special school 
for trainable mentally deficient children” (Mitchell & Mitchell, 1985, p. 27) and the 
“forerunner to the occupation centres that were to be established in the 1950s” 
(Mitchell & Mitchell, 1985, p. 27). Winterbourne (1944)  also refers to three daytime 
occupation centres that were operating in Auckland, Christchurch and Dunedin at the 
time he was writing.  
It would seem than that by the middle of the twentieth century special 
education was established as an entity within the education system and was 
developing a range of services and provision for children across a wide range of areas 
including the “establishment of schools for spastics and for the intellectually 
handicapped”(Ewing, 1970.p. 203). The 1953 appointment by the Department of 
Education of an Officer for Special Education reflected this growth and according to 
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Ewing (1970) “was recognition of the need for professional leadership in the complex 
area of special education and for an official liaison with the many voluntary groups 
concerned with handicapped children” (p. 203). However there were still a number of 
disabled children whose education was not under the auspices of the State. Some of 
these were receiving education through the work of the Intellectually Handicapped 
Children’s Society, a parents group established in 1949, and others were resident in 
psychopaedic hospitals. In 1956 the government took over responsibility for then 
established IHCS schools or centres; by 1961 responsibilty for all IHCS centres and 
groups had been accepted by the State (Callendar, 1972).  
Internationally, the 1960s and 1970s was a period of activism in relation to the 
civil and human rights of many groups and in time this activism extended to the issue 
of the rights of disabled people. As in many other countries the post-war period in 
New Zealand saw the development of associations of parents of disabled children, and 
as the century moved on there was mounting pressure from parents and 
parent/charitable groups for provision to be made for the many children still excluded 
altogether from education. This pressure and demand was given more strength and 
impetus as a result of the increasing awareness of issues of civil and human rights and 
the demands for them to be realised. Despite this, even late into the twentieth century 
there were still some disabled children in New Zealand who were receiving no state-
funded educational provision whatsoever, a situation that was not to change until 
1990. However it does seem that by the latter part of the century it was generally 
accepted that the education of disabled children was a responsibility of the State. As 
the quote below reveals there would appear to have been some sense of pride in what 
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was offered but also a strong paternalistic and somewhat self-congratulatory attitude 
to this: 
Nowhere in New Zealand’s educational system are the national 
egalitarian tendency and solicitude for the unfortunate so clearly 
revealed as in the extensive provision of special education services 
for the handicapped. (Dakin, J.C., 1973, p. 77) 
Writing in 1987, Milne and Brown suggested that the “general philosophy for 
educating” disabled children in New Zealand was encapsulated in the following 
statement: 
Traditionally our New Zealand primary schools have accepted 
almost all children who have come to them and teachers, parents 
and the community have been reluctant to set any group of children 
apart from their fellows any more than is necessary for their welfare. 
This approach has been basic to our whole approach to the 
education of the handicapped. 
(Minister of Education, Appendices to the Journals of the House of 
Representatives, 1960, p. 6-7 as cited by Milne & Brown, 1987, 
p.39) 
Mitchell and Mitchell cite this same statement to support their view that the New 
Zealand Department of Education had “long subscribed to a philosophy of integration” 
(Mitchell & Mitchell, 1985, p. 108). They go on to say that, “there appears to be 
widespread agreement within the New Zealand educational community that all 
exceptional children should have ready access to regular educational facilities” (p. 
116). However, these claims seem to be somewhat at odds with the reality of 
education provision for disabled children prior to 1989. Certainly evidence would 
support Mitchell and Mitchell’s view that “although the principle of integration has 
long been espoused in New Zealand, its implementation to date shows less than full 
commitment by the Department of Education”(p. 116). At the time Mitchell and 
Mitchell were writing not only was there no statutory requirement for integration of 
disabled children into regular school settings there were also some hundreds of 
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disabled children who were not receiving any state-funded education at all (Sleek & 
Howie, 1987). In fact under the Education Act 1964, which governed children’s 
education at that time, exemption from enrolment and attendance at school was still 
allowed “in respect of children with a physical or mental disability that renders them 
… unable to be educated” (Sleek & Howie, 1987, p. 58). So while “teachers, parents 
and the community [may] have been reluctant to set any group of children apart from 
their fellows any more than is necessary” and while there may have been “widespread 
agreement within the New Zealand educational community that all exceptional 
children should have ready access to regular educational facilities”, policy and 
practice still reflected the view that there were some children who were “uneducable”, 
and who would receive no benefit from and may be a burden to education. 
However, at the time these authors were writing, pressure for change was 
building across the community and in the education and policy arenas and continued 
to mount through the 1980s and 1990s. In the following section I will discuss the 
special education policy context that preceded SE2000 between the years 1987-1996. 
In this section I will outline issues and developments related to special and inclusive 
education and the education of disabled children that were significant factors in the 
gestation and ultimate shape of SE2000.  
Towards Inclusion: The Special Education Policy Context 1987-1996  
In the 1980s and 1990s the principles of integration, mainstreaming and inclusion 
were beginning to have a significant impact on New Zealand’s education and 
education policy landscape. Pressure for educational inclusion was growing with 
groups such as the Assembly of Disabled People (DPA) and others calling for an end 
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to separate provision for disabled children and young people (Ballard, 1996). In the 
1987 Draft Review of Special Education (Department of Education) an indication of 
the policy direction that was emerging can be seen.  
Clear support has emerged for the principle of equity for all, which 
requires the fullest possible inclusion of all students in regular 
settings, rather than the continuation of the parallel system… While 
special education is still required for many students with handicaps 
it is now internationally acknowledged that they should not be 
segregated from their same age peers without the most compelling 
reasons.  (Department of Education 1987, p. 16) 
It was proposed in this document “that over time, but as quickly as possible, all 
students would be included in the regular education stream” (p. 3) and that special 
education would “be reoriented to substantially dismantle the parallel stream of 
special education and include all students with special education needs in the 
mainstream” (p. 7). The authors of the document issued a caveat, however, stating 
that “a major public campaign is an essential prerequisite for this development. 
Without the support of society as a whole, the necessary resources will not be 
provided” (Department of Education, 1987, p. 9). The plan as outlined was not 
implemented, and although the changes in the subsequent 1989 Education Act seem 
consistent with this emerging policy direction there was no indication in that Act of 
any intended change to the available range of provision. Perhaps policymakers 
recognised that at that point, in 1989, these changes may not have been favoured by 
what the Review described as, “society as a whole”(Department of Education, 1987).  
The Education Act 1989 
The passing of the 1989 Education Act marked a highly significant moment in time 
with respect to education generally in New Zealand as it signalled a major 
reconceptualisation of education and legislated a major restructuring of the education 
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system. In relation to the education of disabled children the Act also signalled and 
legislated significant change that reflected moves internationally to enshrine disabled 
children’s rights to education in law. Prior to 1989, disabled children had no absolute 
“right to education provision in the law of New Zealand” and there was “ no legal 
obligation upon educational authorities to provide any education at all to exceptional 
children whose parents do not wish to educate them privately” (Sleek & Howie, 1987, 
p. 61-63). As Sleek and Howie (1987) pointed out the Education Act 1964 provided 
permission but no obligation to provide state special education facilities for disabled 
children. The lack of the right to education provision in the law meant that in practice 
many children were excluded from any state supported education at all (Sleek & 
Howie, 1987) and indeed from education altogether. In the 1989 Act this changed and 
the right of all children, irrespective of ability, to attend a state school (Section 8) and 
compulsory education for all children, including disabled children, aged between 6-15 
years (Section 20) were enshrined in law.  
(8) Equal rights to primary and secondary education 
(1) Except as provided in this Part of the Act, people who 
have special educational needs(whether because of disability 
or otherwise) have the same rights  to enrol and receive 
education at state schools as people who do not. 
(20) New Zealand citizens and residents between 6 and 15 to go to school 
(1) Except as provided in this Act, every person who is not a 
foreign student is required to be enrolled at a registered school 
at all times during the period beginning on the person's sixth 
birthday and ending on the person's 15th birthday. 
(Education Act 1989) 
These changes meant that not only were disabled children now entitled to enrol in a 
state school but also that exemptions “in respect of children with a physical or mental 
disability that renders them … unable to be educated” (Sleek & Howie, 1987, p. 58), 
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were no longer allowed. Schooling was now compulsory for all children, including 
disabled children, between the ages of 6-15. While not overtly stated, implicit in this 
legislation were firstly the recognition that all children had the right to a state-funded 
education, and secondly a move away from the belief that some children were 
uneducable to the recognition that all children can learn and benefit from education.  
Another significant feature of the Act in relation to special education and thus 
the education of disabled children was the establishment of a new Crown agency 
responsible for special education, the Special Education Service. This service was 
established to “provide advice, guidance, and support for the benefit of people under 
21 with difficulties in learning or development” (Education Act, 1989, Pt 4, S 39). 
The service brought together in one agency a range of professionals including 
educational psychologists,speech therapists, and other advisors and therapists who 
provided support to disabled children and others with special education needs, their 
families, and to the schools in which they were enrolled. The Special Education 
Service (SES) worked in a variety of roles and across a range of spheres. The list 
below shows that the work of the agency covered a wide ambit including among other 
things classroom support, training for teachers, and advising and making 
recommendations to the Ministry of Education: 
• determining eligiblity for special services and placement; 
• advocating for students and families within the education system; 
• providing advice and support to educators about learning and teaching both in 
general and in relationship to pupils experiencing difficulties; 
• providing advice about programmes for individuals; 
• assisting families with non-education–related difficulties in their functioning; 
• facilitating co-ordination of service provision; 
• providing formal and informal training for educators and others involved with 
children and young people; 
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• advising the Ministry of Education on the allocation and use of discretionary 
resources and the deployment of staffing. 
(Ministry of Education, 1991, p. 6) 
From its inception the service had a strong comitment to inclusion which was 
articulated clearly and unequivocally in their early defined policy on mainstreaming: 
The SES believes that it is the right of all learners with special 
developmental and educational needs to share the same learning 
environment as their age mates within the local community. 
The SES will work towards the goal of integrating all learners with 
special needs into a regular age appropriate classroom of their local 
school alongside their peers.  
(Special Education Service, 1991, p. 1 as cited in Moltzen, Mitchell, 
& Middleton, 1992, p. 7) 
The commitment of the SES to inclusion is significant because given the wide-
ranging ambit of its work, the service was well placed to promote inclusion and to 
influence policy and practice right across the education sector and into the community 
as well. It would seem that in the early 1990s individual professionals within the 
service, and the SES agency itself were engaged actively in so doing. Brown & Wills 
(2000) noted that professionals working within the SES aligned themselves with those 
parents and community-based groups who were advocating an end to separate 
provision for disabled children.  
At the agency level, the SES was strongly represented in the interagency 
group of seven parents and educators who travelled overseas to study “the latest 
practices of inclusive education in Canada, Sweden and Denmark” (New Zealand 
CCS, 1991). It was also acknowledged as one of the agencies which made the tour 
possible which would suggest that the SES provided financial support for venture. 
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The three SES members of this group held senior roles in the service, one as the  
National Advisor Policy and Development and the others as District Managers. This 
group developed what was called a “blueprint for inclusive education” designed to 
provide “goals and practical strategies to achieve a vision of inclusive education in 
New Zealand” (p. 1) in which: 
All learners will have a quality learning environment alongside their 
family, friends and age-mates within their local community.   
(New Zealand CCS, 1991, p. 16) 
Interestingly this vision statement is very similar in tenor and wording to the belief 
statement written in the SES policy on mainstreaming that is included above. The 
commitment of the SES to inclusion was likely to have been a significant factor in the 
direction of education policy for disabled children and those with other special needs. 
Certainly Ballard (1990), who had noted the agency’s commitment to what he called 
“integration”, considered it to be so: 
Given the rights provided in the Education Act and the clear 
commitment of the new Special Education Service to integration 
through mainstreaming, it seems possible that the dual system of 
special and regular education in New Zealand could be moving 
toward merging as one education system that meets the needs of all 
children.  (Ballard, 1990, p. 116) 
So from 1989, in legislation, and in principle at least, all disabled children had equal 
rights as all other children to enrol and receive education at state schools; no school 
would be entitled to refuse a child’s enrolment on the basis of disability. The way was 
opened for a more inclusive approach to the education of disabled children in New 
Zealand. An approach which it would appear was likely to be facilitated by the 
Special Education Services, the new key bureacracy concerned with special education 
and thus educational provision for disabled children.  
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An Idea in Search of a Policy 1990-1995 
Inclusion in the guise of “integration” or “mainstreaming” continued to be on the 
policy agenda in the 1990s. In 1990, the Ministry of Education (1990) commissioned 
report of the Education Reform Implementation Process Review Team, the Lough 
Report, recommended that a process for implementing “the government’s policy of 
mainstreaming”(p. 46) be established that would: 
identify procedures and a timetable for disestablishment by the 
Ministry of Education, in conjunction with the Special Education 
Service, of the special units and classes and the non-residential and 
residential special schools.                                                       (p. 46) 
Further to this in 1991, the Ministry of Education included the following objective in 
a discussion paper on the education of learners with special needs: “Special education 
to take place in regular settings” (Ministry of Education, 1991 as cited in Moltzen, 
Mitchell and Middleton, 1992, p. 7).  
However there was a gap between averring policy support for “equity for all 
which requires the fullest possible inclusion of all students in regular settings, rather 
than the continuation of the parallel system” (Department of  of Education, 1987, as 
cited in Brown & Wills, 2000, p. 3), and achieving that in practice. As noted earlier, 
the policymakers had recognised that public support would be needed to successfully 
“dismantle the parallel stream of special education and include all students with 
special education needs in the mainstream” (Department of Education, 1987 p. 7). But 
in the early 1990s it is not entirely clear what level of public support there was for 
such a radical move. Ballard (1990) writing at the time, suggested that support for 
“mainstreaming” was “probably a minority view” in New Zealand and separate 
special education provision was still supported by special educators and some parents 
(p.117). Moltzen, Mitchell, and Middleton (1992) who interviewed principals, 
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trustees and teachers from fifteen New Zealand schools about matters related to 
special education including the policy of mainstreaming, found that while the 
majority of their respondents supported mainstreaming in principle, they expressed 
reservations about it in practice. Concerns cited related to inter alia adequate 
resourcing, the degree and nature of disability, and the need for teachers to be 
properly trained to work with disabled children. These are the views of a relatively 
small sample, but they do represent the views of different groups closely involved 
with the issues in different school sectors and they were probably fairly representative 
of views in the schooling sector generally at that time. While the rights of disabled 
children to receive their education in regular schools may have been enshrined in 
legislation, clearly there was still some way to go to achieve universal acceptance of 
the implications of that right for policy and practice.    
It would also appear there was, to some extent, a policy vacuum with respect 
to special education issues at that time. Ballard (1996) refers to the fact that the 
Ministry of Education, established under the 1989 Act, “operated without a special 
education policy” (p. 36) in the years 1989-1995, and that “special education had no 
direction” (p. 36). A similar lack of a “cohesive statement” of special education 
policies had also been commented on by Milne and Brown (1987) who suggested that 
the system had evolved in a somewhat ad hoc way over the years. The lack of 
coherent and comprehensible special education policy was also noted by the Special 
Education Policy Implementation Team(SEPIT) who in their  final report stated that 
there was “a general perception that clear policy statements on special education are 
fragmented, complicated and poorly understood” (Special Education Policy 
Implementation Team, 1993, p. 15). 
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Nevertheless, a lack of an official special education policy should not be 
confused with a lack of interest or activity with respect to special education and 
educational provision for disabled children in this period. Mitchell (2001) claims that 
there are “few sectors in New Zealand education that have been as frequently 
reviewed … as special education” (2001, p. 319). In this period, described by Mitchell 
as the “First Wave of Reforms”, there certainly was considerable activity occuring in 
relation to special education although much of this was concerned with issues related 
to resourcing and administration rather than with articulating a coherent and cohesive 
policy position with respect to inclusive education. The change of government in 
1990 ushered in a period of further reform in the education sector to bring it into line 
with the neoliberal reforms enacted by the previous Fourth Labour Government. As 
befitted a conservative, neoliberal inclined administration, issues of equitable and 
efficient distribution of special education resources became one focus of policy 
attention prompted by concerns such as that articulated by the SEPIT team: 
The current distribution of special education resources reflects 
historical decisions and is not spread equtably throughout the 
country. Consequently children and young people are being funded 
in very different ways in different parts of the country. 
(Special Education Policy Implementation Team, 1993, p. 165) 
In addition there was an increasing awareness that special education had been 
relatively untouched by the major reforms to the education system enacted by the 
Fourth Labour Government and thus issues related to the administration of special 
education were also on the agenda at this time. 
Special Education in New Zealand: Statement of Intent 
In 1991 Special Education in New Zealand: Statement of Intent was released by the 
Ministry of Education. The purpose of the document was “to set out the framework 
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for the Government’s intentions for special education policy” (Ministry of Education, 
1991, p.4). Moltzen, Mitchell, and Middleton(1992) suggested that the new 
government “had a noticeably diminished commitment to mainstreaming” (p.7) and 
descibed the Statement of Intent as “cautious- even equivocal” (p. 7) in its 
commitment to inclusion or mainstreaming. In this document the government appears 
to be avoiding the choice between two contrary positions by giving support to both 
the inclusion of disabled children in age appropriate regular education settings and to 
continued special school provision as long as it was supported by enrolments. 
However it is also clear that the concern and focus of the document is not really with 
the question of inclusion and educational placement but rather, as Mitchell (2001) 
suggests, “underlying this document was the perception that the then administration 
of special education was problematical” (p. 322). A key concern of the document was 
to attend to this problem. In the document it is explained that historically the  
development of special education had been the result of “lobbying by practitioners 
and theorists on behalf of various groups of students with special needs, rather than a 
concerted effort to provide a comprehensive system of educational provision relevant 
to all such students”(Minstry of Education, 1991, p. 10). This had meant, according to 
the writers of the document, that the system of special education had developed in 
“piecemeal fashion” which resulted in the following issues: 
• an unfair allocation of services 
• an unfair distribution of services 
• a lack of coordination among the various private and state sector agencies 
serving students with special needs 
• a system that is often slow to respond to the needs identified by parents  or 
education providers 
• a system that fails to take into account the needs of Maori students 
• an inadequate system of monitoring and evalutating special education 
provision 
• a lack of co-ordination and uneven provision between sectors 
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• a system which ties up an undue proportion of resources in adminstrative and 
assessment procedures   (Ministry of Education, 1991, p. 10) 
According to Mitchell, (2001) the reforms outlined in the Statement of Intent 
indicated that the government considered that “the special education sector” 
represented “unfinished business in the reforms of education administration in New 
Zealand” (p322). The Statement of Intent laid out the government’s plan for 
remedying this situation and was very much concerned with the key mantras of the 
earlier neoliberal reforms in education: equity, efficiency, decentralisation and 
consumer choice. Not suprisingly some of what it proposed was controversial and 
attracted criticism in many quarters (Mitchell, 2001).  
Following the release of the Statement of Intent there was a long period of 
consultation with a series of national meetings and hui conducted under the auspices 
of SEPIT (Brown & Wills, 2000); it was not until 1993 that SEPIT finally released its 
report and recommendations. The report laid out a “proposal for  future delivery of 
special education resources which was developed by SEPIT” (Special Education 
Policy Implementation Team, 1993, p 1). Accordingly, much of the focus of this 
report and its recommendations were to do with the management and allocation of 
resources and the funding of special education (Mitchell, 2001) which had been 
identified as being inequitably delivered across the country (Mitchell & Ryba, 1994). 
The recommendations included the establishment of local special education 
management groups to whom responsibility for the use of special education resources 
would be devolved along with the establishment of a national special education 
committee which would provide policy advice to the Minister and be responsible for 
the development of a national strategic plan for special education (Mitchell, 2001). 
Another significant feature of the report was the recommendation that there be review 
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of the criteria for receiving special education resources and that the allocation of 
resources should change from a population basis to a needs basis (Mitchell & 
Ryba,1994). It was suggested that the change should occur over a 3-5 year period and 
that prior to this happening eligibility criteria, and the number and location of children 
with special needs would need to be determined (Mitchell, 2001). These 
recommendations resulted in the government commissioning a review of special 
education criteria. This review (Mitchell & Ryba, 1994) recommended a national 
framework for determining students’ needs for support and introduced the notion of 
varying levels of need ranging from those which would generally be able to be met 
within a regular school’s standard resources, through to those which would require a 
very high level of additional and specialised support (Mitchell, 2001). The influence 
of this review can be seen in the framework described in Special Education 2000 
which reflected aspects of the structure proposed by Mitchell and Ryba.  
An Idea Whose Time Had Come 
Nothing is so powerful as an idea whose time has come 
 -Vicktor Hugo 
As can be seen from the previous discussion, educational policy considerations with 
respect to disabled children and other children with special needs were by the 1990s 
mired in concerns with administration and resourcing and the government focus 
seemed to be on bringing special education into line with the wider education reforms. 
However this does not truly represent the entire picture for while possibly not at the 
forefront of the concerns, a continuing move towards inclusion and the rights of 
disabled children can be seen in three wider education policy developments during 
this period: The Human Rights Act, 1993; the New Zealand Curriculum Framework, 
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1993 and The Salamanca Statement, 1994. Following the assertion of the rights of 
disabled children to state-funded-education enshrined in the Education Act 1989, 
disabled children’s rights with respect to education were further strengthened in the 
the Human Rights Act of 1993 which prohibited discrimination on the grounds of 
disablity and made it unlawful for: 
an educational establishment, or the authority responsible for the 
control of an educational establishment, or any person concerned in 
the management of an educational establishment  or in teaching at 
an educational establishment,— 
(a) to refuse or fail to admit a person as a pupil or student; or 
(b) to admit a person as a pupil or a student on less favourable terms 
and conditions than would otherwise be made available; or 
(c) to deny or restrict access to any benefits or services provided by 
the establishment; or 
(d) to exclude a person as a pupil or a student or subject him or her 
to any other detriment,—(Human Rights Act, 1993, Section 57) 
In 1993 the New Zealand Curriculum Framework (Ministry of Education,1993), New 
Zealand’s first national curriculum was introduced. This document as a statement of 
education policy asserted a strong commitment in principle to inclusion. In the 
document it was stated that the curriculum was to apply to:  
• all New Zealand schools, including kura kaupapa Māori, and 
special education schools;  
• all students, irrespective of gender, ethnicity, belief, ability 
or disability, social or cultural background, or geographical 
location;  
• all years of schooling, from new entrants to the completion 
of schooling; that is, from years 1 to 13. (p. 4) 
and further, the following principle was asserted: 
The New Zealand Curriculum provides all students with equal 
educational opportunities.  
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• The school curriculum will recognise, respect, and respond 
to the educational needs, experiences, interests, and values 
of all students: both female and male students; students of all 
ethnic groups; students with different abilities and 
disabilities and students of different social and religious 
backgrounds. Inequalities will be recognised and addressed. 
All programmes will be gender-inclusive, non-racist, and 
non-discriminatory, to help ensure that learning 
opportunities are not restricted.                                     (p. 6) 
The third factor that demonstrates the continuing move towards inclusion during the 
1990s, is that in 1994 New Zealand became a signatory to the Salamanca Statement. 
The Salamanca Statement was an international declaration and assertion of the rights 
of all disabled children to be included in regular education and the responsibility of 
national governments to make provision for this. As outlined earlier, this document 
called on all signatories to “adopt as a matter of law or policy the principle of 
inclusive education, enrolling all children in regular schools, unless there are 
compelling reasons for doing otherwise”(as cited in Mitchell, 2010, p. 125). By 
signing this document the New Zealand government agreed to the principles therein 
and thus was not only committed but also bound to the principle of inclusive 
education.  
By the mid-1990s then it would be fair to argue that with respect to education 
policy in New Zealand “inclusion was an idea whose time had come”. However it was  
jostling for position with another competing imperative, neoliberalism, that was 
exercising considerable sway and influence at that time. The characteristics of the 
neoliberal turn in the New Zealand policy context generally and more specifically in 
terms of education policy in New Zealand in the 1980s and 1990s form part of the 
analysis and critique with respect to SE2000 that is the focus of the next chapter.  
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Chapter Five 
Special Education 2000: New Zealand’s first “inclusive 
education” policy 
This chapter examines SE2000, the influences and tensions in the policy context that 
shaped and constrained it, and the way these influenced how special school provision 
was positioned and addressed in the policy. The chapter begins by briefly outlining 
practical features of the framework and structure of SE2000. Following this the 
substantive matters of the chapter are addressed. First, the influence of neoliberalism 
both in terms of the wider policy context and in relation to the shape and structure of 
the policy itself is considered. This is followed by a critique of how the question of 
special school provision is attended to in the policy; the argument is made that the 
position taken in the policy with respect to special school provision was the result of a 
kind of political pragmatism in the face of the tensions between the conflicting policy 
imperatives of neoliberalism and inclusion. Finally I argue that there was a 
fundamental and essential injustice inherent to SE2000; in endorsing universal 
inclusion as the policy goal, it promoted only a single vision of justice with respect to 
the needs of the children and young people it was designed to serve.  
Special Education 2000 
SE 2000 was introduced with the lofty and somewhat nebulous goal of “achieving 
over the next decade, a world class inclusive education system” (Ministry of 
Education, 1996, p. 3). As noted earlier, it is reasonable to suggest that the changes 
introduced in the policy, particularly the provision of fully portable funding which 
would follow eligible children wherever they went (Moltzen & Mitchell, 2000), were 
intended to ease the access of disabled children into regular school settings. However, 
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given that the use of the language of inclusion was a new departure in the New 
Zealand educational policy lexicon, it is curious that no explanation or definition was 
given of what might constitute a “world class inclusive education system”. “Inclusive 
education” had entered the realm of New Zealand educational policy-speak as an 
essentially unproblematic concept. In the policy arena at least, the turn to inclusive 
education, had begun.  
Framework and structure  
At the practical level, the strategies for achieving “the world class inclusive 
educations system” were described in a new model for the provision of special 
education resources and delivery. Much of the detail of this is not relevant to the 
argument being pursued in this thesis but as it forms part of the context of the 
discussion I will briefly outline the key points here. Under SE 2000 the funding and 
service model was conceived as a pyramid divided into three sections that, to a large 
extent, can be said to represent diminishing levels of need among increasing numbers 
of eligible students. The policy, described as a “phased strategy” (Ministry of 
Education, 1996, p. 2) by the Ministry of Education (MOE), was rolled out initially in 
three stages over the period 1996-1998. According to Fancy, the Secretary for 
Education at the time (1999), the phased approach was necessary “because of the size 
and complexity of the policy”(p.7). Certainly the policy was attacking the problem of 
special education on a number of fronts. In its initial form the initiative had five 
component parts: 
1. The Special Education Grant paid directly to schools to meet the needs of 
students described as having moderate learning and behaviour difficulties. 
2. The Ongoing Resourcing Scheme an individual resourcing entitlement for 
children described as having high and very high needs. 
 86 
3. Speech-Language which providing resourcing and funding for children with 
speech and language difficulties. 
4. The Severe Behaviour Initiative which provided funding to support children 
with severe behavioural issues 
5. The Early Childhood programme that was to support early intervention 
services. 
These five parts constituted the framework for resourcing and provision but from 
early on in the development there were significant additions and alterations made to 
the policy. These changes were made in the light of information derived from 
Ministry of Education commissioned reviews (Massey, 1999, 2000, 2002; Wylie, 
2000), and in response to feedback from stakeholders including parents and schools.   
The Ongoing Resourcing Scheme 
SE2000 was comprehensive and wide-ranging in its scope but the component that is 
of particular interest with respect to this work is the Ongoing and Reviewable 
Resourcing Scheme (ORRS). I will briefly outline the key aspect of ORRS here 
before exploring theories and principles in the policy. ORRS provided for 
individually targeted funding for a small group of children with what were defined as 
“high” and ”very high needs” for support to access the education system. 
Classification of level of need was to be determined by “the amount of additional 
assistance the student needs in order to participate in and benefit from the school 
programme” (Ministry of Education, 1996, p. 7). The percentage of school-aged 
students estimated by the MOE to have “high” to “very high” needs has been 
variously reported as two or three per cent of the total school-age population 
(Ministry of Education, 1998; Moltzen & Mitchell, 2000). Children and young people 
who gained classification as having “high” or “very high” needs, received 
individually targeted support under ORRS. These students attracted both additional 
teacher time and a cash component to fund teacher-aide support and support from 
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specialist therapists such as speech-language therapists, physiotherapists, and sign 
language interpreters. The level of the cash component and the additional teacher time 
varied according to the assessed level of need so that those assessed as eligible for 
very high needs support attracted a higher amount of both teacher and financial 
resources. Funding and support through ORRS was portable so that if the child 
transferred schools, the funding went with him or her; it was expected that this aspect 
of the scheme would result in “a greater demand than previously for placement in 
regular schools and regular classes” (Moltzen & Mitchell, 2000, para 3). However, as 
I shall discuss later, this expectation was not entirely realised.  
Management of the ORRS Funds 
Management of the funds generated through ORRS was to be in the control of the 
Special Education Service (SES) or of schools or a cluster of schools delegated as 
“fundholders”. In order for a school or cluster of schools to act as fundholders they 
had to be receiving funds for twenty or more students with high or very high needs. 
Many special schools met this requirement. The majority of the funds (approximately 
sixty percent) were managed by SES (now Special Education in the Ministry of 
Education); the rest were, and are still, managed by fundholder schools (known now 
as Accredited Special Education Service Providers). 
Although the ORRS entitlements were to be allocated on the basis of 
individual need, the MOE expected the funds to be aggregated into a pool by 
fundholders; the money was not considered by the MOE to constitute an individual 
entitlement. As explained above the funds were to provide specialist and teacher-aide 
support for the individual student. The nature and quantum of this support would be 
determined on the basis of identified specific needs as agreed by parents, school, 
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fundholders and the student, and described in an Individual Education Plan (IEP). The 
Ministry of Education’s expectation was that the model of delivery would operate on 
an “unders and overs” system whereby the needs of all the students in the pool are 
balanced against one another so that some students are deemed to have lesser needs 
and others greater; the money is then distributed accordingly. This model is, of course, 
inherently competitive; the person who can make the better case for need is likely to 
get the bigger amount of support and this potentially can result in a situation in which 
some students come out as winners and others as losers. As I will discuss later, ORRS 
was to have a significant influence in the special school sector but possibly not quite 
the influence that was expected by the policymakers.  
SE2000: The Policy Context 
SE2000 was, “made in the context of multiple human activities, experiences, purposes 
and needs” and as such was influenced by prevailing ideologies and philosophical 
premises (Scheffler as cited in McLaughlin, 2000, p. 444). At the level of principle 
and philosophy, SE2000 was clearly influenced by and espoused theories of inclusion 
and inclusive education, but in addition the policy was also the product of a policy 
context in which neoliberal principles were a pervasive and prevailing influence on 
policy formation and shape. Choice, and freedom from state interference in making 
choices, devolution and decentralization, market-oriented principles and sovereignty 
of the consumer were, and still are, significant imperatives that informed the 
particular shape of neoliberal thinking in New Zealand education policy. These 
imperatives, along with that of including all children in regular schooling that 
underpinned inclusive education, together served as the ideological underpinnings 
that informed the shape and development of SE2000 and created the anomalies and 
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contradictions inherent to it. Peters and Marshall (1996) point out that the 
development of new policy for educational reform: 
does not take place within a vacuum because it is constrained by a 
pre-existing policy context which helps to determine its initial terms 
of reference, its core values and ultimately its political acceptability. 
                                                                                                  (p. 77) 
This is certainly true of the development of SE2000 which occurred during a time of 
significant educational change and reform both in New Zealand and internationally. 
The context from which the policy emerged was one in which ideas about education 
were under the influence of what were in effect contradictory principles and tenets 
derived from a social democratic perspective on the one hand and from a neoliberal 
perspective on the other (McMenamin, 2014). In SE2000 we can see reflected the 
confluence of policy imperatives driven by the quite different philosophies or 
ideologies of inclusion and neoliberalism. The tensions, contradictions and 
compromises inherent to SE2000 are a result of this uneasy merger and, as I will 
explain in more detail later, this balancing act between the two essentially 
contradictory imperatives was significant in the way in which special school provision 
and the question of location were attended to in the policy. Prior to examining the 
question of location in the policy, I will in the next section discuss the neoliberal turn 
in the New Zealand policy context generally and more specifically in terms of 
education policy in New Zealand in the 1980s and 1990s, the time during which the 
influence of neoliberalism was certainly at its peak. 
Neoliberalism 
Roberts and Peters (2008) describe neoliberalism as the “big story” and “dominant 
narrative” (p. 1) of our time, at least with respect to what they describe as “reform 
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agendas around the Western world” (p. 1). But neoliberalism is not one single unified 
political philosophy or ideology (Roberts & Peters, 2008; Steger & Roy 2010). Steger 
and Roy (2010) describe it as “a rather broad and general concept referring to an 
economic model or ‘paradigm’ ”(p. 28). Olssen, O’Neil, and Codd suggest that the 
concept “serves as a useful proxy indicator to characterise those groups that support 
an expanded market and reduced public provision” (p. 135) and describe the 
“common basis shared by neoliberals” (p. 137) as a “basic commitment to individual 
liberty” and the emphasis on “a ‘reduced’ state” (p. 137). Olssen, et al. (2004) explain 
the neoliberal view of the state as 
that of ‘mediator’ and ‘instigator’ of the successful operation of the 
market. In this its role is to neither promote social justice nor 
develop public monopolies. Thus, the assertion of this new morality 
not only entails a revised conception of the individual, but a revised 
conception of the nature and process of democracy, of the role of 
the state, and by implication, of the policy –making process and its 
outcomes. State support for egalitarian policy initiatives is thought 
to be an attack on ‘enterprise and endeavour’, ‘self-reliance’, 
‘responsible self-management’, and ‘personal sacrifice’ (Keat, 1991; 
Peters, 1992).  (p.138) 
 
Despite the nuances and variations in the concept there are some key aspects that 
define and characterise neoliberal theories. A belief in the power and rectitude of the 
market in tandem with a reduction in and alteration of the role of the state underpins 
neoliberal thought and action. Inherent in this market-oriented view is an emphasis on 
consumer sovereignty and with that, an emphasis on and commitment to consumer 
choice as a fundamental principle. Individualism, that is the notion that society is 
based on individual enterprise and self-reliance with each individual responsible for 
his or her own well-being, is also fundamental to both neoliberal thought and action. 
Incorporated in this is the postulate of homo economicus which assumes a priori, 
“that people are isolated individuals whose actions reflect mostly their material self 
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interests” (Steger & Roy, 2011, p. 20). In this view of the world, people are 
constituted as consumers and as free, independent individuals unfettered in their 
ability to make choices and decisions on the basis of individual needs and desires. 
Freedom is interpreted in specifically individual terms as being free from state 
interference (Peters, 2011). This understanding of freedom sees state involvement in 
social issues as interference and generally unwarranted.   
    Thus in neoliberal thinking, individualism, a reduced role for the state, and 
the primacy of the market all underpin an ideological position in which, at its most 
extreme, matters of social justice are no longer seen as the preserve of governments 
nor as properly the concern of policy and policymakers. This is a position which “puts 
the production and exchange of material goods at the heart of the human experience”, 
(Steger & Roy, 2008 p. 30), and which “holds that the social good will be maximised 
by maximising the reach and frequency of market transactions and seeks to bring all 
human actions into the domain of the market” (Harvey, 2005, p. 12).   
The Neoliberal Turn in New Zealand Education 
Historically and symbolically, 1984 represents… a profound shift in 
the principles of social and political philosophy, and the promotion 
of the neoliberal political project of globalisation. 
(Peters, 2011, p. 102) 
The election in 1984 of the Fourth Labour government ushered in a period of 
unprecedented, far reaching, radical economic and social reform based on neoliberal 
principles. This process of reform was continued and furthered by both the centre 
right National government which was elected to power in 1990, and the Labour 
government which took office in 1999. Roberts and Peters (2008) described the 
reforms as an “ aggressive programme of corporatization, marketization and 
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privatization in economic and social policy” (p. 2) that was grounded “in a view of 
human beings as rational, self-interested, choosers and consumers” (p. 3). The initial 
reforms in public administration were based on “five fundamental principles of equity, 
quality, efficiency, effectiveness and economy” (Mitchell, 2001, p. 320), and were 
justified on the basis that the changes to the administration would lead to greater 
efficiency which would be better for the country as a whole (Olssen, O’Neil, & Codd, 
2004).     
It was not until its second term that the Fourth Labour Government targeted 
the national education system for the programme of change and reform that would 
bring it in to line with the other public service areas. Comparing the reforms in New 
Zealand with those in England and Wales, Olssen et al. (2004) make the point that in 
New Zealand rather than the quality of education being the central issue of concern, 
the “original impetus for reform was targeted as public administration”(p. 177). While 
this may be true, the impact of these reforms was, as Olssen and Morris-Matthews 
(1997) explain, such that “the very notion of education” (p. 17) changed, and for: 
the first time in New Zealand’s history, the conception of education 
as a private commodity subject to market conditions became a 
reality. The central issue of equality of opportunity which 
dominated the debate up until the end of the Muldoon era, gave way 
to talk about ‘efficiency’, ‘choice’, ‘competition’ and 
‘accountability’.                                                                    (p.17-18) 
The changes in education reflect in large part the neoliberal views of the Treasury, 
that “education shares the main characteristics of other commodities traded in the 
marketplace and could not be analysed successfully as a ‘public good’ ” (as cited in 
Olssen & Morris-Matthews, 1997, p. 11-12). Education thus should be sited in the 
marketplace as a commodity like any other and should be subject to the same vagaries 
of the market place as any other. These views were given further weight and shape in 
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the highly significant Picot Report (Department of Education, 1988) which Adams, 
Clark, Codd, O’Neill, Openshaw, and Waietere-Ang (2000) described as proposing 
“the most radical restructuring of our education system in a hundred years” (p. 150). 
This report set in motion a raft of reforms and changes that were underpinned by 
neoliberal values and tenets and were based on what were described in the report as 
“Core Values": 
• Choice  
• An assumption of individual competence 
• Cultural sensitivity 
• Good management practices (Department of Education, 1988, p. 3). 
The reforms articulated in the Picot Report took on their policy shape in the 
government White Paper Tomorrow’s Schools in 1988, and in “the Education Act of 
1989 and its subsequent amendments” (Mitchell, 1996, p. 55). Olssen et al. (2004) 
describe how the “new educational structure entailed a devolution of decision-making 
in a wide range of administrative areas, including resource allocation, staff 
appointments, support services and staff development” (p. 176). The main thrust of 
the reforms they explained was to “reduce the size of the central bureaucracy, to 
abolish regional education boards, and to convert each learning institution into a self-
managing unit having its own, elected Board of Trustees” (p.176). However, while 
devolution of decision-making was the order of the day, the reality was that control 
remained “firmly invested” in the newly established state agencies, the Ministry of 
Education, the Education Review Office, and the New Zealand Qualifications 
Authority and was maintained through systems of accountability and surveillance that 
characterise the neoliberal project. Under the reforms, schools were to be the “basic 
building block” (Mitchell, 1996) of educational administration. Each school would 
become “self-managing” with responsibility for its own finances and educational 
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resources and, within the bounds of Ministry defined guidelines, able to set its own 
objectives to meet the needs of its local community. Schools were to be run as a 
partnership between the community and professionals; responsibility would be shifted 
from the central to the local level. Through the vehicle of these reforms the state 
shifted “from provider and manager of public education to legal arbiter of consumer 
rights” (McLean, 1988, p.201 as cited in Gordon& Codd, 1991). McLean referring to 
the 1988 British Education Act, further argues that the effect of such changes are that 
the:  
central government abjured responsibility for social welfare and 
distanced itself from the agencies that provided it, whether private 
or local public authorities. Its concern was with efficiency and the 
rights of consumers. But this distant and non-participant 
government still exercised its regulatory and inspection functions. 
    (McLean, 1988, p. 202 as cited in Gordon & Codd, 1991, p. 23)  
These are comments that can equally be applied to the New Zealand context.  
SE2000 was thus developed in the wake of educational reforms that brought 
about an extraordinary and comprehensive alteration to the public education 
landscape in New Zealand. While special education was not addressed at the time of 
the major education reforms in 1989, apparently because it “was seen as too complex” 
(Davies, 2000, p. 1), it would appear that it  was certainly developed in line with the  
thinking informing the earlier reforms and in deference to the “core values” 
articulated in the Picot Report. As Mitchell (2001, p. 331) points out, prior to “ the 
introduction of SE2000, … special education was a highly centralised sector, with 
top-down legislation and policy guidelines, a non-contestible Special Education 
Service and centrally determined provision”, characteristics which would, without 
doubt, have represented a somewhat jarring anomaly in the system overall and in the 
mind of a government committed to neoliberal reforms in the public sector.   
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In 2000, Davies, a key policy actor working in the Special Education Services, 
presented a paper at the International Special Education Congress (ISEC) 2000 in 
which he clearly sites the new special education policy within the philosophy of the 
1989 reforms. Davies (2000) stated that “the increase in demand for parental choice 
and the philosophy of self-managing schools presented pressures that resulted in a 
new policy, Special Education 2000” (p. 1). He went on to explain that there was a 
need to “ensure that special education provision was consistent with self-managing 
schools” (p. 5), and that the “alignment between the 1989 education reforms and 
special education required a new resourcing mechanism that would enable schools to 
assume full responsibility in meeting the full range of student need” (p. 5). As Wills 
(2006) has argued while the ‘manifest’ intentions of the policymakers may have been 
that of achieving inclusion, “the ‘latent’ intentions of the policymakers were to 
introduce the new public management approaches of the reforms of education into 
special education” (p. 191). Certainly the language of policy statements and 
documents and key features of the policy reflect a concern with efficient, effective 
and equitable use of resources, a concern that characterised Tomorrow’s Schools and 
that speaks to the minimization of the state’s role in social policy, to ensuring good 
use of taxpayer money, offering sound financial management and providing policy 
structures that give “greater certainty and predictability” (Fancy, 1999, p. 3).  
Gordon and Codd (1991, p. 21) argue that under Tomorrow’s Schools the 
“new administrative structures produce a decentralization of responsibility for 
resource allocation while maintaining centrally determined regulation of supply”. 
Such an effect is demonstrated in terms of the delivery and funding of resources for 
special education through SE2000 so that while the way in which allocations of 
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Special Education Grant (SEG) and the ORRS scheme funding were used was 
determined at the local level, the supply of such funding was fixed on the basis of 
centrally determined criteria and categories, and within the budgetary constraints as 
established by the State. This approach to policy is further demonstrated in the words 
of Howard Fancy, the then Secretary of Education, in an address to the Special 
Education 2000 Research Conference in 1999. Fancy (1999) explained that a key 
aspect of the SE2000 policy was to “get the best possible value from … money while 
designing policies that will work within the annual budget parameters determined 
each year by government” (p. 5). However, he also explained that the policy would 
allow “more decisions to be made by those who are closest to the child and best 
placed to know the child’s needs” (p. 5), and allow schools to “develop more effective 
and innovative ways of providing a better learning environment for children with 
special needs” (p. 5). These comments reflect the twin goals of devolution of 
decision-making and enhanced central fiscal control that was typical of the neoliberal 
turn in New Zealand’s education policy.  
  The  positioning of choice as a core value and the positioning of pupils and 
parents as “the consumers of education” (Department of Education, 1988, p. 4) key 
aspects of the 1989 reforms, are also reflected in the language of SE2000. In one of 
the earliest statements issued from the Ministry of Education the primacy of parents is 
asserted along with a strong assertion that the policy would increase choices available 
to parents:  
While specialist advice and support is important in creating the best 
possible learning environment, it is the family who is critical to the 
child’s educational achievement. It is the family which has the long-
term responsibility for the child and knows the child best. It is 
therefore the family which will make the most important decisions 
on the child’s behalf.                    (Ministry of Education, 1996, p. 2) 
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And: 
Special Education 2000 will increase choices available to families 
by guaranteeing resources to students with high needs and by 
making that entitlement transferable from school to school. Families 
of students with high needs will have greater ability to make choices 
between schools, confident that resourcing will no longer be a 
barrier to entry.                            (Ministry of Education, 1996, p. 2) 
In these statements we can see exemplified the undergirding neoliberal principles at 
play. In the first, the assertion of the critical role and rights of parents as decision 
makers in the education of their children, which in many ways appears a logical and 
even common sense position, adheres to neoliberal ideas of the sovereignty of the 
consumer and the focus on individual rights and responsibilities. In the second 
statement, the focus on choice and the ability to make choices clearly aligns with 
neoliberal principles while the emphasis on resourcing as the key to overcoming any 
barriers to inclusion children and families faced is consonant with the fairly narrow 
conception of equity which is characteristic of neoliberal thought and policy. 
Moreover in two of the three original goals of the policy, “to develop a clear, 
consistent and predictable framework for resourcing special education and to provide 
special education resourcing wherever the child attends school” (Wylie, 2000, p. 19), 
we can see a similar focus that would suggest that what attention there was to the 
issue as a matter of social justice was focused essentially on equity as a matter of the 
fair distribution of resources. Olssen et al. (2004) make the point that to “the extent 
that neoliberal arguments did invoke political clothing in New Zealand they appended 
themselves to progressive left-wing concerns of enhancing equity in the areas of 
gender and race” (p. 177). Something similar can be seen in SE2000 with neoliberal 
arguments being appended to concerns with enhancing equity in relation to the 
education of disabled children and the rights of their parents. Some of the impact of 
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this will be discussed in the next section which examines the tensions and constraints 
in the policy in relation to special school provision.  
SE2000 and The Question of Special School Provision  
Special Education 2000 proclaimed an overarching aim of achieving a  “world class 
inclusive education system” in New Zealand. The policy did not specify what was 
meant by this but it would be fair to suggest that what was meant would correspond 
with prevailing definitions of inclusive education at that time. Definitions in which, 
with respect to the educational needs of disabled children and young people, the sine 
qua non of “inclusive education”, was every student accessing “the curriculum as a 
fulltime member of an ordinary classroom alongside other students of a similar 
chronological age” (Ballard, 1996. p. 33). This policy direction was in line with the 
“international move towards inclusion of all children with special education needs in 
local educational settings” (Ministry of Education, 2005, p. 18) that was gaining 
significant momentum at that time.  
Given this understanding of inclusive education, special school provision 
would surely be a factor that would warrant significant attention in the policy; 
interestingly this was not the case. There was very little said with respect to the role or 
function of special schools in the “world class inclusive environment”. Statements 
that referred to special school provision simply made the point that this type of 
provision would continue while there were enrolments; hardly a ringing endorsement 
but neither an absolute condemnation. Of course, it could be argued that from a 
demographic point of view, special school provision constituted only a small part of 
the education system. However this belies the significance of this type of provision in 
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relation to the movement for inclusion with respect to disabled children and young 
people. The question of location, that is, where a disabled child or young person goes 
to school, as noted earlier, loomed large in the debates and arguments for and against 
inclusive education. 
As explained in Chapter 2, inherent to the notion of inclusion, is the belief that 
the regular school setting is the optimum place for all disabled children and young 
people to receive their education; the corollary, of course, is that special school 
settings are less than optimum places for disabled children and young people to 
receive their education. In fact, it can be argued, that in 1996 when SE 2000 was 
announced, the notion of inclusive education by definition meant the absence of any 
form of special school provision (Lipsky & Gartner, 1996). The strength of this view 
is represented by Florian (1998) who argued that the  “inclusion of all pupils in 
mainstream schools is part of an international human rights agenda” (p. 107), and 
cited the view of the Centre for Studies in Inclusive Education (CSIE) (CSIE, 1996), 
that “there is no legitimate reason to separate children for the duration of their 
schooling, they belong together” (p.107). Similarly Allan and Brown (2001) explain 
how in debates on inclusion, special schools are judged as “sites of oppression and 
discrimination” (p. 199). The following excerpt from a New Zealand text gives some 
indication that there was a similar strength of opinion in some quarters here.  
Ample evidence has been provided in this book to illustrate the 
importance of including all students in the mainstream of regular 
education. …Yet parents may decide that it is best to accommodate 
their children in segregated schools…In this case, it is questionable 
whether the option selected by the parents is in the interests of the 
child.                                                                   (Ryba, 1995, p. 223)   
It is then a curious feature of SE2000 that the issue which, arguably, was at the nub of 
its concerns and pivotal to its aims was essentially sidestepped. However, while 
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curious, it is not inexplicable if we consider the ideological and political context in 
which the policy was gestated and developed, and by which it was influenced. As 
discussed above, the years prior to the announcement of SE2000 were characterised 
by the spread of neoliberal policies and the growth of the movement for inclusion 
both in New Zealand and internationally. The conflicting demands of these two 
imperatives appear to have created a situation such that, at that time and in that policy 
context any real discussion about special school provision was essentially politically 
untenable. As a consequence there is no strong position articulated in the policy with 
respect to the value or otherwise of special school provision; rather the position seems 
to be to neither confirm nor deny any strong policy view about this.  
Neither Confirm nor Deny 
Neoliberalism certainly exerted a strong and pervasive force on educational policy in 
New Zealand during the 1980s and 1990s, and similarly during this time there was a 
steady move towards inclusion as the key policy platform in relation to the education 
of disabled children and young people. The tensions between the principles and 
imperatives of these two driving ideologies are salient factors to consider when 
examining the absence of any strongly articulated mandate for the future of special 
schooling in SE2000. In terms of special school provision the imperatives of these 
forces worked against each other within the policy; the imperatives of neoliberalism 
precluded the articulation of a policy objective that would see the end of special 
school provision while contrarily the imperatives of inclusion precluded the 
articulation of any policy objective that would support its continuation. From a 
neoliberal perspective, a policy objective that would end special school provision 
would be untenable. As we have seen, the assertion of choice as a core value and the 
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positioning of education as a commodity subject to the vagaries of the marketplace 
had been fundamental to the education reforms of the 1980s and into the 1990s. As 
Codd (1993) explains: 
As the reform agenda unfolded, the promotion of choice was to 
become one of the central policy objectives - a key that would 
presumably unlock all that is both desired and desirable in education. 
The Picot Taskforce, for instance, proclaim "choice" as the first of 
their core values and state that this "will involve providing a wider 
range of options both for consumers and for learning institutions" 
(Taskforce, 1988, p. 4). Moreover, they "see the creation of more 
choice in the system as a way of ensuring greater efficiency and 
equity" (ibid.). The promotion of choice as a primary social 
objective, and the reference to parents or learners as "consumers", 
clearly locates these statements within a market-liberal discourse…”. 
                                                                                                    (p.79) 
 
 
Special school provision within the marketplace represented “choice” for the 
consumer and as such, under the market-liberal discourse, the continuation of this 
type of provision would most properly be a matter for the market to decide. Given this 
understanding the reference in the policy to the continuation of special school 
provision being dependent on continued enrolments (Ministry of Education, 1996) 
can be seen to be in definite accordance with the prevailing neoliberal tenets. If 
consumers continue to choose a product then the product will flourish if not then it 
will fade away; either way it is not the role of the state to predetermine the choices of 
the consumer. Conversely a policy objective that would lead to the closure of special 
schools and the discontinuation of this type of provision would be contrary to 
neoliberal principles as it would represent, in effect, the government interfering with 
the proper workings of the market place. In addition, neoliberalism espoused a basic 
commitment to individual liberty, defined essentially as freedom from state 
interference. From this perspective the rights of parents to decide on matters related to 
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the education of their children were considered unassailable; a matter for individual 
families and not the preserve of the state. If there were a defined policy objective for 
the removal of special school provision stated in the policy then that would entail 
inappropriate state intervention in a matter which was essentially the concern of 
individual families and so would not be in accordance with neoliberal principles of 
individual freedom and a minimal state role.  
While a removal or proposed removal of special school provision would 
offend against the imperatives of neoliberalism, the imperatives of inclusion would be 
equally compromised and contradicted by a policy objective that specifically and 
unashamedly articulated support for continued special school provision. From a 
philosophical perspective, if inclusion is defined as “all children attending, local, 
regular, state primary or secondary schools” then a policy objective that suppported 
the continuation of special school provision would be in direct conflict with that 
philosophy. Similarly if there were a policy intention that all children should attend 
regular state primary or secondary schools then avowed support for continued special 
school provision in the policy would contradict and undermine that intention. These 
were the principles which, in its rhetoric at least, SE2000, espoused and promoted. In 
this case the reference to maintaining special school provision while there were 
enrolments can be seen as a kind of middle ground. While it does not overtly propose 
the removal of this type of provision, it certainly provides no strong support for it and 
in no way advocates for its merit or value. The tentative nature of the direction for 
special school provision hints at an expectation of a gradual reduction in special 
school enrolments; as the promise of SE2000 was realised special school provision 
would essentially wither away. 
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The gestation and development of policy is a messy business. As Bines (2000) 
points out “policy is inevitably a balancing act between different pressures and has to 
mesh with contexts and legacies and competing aspirations and views” (p. 27). This 
description is particularly apposite to SE2000. The way in which special school 
provision is accommodated within SE 2000 demonstrates, just such a balancing act 
between competing aspirations and views. Scheurich (1994) argues that  “the 
prevailing/dominant ideologies are constitutive of the social problem and also 
constitute the range of acceptable policy choices” (p. 306); such is the circumstance 
illustrated in SE2000 in which essentially contrary imperatives derived from 
neoliberalism and inclusion, determined what were possible and acceptable policy 
choices in New Zealand at that time. On initial examination the sidestepping in 
SE2000 of the issue of location or setting, an issue fundamental to notions about 
inclusive education for disabled children, appears curious. However, given the 
contextual environment from which the policy emerged, the absence of any real 
interrogation of the issue of “location” is neither curious nor surprising. The 
ideologies to which the policy was bound and which informed the thinking of the 
policy makers meant that to address the issue of location in any significant way would 
have challenged the wisdom of both ideologies and crossed the boundaries of what 
was politically possible and politically acceptable at the time. It is no wonder then, 
that in SE2000, the retention or rejection of special school provision was neither 
confirmed nor denied however whilst this political pragmatism may have worked at 
the policy level, it left special school communities in a political vacuum that, arguably, 
left them vulnerable and subject to injustice in a number of ways. This will form part 
of the discussion of the experiences of special schools in the context of the turn to 
inclusion in New Zealand education policy and the implementation of SE2000 which 
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will be discussed in the next chapter. But first the way justice and unfairness were 
implicit in and fundamental to the policy and how this fundamental unfairness set the 
context for injustice with respect to the special school communities will be discussed. 
SE2000, Inclusion and Justice  
Under SE2000 justice in education for disabled children and young people was 
conceived as and equated with inclusion. The premise that this was the best 
educational option for all disabled children and young people appears to have been a 
given in the policy. It would seem that SE2000 was underpinned by particular 
assumptions about what constituted justice in education for all disabled children; 
assumptions that meant that questions related to the justice or injustice of the 
particular definition and organisation of inclusion promoted by the policy were not 
asked. This constituted a fundamental and essential injustice in the policy for it 
promoted only a single vision of justice with respect to the needs of the children and 
young people it was designed to serve. 
As Terzi, (2010) points out,  “the question of a fair provision” for disabled 
children and young people is “extremely controversial”(p. 2). In SE2000 there 
appears to be no acknowledgement that there could be different but morally equal 
views and understandings of the conception of education as a “good” for disabled 
children and young people, or that there could be different but morally equal views 
and understandings of the right way to proceed to enable disabled children and young 
people to benefit from this good. Codd (1987) makes the point that,  
 If policy-makers and practitioners are to arrive at defensible moral 
judgements about how they ought to treat exceptional children and 
their parents, they must strive to reach each particular judgement 
through an exploration of the moral assumptions that lie behind it 
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and a careful consideration of the more general principles to which 
it relates.                                                                                    (p. 79) 
SE2000 shows little evidence of any exploration of moral assumptions. Rather, two of 
the three original goals of the policy, “to develop a clear, consistent and predictable 
framework for resourcing special education and to provide special education 
resourcing wherever the child attends school” (Wylie, 2000, p. 19), suggest that what 
attention there was to the issue as a matter of social justice was focused essentially on 
the fair distribution of resources. Young (1990) argues that contemporary theories of 
justice are not sufficiently broad in their conception and that the distributive paradigm 
particularly, tends “to restrict the meaning of social justice to the morally proper 
distribution of benefits and burdens among society’s members” (p.15). SE2000 
demonstrates just such a lack of breadth in its conception of the scope of social justice 
with respect to the education of disabled children and young people.  
The central characteristics of education policies, then, are that they 
define the scope and content of educational provision, offer a set of 
principles and objectives for practice and mediate distribution and 
redistribution of education. Each of these three activities must be 
based upon beliefs about the nature of education in society.  
(Codd & Sullivan 2005, p. xvii) 
As Codd and Sullivan explain the characteristics of education policies are “based 
upon beliefs about the nature of education in society”, given the multiplicity of views 
and beliefs that abound with respect to this question it would be fair to expect that 
education policies would reflect the plurality and complexity of understanding about 
the nature of education in society. But the premise that SE2000 was based on reflects 
Walzer’s (1983) notion of “simple equality” which, as described in Chapter 3, sees 
equality as being synonymous with sameness; sameness of treatment and sameness of 
experience. There is no doubt that SE2000 was conceived as a policy that would 
further social justice in education with respect to disabled children and young people, 
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however the policy failed to attend to the complexity of the issue it was designed to 
address.  
Herein, I argue, lies the essential injustice of the policy. On the basis of a 
belief that was neither universally held or nor empirically proven, the scope and 
content of educational provision for disabled children and young people were defined, 
principles and objectives for practice determined, and the distribution and 
redistribution of education for disabled children mediated. But all of this was done 
without reference to the complex nature of the issue and the multiplicity of views and 
beliefs about what should happen. Young (1990) describes how assumptions about 
structures and systems are often left unchallenged. In the case of employment, for 
example, she writes: 
when philosophers ask about the just principles for allocating jobs 
and offices among persons, they typically assume a stratification of 
such positions. They assume a hierarchical division of labor in 
which some jobs and offices carry significant autonomy, decision-
making power, authority, income and access to resources, while 
others lack most of these attributes. Rarely do theorists explicitly 
ask whether such a definition and organisation of social positions is 
just.                                                                                            (p. 22)  
SE2000 was correspondingly underpinned by assumptions that were left unchallenged 
and not explicitly questioned, assumptions such as: That inclusion would constitute 
justice in education for all disabled children and young people or that, state-provided 
education, where all children receive the same education in the same settings, would 
be the optimum for all disabled children and young people. Underlying these is the 
key assumption that the views, values and beliefs informing this model of inclusion 
would be universally accepted by all those on whom they impact and by the wider 
society generally.  
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Fundamental to the unfairness implicit in SE2000, was the promotion of single 
model of provision and the lack of recognition of the differences and desires among 
children and parents. The policy proposed a limited solution to a complex issue and 
demonstrated a lack of recognition of the plurality of views about what might 
constitute justice in education for disabled children and young people. This, in tandem 
with the absence of any articulated vision or role for special schools in the policy’s 
putative “world class inclusive education system”, left the schools and their 
communities vulnerable to injustice in a number of ways. However the position taken 
in SE2000 was also demonstrably unfair to those, such as teachers and parents of 
disabled children and others, who believed that special school provision had a place 
as an alternative to the state-conceived option of inclusion. 
Unequal Treatment   
While SE2000 would appear to demonstrate the concept of “simple equality in the 
sphere of education”, the same could not be said of actual practice in relation to state-
funded educational provision for all children in New Zealand. In fact the New 
Zealand state-funded education system reflects a complex, rather than a “simple” 
approach to equality. As is explained on the Ministry of Education website, “Within 
the state school system there are English and te reo Māori options, options for 
different age-groups, language and cultures, values and religious beliefs” (Ministry of 
Education, 2015). The state supports a wide range of options including Kura Kaupapa 
schools, integrated religion-based schools and Rudolph Steiner schools, all of which 
are founded on a range of beliefs, values and philosophies about the nature and 
purpose of education as a good. In funding these alternative options the state is, 
arguably, giving tacit support to the plurality of views, values, and beliefs about the 
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nature and purpose of education as a good and the range of provision needed to 
accommodate this plurality.  
However, the converse would seem to apply with respect to the education of 
disabled children and young people under SE 2000. In this policy there is no support, 
tacit or otherwise, for alternative views, values and beliefs either about the nature and 
purpose of education as a good for disabled children, or the range of provision needed 
to accommodate these views, values and beliefs. This situation constitutes an injustice 
to those who supported and wished to maintain special school provision as an 
alternative option: they were treated differently from others who sought state support 
for other types of alternative provision. The views, values and beliefs of those who 
supported special school provision, were, unlike those of other groups, given little or 
no acknowledgment or support. The funding and support of a multiplicity of school 
options demonstrates that, by default at least, the state accepts that a single system is 
not sufficient to the needs of all children. However, SE2000 articulated the opposite 
view in relation to the education of disabled children; a single system was promoted 
as not only sufficient to the needs of all disabled children but as essentially the only 
moral option. This position, which must be seen as an injustice to those people whose 
beliefs differed from the state’s view about appropriate educational provision for this 
particular group of children, set the context for injustice and unfairness that I will 
discuss further in the following chapter.   
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Chapter Six 
 The Experiences of Special Schools  
This chapter consists of an examination of the practical realities for the special school 
sector of the turn to inclusion under SE2000 and a theoretical analysis of that 
experience. In the first section of the chapter the experiences of special schools under 
SE2000, particularly in the early years of its implementation, are described. The 
argument is made that while on the one hand the schools may have experienced 
growth and development, on the other they found themselves in an invidious position 
and in some senses under seige with respect to the attitude and actions of the Ministry 
of Education towards them. The second section turns to an analysis of the experience 
of special schools with respect to justice and injustice. This section draws on Young’s 
(1990) analysis of justice and injustice to demonstrate that under SE2000, the 
circumstances were such that special school communities were more likely to be 
vulnerable to oppression and injustice.  
Revival and Growth 
The implementation of SE2000 brought significant changes and challenges to special 
schools. In 2000 Wylie reported that “special schools have been revived by the new 
policy” (p. 52). She elaborated on this as follows: 
Special school enrolments increased by 4 per cent between 1998 and 
1999, with some schools gaining more than ten students in a single 
year. The smallest special school has 12 students, the largest 125. A 
number of special schools were also substantially renovated recently, 
adding to their attractiveness. The schools have been able to offer 
much more as a result of Special Education 2000, and there are 
anecdotal reports of improved outcomes for students. They also 
report more parents coming to them as units close and mainstream 
options are inadequate, or become too difficult. The special schools 
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are no longer ‘segregated’. Many offer satellite units in regular 
schools, allowing some flexibility as student needs or capabilities 
change. Often they make use of community facilities and support to 
provide students with knowledge and skills needed for everyday life.  
(Wylie 2000, p. 75) 
How then did this revival happen? Largely, it would appear that it was a result of the 
introduction of the ORRS component of SE2000 which led not only to an increase in 
student numbers and school resources but also gave greater control of the use and 
management of these resources to the schools.  
Student Roll Growth 
In the early years of the implementation of the policy there appears to have been 
significant roll growth in the special school sector. Wylie reported national roll 
growth of 4% between 1998-9 (Wylie, 2000, p.75). The early years of the 
implementation of the policy was a period of quite rapid growth in the school rolls; 
overall from 2000-2006, special school rolls grew nationally by about 40% 
(Education Counts, 2009). At the same time as there was significant growth at the 
national level, at the local level some individual schools were experiencing 
unprecedented roll growth. A comparison of roll figures reported in individual 
schools’ Education Review Office reports, show some schools’ rolls to have increased 
by in excess of a hundred per cent in the period 2000-2007. It is difficult to obtain 
accurate comparisons of these figures as the reviews were conducted in different 
years. But what is evident is that of the twenty-eight special schools, there were only 
six whose rolls showed no significant increase in the period from 2000-2006. Of the 
other twenty-two schools, sixteen recorded roll increases of over thirty per cent and 
three of recorded roll growth of over a hundred per cent.   
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The size of roll growth demonstrates that the nature of provision available in 
special schools was particularly appealing to parents and caregivers. Moreover, 
because in the first years of the implementation of the policy ORRS verification was 
considered to confer agreement for special school enrolment, it was relatively easy for 
parents to access special school provision if they so desired. Parents were able to 
approach the special school directly if they wished to enrol their child. Decisions 
about the appropriateness or otherwise of the setting for the child, were made by the 
family and the school. The ease of access to the schools may have been a contributing 
factor to the roll growth but also it would seem that there were other factors that the 
schools offered that were attractive to parents such availability of therapy and 
specialist teachers, the commitment of the teachers to children with special education 
needs, the teachers’ passion, and a safer and less judgemental environment (Ministry 
of Education, 2005). These were all factors that parents of children attending special 
schools noted in the national profiling exercise conducted by the Ministry of 
Education in 2004. 
Staffing Growth and Expansion 
 At the same time as the student rolls were growing there was also a significant 
growth in teacher staffing. This was due not only to the growth in student numbers 
but also because of the additional 0.1 and 0.2 of teacher time that each student 
verified as high or very high needs attracted. In the period 2000-2006 the number of 
teaching staff in special schools grew by approximately forty-eight per cent. This 
increase in teacher numbers obviously allowed lower staff–student ratios and the 
provision of individualised programmes for children. The increase in teacher numbers 
in individual schools also led to increasingly complex roles for principals and the 
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development of more middle management roles in the schools making them more 
similar to regular schools in terms of staffing structures and levels.  
As described above, under ORRS, students verified as having high and very 
high needs attract both funding and additional teacher support. Most special schools 
had sufficient numbers of students to be able to become their own fundholders, as 
they were then known, and some also became fundholders for other schools. As a 
consequence of this the special schools had significant pools of funding available to 
them which they could manage in flexible ways to meet the needs of the students they 
served. Schools were now able to purchase specialist and teacher-aide support directly 
and manage the use of their own funds. Individual special schools and clusters were 
able to use economies of scale and had a sufficient critical mass to enable them to use 
their funding and staffing in ways that best suited the needs of individual students and 
best met the expectations of their parents and caregivers.  
Over time, as they became more confident and assured in the new 
environment, the special schools came to employ their own specialist therapists, 
including speech language therapists, physiotherapists, occupational therapist and 
others. At a time when there was a shortage of these specialists in the education sector 
at large, special schools were able to offer attractive employment and satisfying work. 
At a time when the model of specialist support provided in regular education settings 
was consultative, specialists in special schools were able to work hands-on with the 
students. As a result of the implementation of ORRS under SE2000, special schools 
were able to offer low student-teacher ratios, high levels of specialist support onsite, 
and high levels of teacher-aide support. Special schools were able to attract and retain 
teachers, specialists and teacher-aides because of the predictability and certainty of 
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the ORRS funding. This also meant that special schools were able to offer students, 
and their parents and caregivers, certainty and consistency of staffing. 
Many of the schools had developed relationships with regular schools by 
establishing satellite units in these schools and/or through the provision of itinerant 
support services. Strategic development of satellite units allowed the special schools 
to provide for those students whose parents wanted them to have access to social 
experiences with their similar-age peers while still enjoying the benefits and resources 
available in the special school. Some schools had established satellite units prior to 
SE2000 but their numbers increased after SE2000’s implementation. Similarly, prior 
to SE2000 some special schools were providing itinerant support for children with 
special needs in regular settings. These relationships were able to continue and grow 
after SE2000; some regular schools transferred the 0.1 and 0.2 teacher allocations to a 
special school in order to access the support of specialist teachers. Special schools 
were developing, to some extent, into specialist centres which offered a range of 
services both within their own school settings and to regular schools (McMenamin, 
2008). 
This dramatic growth and expansion created significant challenges in terms of 
the management and governance of these schools. Prior to SE2000 the financial 
environment and staffing profiles of the schools were relatively simple. Boards and 
principals had to manage only the operational funding and, generally, were 
responsible only for the employment of teachers, teacher assistants, teacher-aides, a 
cleaner/caretaker and an administrative officer. After SE2000 boards were charged 
with the management of the operational funding and also the ORRS money that was 
bulk-funded to schools. In some schools the ORRS funding constituted very 
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substantial amounts which had to be spent across a range of activities and monitored 
and accounted for carefully. The employment environment had also become 
increasingly complex as a range of specialists was added to the employee profiles of 
many of the schools. Evidence from Education Review Office reports indicates that 
the schools generally rose to these challenges and most schools received 
commendation on their governance and management systems. Reports referred to 
“innovative use of funding”, “increased executive responsibilities”, the “increasingly 
complex organisational structure” and to the boards “successfully managing their 
extended responsibilities” (ERO, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d). 
Challenging Times 
It would appear then that special schools thrived in the post SE2000 environment. 
However that is too simplistic a view. Despite their obvious success in attracting 
students, and the clear support from parents and families, special schools were, and to 
some extent still are, in an invidious position. As noted earlier, the government’s 
special education policy clearly articulated the aim of achieving a world class 
inclusive education system; implicit in this aim is a belief that all children should 
receive their education in regular school settings with their similar age peers. Clearly 
special schools represent an anomaly in such an environment. Moreover the dramatic 
growth of these schools could perhaps also be seen as presenting a significant threat 
to the aims of the policy. Interestingly as the rolls grew the schools were subject to 
significant increases in compliance requirements in relation to the management and 
allocation of the ORRS funds. While these could be seen as standard administrative 
changes they could, equally reasonably, be seen as an indication of Group Special 
Education’s (GSE) aim to increase its control over and involvement in the affairs of 
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special schools. Perhaps the most significant and overt action that lends support to the 
view that education authorities were concerned about the rise and rise of special 
schools, was the change in the enrolment process for entry to a special school. This 
change, which was introduced in 2005, had the effect of providing the Ministry of 
Education with the means to control the numbers of students enrolling in the schools. 
Prior to the introduction of SE2000 children and young people were required 
to have a “Section Nine” agreement to access special education services and provision 
including special school enrolment. This agreement was named after Section Nine of 
the Education Act 1989 and referred to “agreements between parents and the 
Secretary of Education” (Wylie, 2000. p. 36) about the provision of special education 
for the individual child or young person. The section reads as follows: 
(1) If satisfied that a person under 21 should have special education, 
the Secretary shall: 
(a) Agree with the person's parents that the person should be 
enrolled, or direct them to enrol the person, at a particular state 
school, special school, special class, or special clinic; or 
(b) Agree with the person's parents that the person should have, or 
direct them to ensure that the person has, education or help from a 
special service. 
 (2) Notwithstanding anything in section 12 of this Act (which 
relates to enrolment schemes), but subject to the rest of Part II of 
this Act (which relates to the suspension, expulsion, and exclusion 
of students), where there has been an agreement or direction under 
subsection (1) of this section, the person concerned shall be allowed 
to enrol at the state school, special school, special class, or special 
clinic, concerned or (as the case requires) to have education or help 
from the special service concerned. 
When SE2000 was introduced ORRS verification was “deemed to equate to a 
“Section Nine” agreement” (Wylie 2000 p. 40). ORRS verification thus constituted a 
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proxy for the agreement between the parents and the Secretary of Education for the 
provision of special education services including special school enrolment. This 
situation continued without any apparent problems until 2004 when GSE informed 
special schools that there was to be a change in the enrolment process for students 
wishing to enrol in special schools. GSE’s explanation for this action was that having 
reviewed the enrolment process they realised that it was in contravention of the 
legislative requirements, as set out in Section Nine of the Education Act 1989, that all 
children or young people who were enrolled in or wished to enrol in a special school 
must have permission by way of a Section Nine agreement. ORRS verification was no 
longer equated with a Section Nine agreement. 
The new enrolment process required that there should be a Section Nine 
agreement as a condition of enrolment in a special school and, in a more unusual 
move, required that there must be a new Section Nine agreement if a child or young 
person moved from a satellite class in a school to a different class in the same school. 
A description of a Section Nine agreement as found on the Ministry of Education 
website in 2009 was as follows:  
A section 9 agreement is a formal agreement between the Ministry of 
Education and the parents/guardians of a child or young person that allows 
the child or young person to receive special education services or to enrol at 
a special school.  
A section 9 agreement is for a child to receive a special service or to 
attend a named school, and in some circumstances, a named satellite 
class of a special school. 
 
When the student leaves that particular school or class, ORRS 
resourcing continues wherever that student is enrolled, but the 
section 9 agreement specifying that school or class does not. A new 
application is required each time a student seeks enrolment at a 
special school or class other than that named on the section 9 
agreement.                                    (Ministry of Education, 2009b) 
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 After the imposition of this change, the enrolment process required that there be a 
meeting of the parents, the principal of the special school, and GSE staff at which the  
appropriateness of the enrolment would be discussed and determined. The enrolment 
could only proceed with the approval of the GSE staff acting on behalf of the 
Secretary of Education. However the agreement was not a permanent agreement for 
the duration of the child’s school years and had to be reviewed at transition times and, 
as noted above, in the event of a student being transferred from a satellite class to 
another class within the same school.  
The significance of these changes cannot be overstated. This process removed 
control of enrolment from the special schools and parents to Special Education, 
Ministry of Education. While the process occurs in consultation with parents and 
schools, the Ministry has the final say over whether the enrolment will proceed. 
Arguably this provides the Ministry with the ability to control the nature and number 
of students enrolling in special schools. However this process also clearly challenges 
the notion of parents’ right to choose the appropriate school for their children. This 
right, except where a school has an approved enrolment scheme, was strongly 
asserted by the MOE: “You have the right to choose which school your child attends” 
(Ministry of Education, 2009a) could be found boldly stated on the Ministry of 
Education website until its recent revamp. However, the right of parents of a disabled 
child to freely choose a school for their child applied only if they were to choose a 
regular school setting. This same right was not available to parents of disabled 
children who sought special school enrolment (McMenamin, 2008).  
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Furthermore by requiring a new Section Nine agreement to alter a student’s 
class placement within the school, the Ministry was actually exerting control over the 
day-to-day management of the school. This represents a significant interference on 
the part of the Ministry of Education in the day-to-day running of the school, the more 
so because in New Zealand schools are considered to be self-governing and self-
managing. In addition the nature of the process represents an insult to the professional 
judgement and professionalism of principals in special schools who are deprived of 
the right to make decisions concerning the appropriateness of enrolment of students 
into their schools and the appropriate placement of students in classes within their 
schools. The implication that a representative of the Ministry of Education is better 
placed to determine the appropriate placement of a student within a school than the 
principal and teachers at the school flies in the face of the Ministry’s (1998) own 
stated view that decisions about a child or young person’s education are best made by 
those closest to and most involved with the child or young person. A further slight to 
the special school sector occurred when the web-based national student enrolment 
register that was implemented in all New Zealand schools in 2007. While regular 
schools enter their own new enrolments onto this database, special schools are not 
permitted to do so; the Ministry enters special school enrolments.  
Meeting the Challenges  
Faced with circumstances such as those outlined above, it would be hardly surprising 
that special schools began to feel somewhat beleaguered. There were two 
developments that suggest that they did. The first was the establishment of the South 
Island Regional Special Schools Association. The national Special Schools Principals’ 
Association was well established and had a long history of advocating for Special 
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Schools. However with the increasing complexity of the issues faced by special 
schools, the principals in the South Island decided there was a need to have a body 
that represented the interests of South Island special schools. A significant factor in 
the development of this group was a sense that the schools needed to work together 
and present a united front; that as a group they were more likely to be heard and be 
able to influence any decision-making that might affect their schools (R. Farrelly, 
personal communication, May 22, 2008).  
The second, and arguably more significant, development was the 
establishment of a national parents’ association. In 2005 a group of Auckland special 
school Board of Trustees’ members met to discuss issues they faced in common. As a 
result of this meeting they decided to establish a national association called the 
Special Schools Parents Association (SSPA) that would have parent representation 
from each school (P. Deverall, personal communication, May 25, 2008). This was the 
first time that parents of children enrolled at Special Schools had banded together in a 
national group. The establishment of this group marked a significant step; prior to this, 
the school principals were the only voice of the special schools. While special school 
principals could, and do, act as advocates they are of necessity more constrained in 
their dealings with educational authorities than parents might be.   
The establishment of the association was the result of a number of concerns 
that the parents had with respect to the way GSE was operating and its negative 
attitude to the sector, which they felt represented a belief among some in GSE that 
special schools should not exist. (P. Deverall, personal communication, May, 25, 
2008). Other concerns included the invisibility of special school provision and limited 
information on special schools available on the Ministry of Education website. As a 
 120 
result of developing a national body, the Association gained the Ministry of 
Education’s agreement to post a statement on the website which SSPA believed more 
fairly represented the range of special education provision available in New Zealand. 
In this statement the association argued that the right to enrol at the local regular 
school is an enabling policy and does not mean that a child has an obligation to enrol 
in the local regular school. They also asserted the legitimacy of all available options. 
The presence of this statement on the website made the association at that time more 
visible and provided a voice for parents in that domain.   
The establishment of these two groups suggest that their communities felt the 
need to band together to meet perceived external challenges and to make their voices 
heard. It would seem more than coincidental that these two developments occurred 
soon after the implementation of the new enrolment processes. Through the 
implementation of what could fairly be described as a draconian procedure for 
enrolment in special schools, the MOE may have inadvertently prompted the 
increased solidarity among special school communities and thus added to the 
development of their identity and increased their visibility and influence 
(McMenamin, 2008). However that fact that the communities felt the need to band 
together in this way indicates that they felt under siege and marginalised in the 
context. That the parent group also felt it incumbent on them to lobby for some sort of 
visibility on the MOE website further supports this view. As I will argue in the next 
section, under SE2000 the special sector at large experienced and was subject to 
injustice. It is to that I now turn.  
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Justice for Some 
Rizvi and Lingard (1996), as noted earlier, point out that the material reality of 
injustice is something that those who experience it are acutely aware. They refer in 
their discussion to realities such as hunger and poverty, however injustice is equally 
felt in terms of unequal treatment, lack of voice, stereotyping and marginalisation all 
of which, I argue, special school communities were more likely to experience or be 
vulnerable to under SE2000. The way the policy was framed and constituted in turn 
framed and constituted special school provision unfairly and created a context for the 
occurrence of injustice and unfairness. In this section, drawing on Young’s (1990) 
notion of oppression and domination as the two social conditions that define injustice, 
I argue that SE 2000, a policy seemingly directed to achieving just and fair education 
for disabled children, was not in fact, fair and just to all those upon whom it impacted.  
Oppression 
Young(1990) argues that a conception of justice should see people as doers and actors 
who:  
seek to promote many values of social justice in addition to fairness 
in the distribution of goods: learning and using satisfying and 
expansive skills in socially recognised settings; participating, 
informing and running institutions, and receiving recognition for 
such participation; playing and communicating with others, and 
expressing our feelings, experience, feelings and perspectives on 
social life in contexts in which others can listen.                     (p. 37)  
Social justice, she contends, concerns the degree to which a society contains and 
supports the institutional conditions necessary for the realisation of these values. My 
argument here is that under SE2000 the realisation of these values was compromised 
for those in special school communities. Special schools were constituted in such a 
way that they were compromised as “socially recognised settings”, and the 
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recognition received by those who were involved in these schools was similarly 
compromised. At the same time the force of the orthodoxy of inclusion was such that 
it is doubtful that the context was one in which others, particularly those in positions 
of influence, were really able to listen with understanding to the feelings and 
perspectives of those who made up the special school communities. Taking Young’s 
idea further, given the above, the argument here is that under SE2000, the special 
school communities experienced the social condition that she describes as 
“oppression”. Young argues that oppression is one of two conditions that define 
injustice. She sees oppression as structural and systemic rather than the “the exercise 
of tyranny”, as it is traditionally seen (p. 40). She defines it thus:  
oppression refers to the vast and deep injustices some groups suffer 
as a consequence of often unconscious assumptions and reactions of 
well-meaning people in ordinary interactions, media and cultural 
stereotypes, and structural features of bureaucratic hierarchies and 
market mechanisms- in short, the normal processes of everyday life. 
                                                                                                   (p. 41)  
 
Young sites oppression within the parameters of “the normal processes of everyday 
life” and the “ordinary interactions” between people. Processes such as the 
development and implementation of education policies would fall within this ambit.  
She argues that it is not possible to give one “essential definition of oppression” 
(p.43) and explicates a set of categories she calls the “five faces of oppression” (p.42): 
Exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence. As I 
will outline below, two of these, marginalisation and cultural imperialism, have 
application to the experiences of New Zealand special school communities 
(McMenamin, 2013) in a policy environment in which the prevailing orthodoxy was 
inclusion. 
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Cultural Imperialism: The “Othering” of Special School Communities. 
In an environment in which the policy stance and prevailing orthodoxy was inclusion 
the voices of those who deviated from that view were to some extent silenced or at 
least muffled. As noted earlier to “interrogate the notion of inclusion” is to “court the 
accusation that one is fundamentally opposed” to values such as justice, compassion, 
equality and human rights (Pirie & Head, 2007, p.21.), these are of course values 
which none would surely wish to deny. 
In the inclusive policy environment of the 1990s, support for special school 
provision was construed in some quarters as opposition to inclusion. Those who 
articulated such support were in effect saying the unsayable and, were thus constituted 
as in some ways morally inferior in their thinking. Young (1990) argues that justice 
requires “participation in public discussion and processes of decision-making” and 
further that everyone should have the “right and opportunity to participate in the 
deliberation and decision-making of the institutions to which their actions contribute 
or which directly affect their actions” (1990, p. 91). But in an environment in which 
inclusion had assumed a kind of moral force, there would have been little opportunity 
for real public discussion and few chances for those who favoured alternative 
arrangements to be able to participate effectively in decision-making about 
educational policy and provision for disabled children and young people. A plausible 
description of what was in play in New Zealand at this time, and in subsequent years, 
is that it was a form of what Young calls “cultural imperialism” (Young, 1990, p. 58). 
As she explains it: 
To experience cultural imperialism means to experience how the 
dominant meanings of a society render the particular perspective of 
one’s own group invisible at the same time as they stereotype one’s 
group and mark it out as Other.                                                (p. 58) 
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In such a way, under SE2000, the perspectives of those who were involved with or 
supported special school provision, were made to some extent invisible while, at the 
same time, the nature of special school provision was certainly stereotyped within the 
wider education context and seen as “Other”.  
Young argues that “cultural imperialism involves the universalization of a 
dominant group’s experience and culture, and its establishment as the norm” and 
describes how “often without noticing they do so, the dominant groups project their 
own experience as representative of humanity as such” (p.59). This resonates with 
Cigman’s (2007b) description of “the project of universal inclusion” (p.776) and her 
analysis of the dispute between those who argue for the closure of all special schools 
and those who argue for the right to send their children to special schools as a dispute 
about universality. Following from these ideas, I argue that under SE2000 the notion 
of inclusion, as all children and young people gaining their education at the regular 
school, was universalised and established as the ideological norm with the effect that 
those who supported alternative provision by way of special schools found themselves, 
as Young puts	  it,	  “defined from the outside, positioned, placed, by a network of 
dominant meanings they experience as arising from elsewhere, from those with whom 
they do not identify and who do not identify with them” (Young, 1990, p. 59), 
marginalised in fact. 
Marginalisation: Special Schools on the Outside. 
Thus while marginalisation definitely entails serious issues of 
distributive justice, it also involves the deprivation of cultural, 
practical and institutionalised conditions for exercising capacities in 
a context of recognition and interaction.  (Young, 1990, p. 55) 
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Young draws our attention to the way in which marginalisation has wider significance 
than can be captured solely in terms of issues of distributive justice. Marginalisation 
also concerns issues of justice that relate to recognition, valuing and acceptance.  
Under SE2000, special education policy was constituted as “inclusive education 
policy”, with the attendant understandings that term brought and that have been 
discussed earlier. An effect of this was that special school communities were, to some 
extent, deprived of the “practical and institutionalised conditions for exercising 
capacities in a context of recognition and interaction”. The context in which the 
special school communities found themselves was not one of “recognition and 
interaction”, rather their position was increasingly compromised within the wider 
educational and social community to the point that their very presence came to be 
seen by some to represent the failure of inclusion and there were calls for their closure 
(Gordon & Morton, 2008; Higgins, MacArthur, & Morton, 2007; IHC, 2009; Kearney 
& Kane, 2006; MacArthur, 2009; Matthews, 2009; Wills, 2006). The preferred and 
supported policy position of inclusion that was implicit in SE 2000, and the lack of 
any stated vision for the future of special schools in the policy, thus created a situation 
in which special school provision was constituted and positioned as the lesser 
educational option, a kind of school of last resort.  
Much of the force of the argument against special school provision rests on the 
notion that the purpose of special school provision is to segregate disabled children 
and young people. Cigman (2007a) argues that this view is based on a premise that 
special schools are inherently humiliating or demeaning and that while it may have 
been accurate in respect of “old-style segregated education”, it is now outdated and is 
not applicable to special schools in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries. 
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However special school provision was, by implication at least, framed in this way 
under SE2000 and thus cast as a morally questionable type of provision.   
 “Segregation” is a term that has essentially negative connotations. It implies 
an enforced setting apart of groups of people on the basis of a particular characteristic 
such as race or, more pertinent to this discussion, disability. Without doubt, 
historically, disabled people have been segregated from society and deprived of the 
right to live an ordinary life as others do and this is clearly an unconscionable state of 
affairs. However, with respect to special schools in New Zealand in the 1990s and 
today, there was and is no enforced setting apart of disabled children into these 
schools. Parents did and do make a choice to enrol their children in the special school 
simply on the basis that in their view it would be the best educational option for their 
child. There is no direction from any educational authority. Given this, it would seem 
an injustice to frame New Zealand special schools as “segregated” with all the 
connotations and opprobrium that term implies. However this “outdated” (Cigman, 
2007a) view of special schools appears to have been espoused under SE2000 which 
promoted the idea, advanced by some, that it was no longer “appropriate to operate 
with separate classes, separate schools and separate administration systems” (Ryba, 
1995, p. 53).  
This position meant that the educational quality and moral worth of what the 
special schools offered to disabled children and young people were essentially 
devalued. As a consequence of this special school provision would have been more 
likely to be devalued and marginalised in the wider education and social context, as 
would the educational experiences of those children and young people attending these 
schools and the work of those teaching in the schools. This situation is unlikely to 
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have provided special school communities with the “practical and institutionalised 
conditions for exercising capacities in a context of recognition and interaction” 
(Young, 1990, p. 55). In addition, the failure to acknowledge a valued role for special 
schools under SE2000 would seem doubly unjust given that, arguably, there was no 
guarantee at that time that regular school system could meet the needs of every 
disabled child and young person. The expectation of the policy was after all, that the 
world class inclusive education system would take a decade to achieve.  
Under these circumstances a just state of affairs would be that in which not 
only were alternative options maintained but also that they were valued. If the 
alternatives available are devalued or marginalised, then a likely consequence is that 
those who receive their education in those settings may also be also devalued and 
marginalised. A perverse effect of SE2000 was thus that the state, by failing to 
articulate clear support for special school provision in SE2000, was responsible for 
the potential stigmatisation and marginalisation of the disabled children and young 
people who attended these schools; some of the very people for whom the policy was 
supposed to achieve social justice.  
Domination: Bureaucracy as Boss. 
Young (1990) defines domination as consisting in “institutional conditions which 
inhibit or prevent people from participating in determining their actions” (p. 76) and 
describes how the “expansion of bureaucratic administration over increasing areas of 
work and life brings with it new experiences of domination” (p. 78). The impact of 
this, she argues, is bureaucratic domination whereby “increasingly the activities of 
everyday work and life come under rationalized control, subjecting people to the 
discipline of authorities and experts in many areas of life” (p. 76). “People experience 
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bureaucratic domination … as clients and consumers subject to rules they have had no 
part in making” (p. 78). In tandem with this Young discusses the notion of the 
ideology of expertism, which, she argues, is a phenomenon that makes challenging 
bureaucratic domination difficult.   
In the ideology of expertism, the knowledgeable and only the 
knowledgeable have a right to rule, because they are the masters of 
the objective and the value-neutral discipline applying to the area of 
social life in question and thus their decisions are necessary and 
correct.                                                                                        (p.80) 
This analysis of domination with respect to bureaucracy and the ideology of 
expertism is pertinent to the experience of special school communities working in the 
policy environment created by SE2000, for in this policy we can see the confluence of 
these two factors. As explained earlier, there was a move internationally to include all 
disabled children and young people in local schools (Ministry of Education, 2005), it 
would appear that this position was uncritically adopted by the policy actors in the 
educational bureaucracies here. The particular bureaucracies special schools were 
subject to were the Ministry of Education (MOE) and Special Education Services 
(SES), which was subsumed into the MOE as Group Special Education (GSE) and is 
now known simply as Special Education in the Ministry of Education.   
Croll and Moses (2000) who, as referred to previously, examined local policy 
making in England with respect to special schools through the 1980s and 1990s, draw 
some interesting conclusions that have relevance here. They argue that considerations 
of policy and practice in special education are strongly influenced by philosophical 
and ideological views and beliefs and that policy is “strongly influenced by the ideas, 
beliefs and convictions held by individuals in key positions” (p. 185). They further 
contend, that “inclusionists among education policy-makers appear to be convinced 
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that their own ideas are right and they seek to persuade others to seek their vision” 
(p.186). Ball (1993) describes how  “collections of related policies, exercise power 
through a production of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ as discourses” (p. 14), which are 
“about what can be said and thought, but also about who can speak, when, where and 
with what authority” (p. 14). Under SE2000, those in positions of influence and 
authority were the people who worked within SES, GSE and the MOE more broadly. 
These people assumed the role of the “knowledgeable” and it is they who in their 
positions in the bureaucracy were the ones who had the authority to speak and 
determine actions with respect to the policy and it was to their “discipline” that 
special school communities were subject. The influence of the bureaucracies was 
demonstrated in actions such as there being only limited information related to special 
school provision on the MOE website and the apparent unwillingness (Wylie, 2000) 
of those in SES, later GSE, to discuss special school provision as an option when 
advising parents of disabled children and young people about educational choices.  
Despite this, as explained earlier, under SE2000, special schools experienced 
quite dramatic growth. This growth may have been seen as a significant threat to the 
aims of the policy by those policy actors who were charged with driving it forward, 
and who were also ideologically committed to it. Young (1990) talks of how 
“government and private agencies subject clients and consumers to meshes of 
microauthority” (p. 79), this description could be aptly applied to the bureaucracies’ 
response to the growth in special schools; a response which included increased 
compliance requirements, and, most significantly, a change to the enrolment process 
for entry to a special school. The significance of this change was that it had the effect 
of providing the Ministry of Education with the means to control the numbers of 
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students enrolling in special schools. It also meant that those wishing to enrol their 
children in special schools became the only group of parents who had to get ministry 
permission to enrol in a particular state-funded school. This change resulted in a 
situation in which the state was, in effect, perpetrating a kind of discrimination 
whereby it determined the educational choices of a particular group of children and 
young people on the basis of their abilities. This is a situation that does not occur in 
the New Zealand education system for any other group. Furthermore, the right to 
decide on what was the best educational option was, for some disabled children, taken 
away from those closest to them and invested in a state bureaucracy, GSE. This must 
certainly constitute bureaucratic domination at its most assertive.  
Special school communities, thus, found themselves “constrained by structural 
and bureaucratic imperatives”, and “subject to rules they had no part in making” 
(Young, 1990, p. 78). Young argues that while the “formalism, universality and 
impersonality” (p. 78) of bureaucratic rules are supposed to protect them from being 
tainted with any particular values, “in their application the decision-maker’s feelings, 
values and particular perceptions inevitably enter”(p. 78). Under SE2000, the values 
that inevitably entered the bureaucratic rules imposed on special school communities 
were informed by the dominant orthodoxy of inclusion; this resulted in those rules 
being demonstrably unjust and unfair to those in the special school communities. 
The Power of Policy  
Policy is more than text. Policy sets the context for practice and action; policy gives 
grounds for action and inaction; policy is evident in both what is said and what is 
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unsaid and the theories and philosophies that inform policy have a wider impact than 
the words and rhetoric alone might suggest.  
Policies embody claims to speak with authority, they legitimate and 
initiate practices in the world and they privilege certain visions and 
interests.  (Ball, 1990, p. 22)  
In Chapter 3, I suggested following Artiles and Dyson’s (2005) position, that to focus 
on whether inclusive education is “… ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, whether ‘it works’ or ‘does 
not work’, is… to miss the point” (p. 43). Rather what should be considered is 
whether the prevailing conception of inclusion leads to policy and practices that are 
just and fair for all disabled children and also their families. When universal inclusion 
is instantiated in policy there may be a perverse consequence whereby rather than 
resulting in a just state of affairs for all disabled children and their families the policy 
may lead to the opposite for some. What is important here is the power of the message 
once it is instantiated in policy and thus validated as the value supported by 
government. This gives the value greater power and impact for “when it is the 
government that sends the message, that changes the message, because government 
defines ones life-opportunities in a pervasive and fundamental way” (Nussbaum, 
2011b, p. 20).  
The critique presented in this and the previous chapter has demonstrated how 
in the New Zealand context, universal inclusion as the driver of policy and practice 
did not lead to just and fair circumstances for all disabled children and their families 
but rather resulted in a state of affairs in which some experienced and were more 
vulnerable to injustice. Admittedly this critique applies to a specific context and a 
particular set of circumstances so we cannot draw absolute parallels across all 
jurisdictions. Nevertheless this analysis does demonstrate how the privileging in 
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policy of a particular view can result in unjust circumstances for some on whom the 
policy impacts. The experiences of the special school sector in New Zealand 
demonstrate that the prevailing conception of just educational provision, defined as 
universal inclusion, does not necessarily lead to policy and practices that are just and 
fair for all disabled children and their families. In the next chapter I will argue that 
educational arrangements that include special school provision can contribute to a just 
state of affairs for disabled children and their families.   
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Chapter 7  
A Just State of Affairs 
This chapter returns to the matter of what might constitute just education provision for 
disabled children and more particularly the matter of special school provision as an 
aspect of that. In Chapter Three, I set out four elements that I argue are salient when 
considering the justness or otherwise of a particular state of affairs and that provide 
the lens through which the matters considered here are examined: The understanding 
that as justice and injustice have their material expression in the realities of people’s 
lives then the justness or otherwise of any circumstance should be assessed and 
examined with reference to that lived reality; the notion of the inviolability of persons 
and the ideas of respect and dignity that inhere to that; the recognition of the plural 
nature of society and the notion of a heterogeneous public; and the understanding that 
justice requires democracy in terms of participation and voice. With reference to and 
in the light of these ideas, I argue in this chapter that special school provision within 
an education system can, and in the New Zealand context does, contribute to a more 
just state of affairs with respect to the education of disabled children than the situation 
of universal inclusion. I further argue that with respect to educational arrangements 
for disabled children, a state of affairs, policy or practice that is just will reflect the 
diverse views, perspectives and aspirations of those most affected, the children and 
their families; justice requires that their many voices are heard and respected.   
The Fact of Special School Provision  
Despite the pervasive and dominant nature of universal inclusion as a policy motif, 
both in New Zealand and elsewhere, the reality is that special school provision 
endures and prevails. What might be drawn from this? Why is this type of provision 
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so enduring and what does this mean as regards just educational provision for 
disabled children? Proponents of universal inclusion argue that this fact demonstrates 
the failure of inclusive policies or even that the presence of special schools is 
subverting universal inclusion and preventing its realisation. But this is a somewhat 
self-fulfilling argument - while we have special schools we can’t have universal 
inclusion-universal inclusion represents justice - special schools thus represent 
injustice and moreover stand in the way of achieving justice. This way of thinking 
prevents any real consideration of why the schools endure or any real possibility of 
entertaining the notion that they might exist for the good. An alternative conception, 
particularly in the New Zealand context where enrolment in this type of provision is 
by choice not direction, is that the enduring nature of special school provision may 
reflect the fact that there is a genuine need and real support for what this type of 
provision offers. Despite the rejection of special schooling by proponents of universal 
inclusion, many view it positively. In New Zealand, as explained earlier, special 
school enrolments grew after the introduction of SE2000 and have remained relatively 
stable since. What is of key importance here is that the choice of special school is 
driven by the family not by an education authority of some sort; New Zealand 
families are, as it were, voting with their feet in selecting this option.  
McLaughlin (2008) argues that “it is rash … to condone or condemn certain 
kinds of separate school solely on the grounds of philosophical principle” (p. 177), 
but this seems to be the case in relation to the project of universal inclusion and 
special schools. Much of the argument against special school provision for disabled 
children appears to be based on conviction rather than fact; the conviction that any 
separation is by definition morally wrong and the conviction that universal inclusion 
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is right for each and every child. However conviction alone is an insufficient 
foundation upon which to predicate a policy. It is also an insufficient basis on which 
to claim that the situation of universal inclusion represents a more just state of affairs 
than a situation that includes special schools. McLaughlin asserts that in judgements 
about these matters “much depends on how the institutions actually operate, and what 
the effects actually are on the students and the broader community” (p. 177). The 
point McLauglin makes here aligns with the idea that the justness or otherwise of any 
state of affairs must be determined with reference to the material realities and facts as 
they play out in people’s lives. As will be demonstrated below, in the New Zealand 
context at least, such a consideration lends weight to the argument in support of 
special schooling as an aspect of just educational provision.  
The Enduring Nature of Special School Provision 
There are a number of factors that contribute to the enduring nature of special school 
provision. Special schools have been reported to have a number of characteristics 
which are known to be attractive to parents of disabled children; characteristics such 
as small class sizes, low staff-student ratios, caring and supportive staff, 
individualised programmes, and safe and secure environments (Bagley, Woods, & 
Wood, 2001; Jenkinson, 1998; Lange & Lehr, 2000; Mitchell, 2010; MOE, 2005; 
MOE, 2010; Wooster & Parnell, 2006). Some parents have reported features such as 
these as being more important to them than the inclusion of their disabled child in the 
local regular school. Disabled children also see these as positive characteristics in 
relation to schooling in general and, more particularly, those disabled children who 
have attended special schools describe these characteristics as positive aspects of their 
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special school experience (Fieler, 2013; Hornby & Witte, 2008; MOE, 2005; Norwich, 
2014; Prunty, Dupont, & McDaid, 2012).  
With regard to the New Zealand context, the resilience of special school 
provision is, from a practical point of view at least, relatively easy to explain. Firstly, 
it would appear that the schools generally provide positive educational experiences 
and welcoming school environments. This is borne out in reviews and reports 
completed by the Ministry of Education and the Education Review Office (ERO). For 
example, in the document, Local Service National Profiling Report (MOE, 2005), it 
was reported that parents whose children attended special schools felt they worked 
well. Parents commented on the schools’ strengths in relation to the knowledge of the 
teachers and specialists, the qualities of the teachers who were described as being 
passionate about and prepared to champion the children they taught, and the 
suitability of the learning programme (p. 73). 
 Similar support is evident in ERO reviews and reports. ERO conducts reviews 
of all schools in New Zealand approximately every three years and also writes 
national reports on matters of particular interest at any one time. A search of special 
school reviews on the ERO website reveals predominantly favourable school reports 
with frequent references to inclusive and respectful learning environments, high 
quality learning and teaching programmes, enthusiastic students, responsive teachers 
and good community and school relationships. Special school provision is similarly 
affirmed in the national ERO (2010) report that examined the quality of inclusion for 
students with high needs in regular schools. It is noted in this document that it is 
“important to point out that many students with high needs learn well in special 
schools and units that may be outside the mainstream” (ERO 2010, p. 3). This view, 
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the report says, is based on individual reviews of special schools. The quality of 
special school provision that is attested to in these reviews and reports is likely to be 
one factor that draws parents to these schools.  
 Secondly, it appears that there is considerable variation in the educational 
experiences that disabled children have in regular schools in New Zealand. National 
reports from ERO (2010) and the Human Rights Commission (2009) indicate that 
there are inadequacies in the quality and nature of the educational experiences 
provided for disabled children in some regular schools. In an evaluation of how well 
regular schools included children with high and very high needs, ERO (2010) found 
that only half of the schools reviewed “demonstrated mostly inclusive practice” (p.1), 
that thirty per cent had “pockets of inclusiveness” and that twenty per cent of schools 
had “few inclusive practices” (p. 1). These findings echo those of the earlier Human 
Rights Commission report, Disabled Children’s Rights to Education (2009) which 
concluded that “there are significant outstanding issues for disabled students in all 
four components of the right to education, namely limitations on the availability, 
accessibility, acceptability and adaptability of education services” (p. 5). The report 
also noted four prevalent themes in the complaints relating to disabled children’s 
education: problems gaining enrolment; stand-downs, exclusion and expulsion from 
school because of disability or behaviour caused by the disability; funding issues; and 
issues in relation to children being able to participate fully in school activities such as 
camps and sports events. These reports indicate that there are significant issues in 
relation to the provision for disabled children in some New Zealand regular schools. 
Such issues are likely to be factors that influence parents to favour a special school 
placement for their child. Elkins, van Kraayenoord, and Jobling (2003) claim that a 
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“successful system of inclusion requires that the community believe in the 
competence of the education system to meet the needs of all students” (p. 143); it is 
unlikely that the New Zealand community can as yet have that belief.  
The persistence of special school provision in the face of the dominance of 
inclusive education policies speaks to the fact that universal inclusion may not be 
sufficient to the needs of all disabled children. There is considerable variation in the 
educational experiences of disabled children in regular schools and inadequacies in 
what some regular schools provide for these children. According to the reports of 
some parents, disabled children who attend regular schools may be taught by 
inexperienced and unsympathetic teachers and may experience bullying, social 
isolation, and social and academic exclusion in that context (Kearney & Kane, 2006; 
Lange & Lehr, 2000; MacArthur, 2009; Shaddock, 2009). In circumstances such as 
these it is hardly surprising that special school provision retains its place in the 
education systems of many jurisdictions.  
The Best Educational Environment 
 But while the quality of provision available in regular schools may, in some cases, be 
inadequate, the resilience and persistence of special school provision is the result of 
more than solely this. The fact that some parents opt for special school is not simply 
because the inadequacies of regular schools leave parents faced with the situation in 
which they have no real choice at all. Although this may be the case for some, for 
others the decision to opt for special school enrolment is an active, informed choice 
based on considerations about what they believe will best suit their child or children 
and their family. In 1996, prior to the implementation of SE2000, Pickering and 
Wilton, made the point that for parents “the schooling of their children is neither an 
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academic nor an ideological question, but an intensely personal experience which 
they have lived, and continue to live” (Pickering & Wilton, 1996, p. 26). This 
statement resonates with Corbett’s (1997) point that “there are many reasons why 
parents may select segregated special provision” (p. 58) and that ultimately parents 
end up “deciding on what seemed best for the individual child in the circumstances” 
(p. 59). Both these comments still have pertinence today and signal another possible 
reason why special school provision remains so resilient despite the fact that inclusive 
education policies have been widely accepted and adopted.  
Parsons, Lewis, and Elkins (2009, p. 54) note that, “there is a substantial 
disparity between the world of legislation and policy-speak compared with everyday 
experiences of families with disabled children”. When parents make choices about 
their children’s education they are driven by personal factors, including what they 
perceive to be their child’s needs, their own anxieties and concerns about that child 
and their own intuitions about what will be best for their child (Gibb, Tunbridge, 
Chua, & Frederickson, 2007; Palmer, Fuller, Arora, & Nelson, 2001). As one of the 
participants in Gasson’s (2008) study explained “we’ve always been open to advice 
but … we can sometimes just feel with our own gut feeling and we basically go back 
to that after we’ve looked at various things” (p. 116). But this is no easy matter; 
parents may be dealing with issues that are not always understood by others. Gasson 
reported the view of another parent whose child could sometimes be violent, that 
those giving advice did not always appreciate the concerns of the parents or 
understand the needs of the child or young person: “They don’t know or comprehend. 
… my worst fear with Bart would be that he would seriously hurt someone” (p. 115).  
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 Cigman (2007b, p. 782) argues that, “special schools are seen by many 
parents not as inherently demeaning environments, but as liberating and in the best 
sense educational environments for their children”. The following comment in 
relation to a child’s educational experience in a special school supports this view: 
With our son, his aggression stopped almost overnight, he was 
happy and for the first-time he wanted to go to school. In addition, 
we actually saw some concrete changes in terms of improvements in 
his expressive and receptive language, problem solving skills, self-
help skills, numeracy and literacy. He was actually able to attend 
school for a full day (previously [he’d] only coped for an hour at a 
mainstream school). He felt comfortable being with other children 
with ASD (he was always very anxious with most neuro-typical 
children).     (Ministry of Education, 2010, p. 37)  
Parsons et al. (2009, p. 54) suggest that, “an acknowledgement of real difficulties by 
parents is likely to be linked to their strong desire for children’s individual needs to be 
adequately recognised, understood and supported”. For example, Moore (2007), who 
is the mother of two autistic sons, argues that the characteristics of autism mean that 
the regular school setting is “totally inappropriate”(p. 35) for her own children. She  
suggests it may also be for many other autistic children and young people; a claim 
that is supported in other studies (Knill & Humphreys, 1996; Parsons & Lewis, 2010).  
For some families, such as those who participated in Gasson’s study, special schools 
provide a setting in which both the family and the children can experience a sense of 
belonging and can be “among people who shared common experiences”: 
For us parents there was the acceptance that we were no longer 
different. We no longer had to apologise. People just accepted them. 
They were James and B and they were disabled people. They had a 
right to special education and we didn’t have to apologise.   (p. 120) 
Complexities and Dilemmas  
Wilson (2015) talks of the “moral complexity of school choice” and describes how 
school choice is a process that  “forces parents to decide between competing aims, 
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values and goods” (p. 187). For many parents of disabled children the process of 
selecting a school or setting involves the negotiation of a range of dilemmas and 
competing values (Norwich, 2013), it is much more complex than a clear and simple 
choice between different preferences. Parents who choose a special school placement 
may, contrarily, also support inclusion, albeit with a caveat. Croll and Moses (2000, p. 
5) noted this paradox in the views of their participants: “a substantial proportion of 
the responses to the issue of inclusion or integration could be summarized as ‘I am 
absolutely committed to inclusion in principle but’…”. Similarly, other studies (de 
Boer, Pijl, & Minnaert, 2010; Elkins et al., 2003; Gasson, 2008) have reported that 
while a majority of parents recognized the benefits of inclusion for children with 
special needs generally, this view changed when it came to the schooling of their own 
child.   
Clearly, as Norwich (2013) argues, parents and their disabled children “value 
choice about their educational provision, including some separate setting options” 
(p.125). However, this is not to deny the difficulty and tensions between the  “plural 
values”(Norwich, 2013) that a parent or parents can hold, and their attempt to 
reconcile these. According to Norwich, this tension, often represented in the view “ I 
support inclusion but …”, leads to dilemmas when values such as the desire to ensure 
the best education for one’s child and the acceptance of values inherent to inclusion 
are put in opposition to one another. This situation is made even more difficult by the 
overwhelming drive towards inclusion in policy.  
Nussbaum (2011b) argues that when a government endorses a particular brand 
of religion it fosters inequality, because “this endorsement is at the same time, 
inevitably a disendorsement, creating an in-group and an out-group” (p. 43). Arguably, 
 142 
the privileging of universal inclusion similarly acts as a “disendorsement” of special 
schooling. So in choosing special school provision in a world where universal 
inclusion is the endorsed position, parents are potentially placing themselves and their 
children in the “out-group”. This must inevitably create further tension and dilemmas 
in their deliberations about what to do. The fact that parents are prepared to 
countenance this risk lends support to the argument that this type of provision meets a 
real need and provides an important choice.   
Nonetheless the circumstances in which these families find themselves are far 
from perfect or even reasonable given the policy imperative for universal inclusion. 
Nussbaum (2011b) claims that when the government takes the position “that a 
different view… is the correct view and that yours is wrong …” this, in effect, leads 
to some being “publicly ranked beneath others” (p.35). As discussed in the previous 
chapter, in a policy context that promotes inclusion as the ideal suchcan be the 
experience of those who value and support special school provision. This is hardly a 
just state of affairs and must be a cause for concern in a democratic society for, as 
Anderson (2010) observes, “deprivation of equal standing is always a concern of 
justice”(p. 93).   
The Experiences of Education  
Inclusion is predicated on “the assumption that the regular school provides an 
education worth being included in” (Slee, 1996, p.110). While for many, and possibly 
most disabled, children this may be a fair assumption, there are also some for whom it 
will not. Walzer (1983) observes that, “education distributes to individuals not only 
their futures but their presents as well” (p. 198); “justice” he points out “has to do not 
only with the effects but also with the experience of education” (p. 198). What Walzer 
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is pointing out here is the importance and impact of the actual daily realities and 
experience of schooling for the children and young people participating in it. The 
importance to parents of their disabled children’s daily experiences of education is 
affirmed by Gasson (2008), who reported that for the parents in her study “the process 
of education was as important as the product” (p.121), as was the child’s happiness; 
“the first priority was we wanted him to be happy. He had to be happy and he had to 
be stimulated” (p. 121).  
The argument that special school provision is an injustice to disabled children, 
fails to attend to the lived realities of the disabled children who attend these schools 
and who experience a valued and valuable education therein. It similarly fails to 
attend to the reality that, as of yet, we cannot guarantee that local regular schools can 
provide an appropriate and satisfactory educational experience for all disabled 
children. But judgements about the justice and fairness of educational arrangements 
and provision must take into account the material reality of those on whom any such 
arrangement impacts. Consideration of realities such as those described above lends 
support to the view that the availability of special school provision represents a more 
just state of affairs than a circumstance in which there is no alternative option other 
than the regular local school. If the provision of special schooling enhances the daily 
reality of education for some disabled children and provides educational experiences 
better suited to their needs then the availability of this option contributes to a just state 
of affairs. However availability alone is not enough. This option must also be 
supported in policy as a valued and valuable option and acknowledged as one aspect 
of just and fair educational provision otherwise, as has been discussed in Chapters 
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Five and Six, these school communities and those that support them will be 
vulnerable to marginalisation and discrimination. 
Recognition of Diverse Views and Values 
Nussbaum (2002, p. 198) observes that the matter “of justice for the disabled is a 
complex and multifaceted issue”. This observation is clearly pertinent to the sphere of 
education and certainly applicable to the question of what constitutes just educational 
provision for disabled children. In the light of this observation, Nussbaum adjures us 
to think about the wide variety of desires, aspirations and needs of these children and 
their families when considering the issue of just educational provision. Special school 
provision, I argue, demonstrates one aspect of a society’s endeavour to give equal and 
fair consideration to the variety of desires, aspirations and needs of disabled children 
and their families. However for some who promote universal inclusion, the need to 
give fair and equal consideration to a variety of perspectives and needs appears to 
carry little weight and the choice of a special school placement is constructed as 
almost a form of deviance:  
the continuation of such schools has often been as a result of 
parental choice. While one sympathizes with the difficulties 
particular parents may face over such decisions, from the 
perspective adopted in this paper such practices cannot be used as a 
ground for supporting this system of provision.  
(Barton, 1997, p. 235) 
From this point of view, the views and desires of those supporting universal inclusion 
are ascribed greater moral probity than the views and desires of those who wish to 
access special school provision so that it is claimed that:  
Even a superbly well organised special school offering the highest 
quality curriculum and educational input to its children has no right 
to exist if that same education can be provided in a mainstream 
school.  (Dessent, 1987, p. 97 as cited in Barton, 1997, p. 235) 
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But, it is difficult to reconcile a denial of the option of special school provision to 
some disabled children and their families with the requirements of justice. Such a 
denial represents a lack of respect both for the moral dignity of these people and for 
their right to choice in aspects of life that affect theirs and their children’s flourishing. 
Consider the following extract from a longer quotation cited in Chapter Five: 
parents may decide that it is best to accommodate their children in 
segregated schools…. In this case, it is questionable whether the 
option selected by the parents is in the interests of the child.  
(Ryba, 1995, p. 223)   
Comments such as this, not untypical among those committed to universal inclusion, 
demonstrate the circumstances where: 
if people don’t think that their neighbors view of life is objectively 
true, they will always want to interfere with them and bring them 
around to their own view and they won’t support policies that 
extend to people a wide range of opportunities for choice. 
 (Nussbaum, 2011b, p. 12)  
This description, which Nussbaum ascribes to Berlin, reflects an attitude that both 
falls short of anything that could be called respectful and also fails to demonstrate an 
“appreciation that people can reflect reasonably on what they value for themselves” 
(Robeyns & Brighouse, 2010, p. 30). The impact of this type of attitude is illustrated 
in the accounts of some parents in Gasson’s (2008) study who described how they  
“experienced controversy about school selection” (p. 115). These parents explained 
that despite their knowledge and understanding of their child, they felt pressured to 
choose the option of regular schooling which accorded with the professionals’ views 
of what would be best for their child rather than their own.  
In circumstances such as these it is clear that the variety of views and values 
held by parents are not accorded equal respect; this is scarcely a just state of affairs. 
Nussbaum (2006) contends that respect for the different values held by citizens is a 
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requirement of living in a democracy, choice she argues, “is good in part because of 
reasonable pluralism: other fellow citizens make different choices, and respecting 
them includes respecting the space within which those choices are made” (p. 184). 
Nussbaum is not here advocating choice as it is understood in the context of a 
neoliberal vision whereby choice represents the fulfilment of the role of the individual 
as rational chooser within the constraints of the competitive market place. The 
conception that Nussbaum is arguing for here, is an understanding of choice as an 
aspect of human flourishing. Sen (2009) explains this as related to the freedom to 
“choose between different kinds of lives” and argues that, “being able to reason and 
choose is a significant part of human life” (p. 18). Walzer (as cited in Blackler, 1999, 
p.198) similarly notes the significance of choice as an aspect of autonomy and points 
out that “ultimately, what makes it possible for me to choose is the fact that other 
people have chosen”. In a democratic society the freedom to choose between different 
conceptions of human flourishing represents “an aspect of respect for human dignity” 
(Nussbaum, 2006, p. 186). The presence of special schooling insofar as it enables 
choice of educational provision demonstrates a society’s respect for the human 
dignity of those who desire that option and respect for their ability to “reflect 
reasonably” on the interests of their children.  
Nussbaum (2006) further suggests that respect for human dignity requires 
recognition that each person is an “end, and cannot be sacrificed to a larger social 
good” (p. 177). Denial of the right to choose a special school placement on the 
grounds that such a choice may compromise the aims of inclusion would seem to 
come dangerously close to treating some disabled children and their families as “mere 
means to the ends” (Nussbaum, p.70) of inclusion. The comment of one parent in 
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Gasson’s (2008) study in relation to her secondary-aged son attending a local high 
school, points poignantly to the fact that the  danger of their child being the means to 
an end may not be lost on parents: 
What could he do and what could he gain from it? –Absolutely 
nothing. It would be good for the rest of the school in terms of 
exposing others to disabilities and teaching them some tolerance 
perhaps. But wouldn’t it be nicer for him just to go out in his 
wheelchair and feel the leaves?                                              (p. 124) 
The comment of another parent in the same study, that “we don’t want to be 
the token family to suit other people’s agendas”, (Gasson, 2008, p. 124) lends 
further support to this.  
The provision of special schooling represents not only an acknowledgement of 
the difference in “capacities and aspirations of students and parents” (Rizvi & Lingard, 
1996, p. 22) such as the desire for an adolescent child to have the option while at 
school to “go out in his wheelchair and feel the leaves”, but also a recognition of the 
inadequacy of “assumptions of uniformity” (Rizvi & Lingard, 1996, p. 22) to the task 
of achieving just educational provision for all disabled children. There are many 
children and young people who are complex in their educational needs but what might 
constitute just education for each of these children is not necessarily the same thing; 
the choices they and their families make will reflect that. So while Harry’s parents 
wanted their sons to go to a special school, other parents may want their children to 
go to the local school. Harry’s parents had particular dreams and aspirations for him 
and his brother, other parents will have different dreams and aspirations, as will 
disabled children and young people themselves. The point is that we aspire to live in a 
pluralist society and in such a society these differences and the decisions that flow 
democratically from them, should not be judged to have a greater or lesser moral 
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worth or a greater or lesser moral claim, and yet if the ideal of educational provision 
for disabled children is construed and articulated in policy as universal inclusion, then 
that is a possible, if not the probable outcome. In contrast to the notion of universal 
inclusion, the provision of special schooling represents one facet of justice in 
education for disabled children and a just response to “what Marx called, “rich human 
need”, that is to say the need for an irreducible plurality of opportunities for life 
activities” (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 167).  
The Obligations of Parents 
Rawls (2005) argues that if the choices or liberty of citizens are to be denied, the 
justification for this must be based on reasons that those citizens can understand and 
also that “we might reasonably expect that they as free and equal might reasonably 
accept” (p. xlix). As regards the denial of the choice of special school provision, it is 
hard to see what reasons could be provided that all parents of disabled children “as 
free and equal might reasonably accept”. What reasons for full inclusion can be 
advanced that all parents of disabled children will not only understand but also that 
they might reasonably accept? More would be needed than reasons such as ensuring 
the cause of inclusion or benefitting society in the future by making it ultimately more 
inclusive. It is unlikely that any parent would see some putative future social gain as a 
good enough reason to compromise what Walzer (1983) describes as the “educational 
presents” of his/her own child.  
 
Moreover, as Kittay (2009), the mother of an adult daughter whom she 
describes as “severely intellectually disabled”, points out, parents have particular 
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obligations to their children. Parents are required “to assure that the child’s life is 
protected, that the child’s development and growth are fostered, and, … that the child 
can find social acceptance” (p. 623). With regard to education, it may be only through 
the choice of special schooling that some parents are able to discharge these 
obligations. McLaren (2013), the father of a fifteen year old autistic son who has  
“highly complex and challenging behaviour” (p.28), “severe sensory processing 
difficulties” (p.32) and “obsessive compulsive behaviours”(p.27), points out the stark 
reality that inclusion in a regular classroom is not an experience that some parents 
may wish to subject their children to:  
It would be considered inhumane treatment if a child with physical 
disabilities was expected to negotiate their way up a flight of stairs. 
However, children presenting with major sensory processing 
difficulties are expected to negotiate their way through the noisy 
and over-stimulating environment of a regular classroom. It can also 
be argued that if this environment causes them considerable pain 
and distress, it is likewise an inhumane form of treatment.        (p. 33) 
A More Nuanced Approach 
Terzi (2010) argues that: 
there is a crucial but neglected philosophical core to the issue of fair 
educational provision for disabled children which centres on the 
fundamental question: what constitutes a just educational provision 
for students with disabilities?  (p. 3)  
In the circumstances that prevail in the current policy environment where inclusive 
education is the dominant orthodoxy and pervasive motif in educational thinking with 
respect to disabled children, the question Terzi raises could be considered otiose for 
the answer is, of course, inclusion. But as Terzi  points out the question of what 
constitutes just educational provision is fundamentally a philosophical and moral 
question, as such it is not one that necessarily admits of certainty (Codd, 1987). Yet, 
as I argue here, certainty of principle and certainty of purpose lie at the heart of the 
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argument for universal inclusion. Norwich (2013), drawing on Berlin, describes this 
universal position as a “hedgehog stance”. Berlin (as cited in Norwich, 2013) drew a 
distinction between those who: 
Relate everything to a central single vision… in which they think 
and feel about a single universal organising principle in terms of 
which alone all they are and say has significance – and on the other 
side, those who pursue many ends, often unrelated and even 
contradictory, connected if at all…The first kind of … personality 
belongs to the hedgehogs, the second to the foxes.  
(Norwich, 2013 p. 9-10) 
Norwich suggests that inclusion, in what he describes as its “ radical position” or what 
I have called universal inclusion, is a hedgehog position in that it proposes “one big 
value and idea that provides security and purpose” (p. 10) and insists on fitting  
“varied experiences and values into an unchanging, all-encompassing unitary vision” 
(p. 10). As Dyson (1999) points out, universal inclusion presents the answer as prior 
to the question, in so doing it frames the problem in a particular way and restricts 
consideration of alternative conceptions of what is owed to disabled children and their 
families. Given the context from which inclusion developed, a context in which 
disabled people’s experiences were characterised by denial of rights and exclusion 
from social institutions and life, this position is understandable, the “struggle” for 
rights requires determination and a solidarity of purpose. Nonetheless, as Rizvi and 
Lingard (1996) argue, “relevant differences in relative power, capacities and 
aspirations of students or parents must be acknowledged without risk to the notion of 
social justice” (p. 22). Policies of inclusive education seem to preclude this 
acknowledgement. But in order to achieve a just state of affairs for all disabled 
children and their families with respect to education provision and to enact this in 
policy, it is necessary to take such factors into account. This requires a more nuanced 
approach than is represented by the hedgehog stance of universal inclusion. It requires 
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an approach that is amenable to considering a broader conceptualisation of what 
constitutes just educational provision, one that can entertain a range of possibilities 
including the option of special schooling.  
In a society that recognises plural values it cannot be assumed that there is a 
shared understanding to call upon when attempting to reconcile conflicting views on 
solutions to problems and dilemmas (Young, 2000) such as are examined here. 
Drawing further on Berlin’s metaphor as used by Norwich (2014), what is needed is a 
more fox-like approach and an “openness to difference ” (Young, 2000, p. 41) that 
promotes a state of affairs in which plural values are recognised and can coexist as far 
as possible, even if somewhat imperfectly; a state of affairs that “takes as little for 
granted as possible and that does not assume the value of any particular way of life or 
the justice of any particular set of social and political arrangements” (Nussbaum, 2006, 
p. 178).  
Respect for Plural Values 
Rawls (2005) suggests that, “reasonable persons…desire for its own sake a social 
world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate with others on terms all accept” 
(p. 50). Of course what is not stated but is implicit in Rawls’ statement, is that before 
there can be cooperation and acceptance and in order for these to occur there must be 
“free expression of all needs and points of view” (Young, 2000, p.91); but more than 
that, this expression must be accorded respect and recognition. These ideas are 
fundamental to democratic societies, as “the natural outcome of the use of human 
reason within free political and social institutions is a multiplicity of values and ways 
of life ” (Reich, 2007, p. 710). Nussbaum (2006) defines a “reasonable citizen” as  
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“one who respects other citizens as equals”(p. 33). A consequence of our respect for 
others, she argues is that “we want a society in which we can live together on terms of 
cooperation that are fair to all and that can be publicly seen to be fair to all 
(Nussbaum, 2011c, p. 2).   
Respect for persons requires respecting the many diverse ways they 
choose to organise their lives and the many beliefs they hold. That 
means that the political conception must limit itself to what citizens 
of many different sorts can share wholeheartedly. Otherwise, 
whatever appearances (and intentions) may be, it does not fully 
respect them.  (Nussbaum, 2011b, p. 3)  
The “political conception” expressed in the idea of universal inclusion is not 
something that is shared “wholeheartedly”, rather it presupposes a particular 
understanding of what constitutes just education for disabled children. Thus it does 
not demonstrate respect of the kind Nussbaum describes above for those who hold 
other views. Moreover, it does not acknowledge disagreement of any sort or that the 
idea is controversial in any way. As demonstrated in the New Zealand context 
discussed earlier, this position inevitably denies the voices of some.  
 
Walzer (as cited in Crowder, 2014, p. 493) suggests that “justice requires that 
the society be faithful to the disagreements, providing the institutional channels for 
their expression, adjudicative mechanisms, and alternative distributions”. At the core 
of what Walzer is asserting is that respect for persons and for justice requires that 
there should be some agreement or at least some attempt to reach agreement about 
policies and principles. Crowder (2014) similarly argues that in a pluralist society 
policies and principles should be tested on the basis of “the extent to which they 
command agreement” (p. 493), that is in terms of their faithfulness to democratic 
principles. This perspective reflects Dewey’s insistence, as described by Noddings 
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(2012), that “outcomes must be acceptable, or at least better than any identifiable 
alternatives, for all involved” (p. 163). 
It is difficult to see how the instantiation of universal inclusion in policy such 
as in SE2000, can meet the requirement to be “faithful to disagreements” when the 
absolute certainty of universal inclusion, essentially denies the possibility of 
disagreement or acknowledgement of alternative views. But at the same time, among 
those most affected by the policy, that is parents and disabled children themselves, 
there clearly are different views and alternative perspectives. To achieve a just state of 
affairs with respect to education provision for all disabled children, those perspectives 
and voices must also be heard and accorded respect and recognition. This requires 
policies and practices that acknowledge and value the diverse views and beliefs 
people hold and the diverse circumstances in which they live their lives. It also 
requires democratic and just decision-making processes that are truly and 
demonstrably fair.  
 What the Best and Wisest Parent Wants… 
What the best and wisest parent wants for his own child that must 
the community want for all its children. Any other ideal for our 
schools is narrow and unlovely; acted upon it destroys our 
democracy.   -John Dewey, School and Society, Chapter 1, 1907 
In Chapter Three I referred to the perennial question that challenges philosophers and 
others with respect to determining a reasonable metric of justice; that is “what should 
we look at, when evaluating whether one state of affairs is more or less just than 
another?” (Robeyns & Brighouse, 2010, p. 1). Dewey’s passage above gives us a hint 
as to what could serve as a touchstone when considering how to achieve a just state of 
affairs with regard to educational arrangements for disabled children. Admittedly, this 
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paragraph is not unproblematic insofar as the idea of the “best and wisest” parent is 
certainly open to varying interpretation. Nonetheless I think that Dewey alerts us to 
something that may be of particular relevance and importance to the matter of just 
education provision and policy for disabled children.  
 In the majority of cases the best advocates for children like Harry, his brother 
and Kittay’s daughter, Sesha, are likely to be those who know them well, those who 
can hear their voices: “To be heard, to be recognized, to have her needs and wants 
reckoned along with those of others, the mentally retarded individual requires an 
advocate—a role that has voice at its center” (Kittay, 2001, p. 560). As Kittay (2009) 
argues “a close attentive eye”(p. 219) and a “strong affective bond” (p. 220), such as 
that between parent and child, are necessary in order to “get a glimpse into the lives” 
of persons like her daughter or Harry and his brother. It is this closeness that enables 
advocacy through a “lens of understanding the impact of different conditions, 
disorders, disabilities or difficulties on children’s individual experiences and 
capabilities” (Parsons et al., 2009, p. 54) and perhaps more importantly, as Kittay 
(2001) suggests, “by considering her in the fullness of her joys and capacities” (p. 
560).  
On the basis of this understanding and bond families will make choices for 
their child or children. Some will value the benefits and opportunities that inclusion 
brings to the child, others will value what special school provision offers. But what is 
of importance is that no one decision is likely going to be the right decision for all and 
neither is any one decision so morally superior that it should be privileged over the 
other. At the heart of this is the fact that disabled children are characterised by 
difference. The best and wisest parents will differ from each other in their choices but 
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they will all make their choices on the basis of intimate knowledge and understanding 
of their children. Kittay argues that care is fundamental to the issue of justice for 
those such as her daughter, however, as she points out, care concerns not only the 
cared for but also the carer. Noddings (2012), discussing the “ethics of care” explains 
that this way of thinking, “insists that ethical decisions must be made in caring 
interactions with those affected by the discussion” (p.233). These ideas point to the 
fact that in thinking about just educational provision for all disabled children it is 
important, as Kitty (2001) suggests, to not only “ask what is due” to these children 
“and why it is due to them” but also “what is due to those who care”(p. 22) for them.  
Attending to the Many Voices 
Justice, requires that all “persons should have the right and opportunity to participate 
in the deliberation and decision-making of the institutions to which their actions 
directly contribute or which directly affect their actions” (Young, 2000, p. 91). As 
regards education provision for disabled children, justice requires that  “the needs, 
wishes and views of all disabled children and young people and their families” 
(Parsons et al., 2009, p. 56) are accorded respect and consideration in determining the 
characteristics of an education “system that is fair, equitable and appropriate for 
everyone”(Parsons, et al., 2009, p. 56). There are “many disabled voices not just one” 
(Cigman, 2007b, p. 792) and many parents’ voices; respect for parents of disabled 
children who support special schooling as an option requires that “their capacity to 
reflect responsibly about the vital interests of their children must be taken seriously” 
(Cigman, 2007b, p. 781). In a democratic society, respect requires that the voices and 
perspectives of all are accorded equal deference so that all can “stand forth with their 
differences acknowledge and respected”(Young, 2001, p. 119).    
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A just state of affairs with respect to educational arrangements for all disabled 
children and their families, requires that there be more than a single, simple notion of 
just educational provision as is conceptualised in universal inclusion. What is needed 
is a more nuanced approach that genuinely attends to the diversity of persons and the 
plurality of values. Such an approach would ensure that the policy context was such 
that the choice to attend a special school is recognised as one morally valid and 
valued option among other morally valid and valued options.  
In some situations, as Anderson (2010) explains, “differences must sometimes 
be recognised as differences”(p. 93). What may constitute a just state of affairs for 
any individual will be shaped by that difference and so policy needs to be expansive 
enough to accommodate and perhaps celebrate that difference. With respect to the 
education of disabled children, a just state of affairs will be that in which provision 
and policy acknowledges and recognises the “blooming and buzzing diversity of 
human experience” (Blackler, 1999, p. 186) that characterises the lives of those 
children and their families. The provision of special schooling as a valued alternative 
is entirely consistent with such a goal. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
-T.S. Eliot, Little Gidding 
This thesis has explored matters to do with special school provision, inclusion and 
just education provision for disabled children and young people. The thesis has 
traversed these matters from both a practical perspective with reference to the New 
Zealand context and a philosophical perspective with reference to questions of justice 
and injustice as they pertain to special school provision, education policy, inclusion 
and the education of disabled children.  
Griffiths (2003) refers to what she calls “little stories” about particular 
situations and circumstances, and explains how they can provide the contexts for 
understanding and insight when theorising about social justice. The little story 
recounted here is that of the turn to inclusion in New Zealand education policy and 
the experience of the special school sector in the wake of that. This story provides the 
context for examining the more complex philosophical questions that have been 
explored here; the conclusions that follow have their basis in the understanding and 
insights gleaned from this story. The first two are particularly centred in the New 
Zealand context but may also have wider application in contexts roughly similar to 
New Zealand; the others have a broader philosophical application.  
The first conclusion that arises from this study is that the pursuit of universal 
inclusion does not always lead to policies and practices that are fair and just for all on 
whom they impact. This can be seen with reference to the New Zealand special school 
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sector and the special schools and their communities who experienced disadvantage, 
uncertainty and marginalisation in the wake of the turn to inclusion and the 
introduction and implementation of SE2000. This uncertainty and disadvantage can 
be attributed to the ambivalence of their position under a policy whose goal was to 
achieve a world-class inclusive education system, and also to the equivocal attitude 
towards them on the part of the Ministry of Education and Group Special Education. 
In a policy environment in which just education for disabled children was equated to 
inclusion in the regular local school and only this, special schools and their 
communities were vulnerable to marginalisation, oppression and domination. In 
addition the voices of those who differed from the dominant orthodoxy were, if not 
totally silenced, certainly muted.  
The second conclusion is that rather than representing injustice with respect to 
education for disabled children, special school provision can, and in the New Zealand 
context does, contribute to a more just state of affairs for some children and their 
families. Where the choice to attend a special school is made freely by the family, the 
availability of special school provision enhances the opportunities for flourishing of 
some disabled children and their families. The availability of this option allows for 
choice, demonstrates respect for the different views and values that families and 
children hold in regard to education, and represents an acknowledgement of the daily 
realities of the lives and needs of the children and their families.  
The third conclusion is that the notion that inclusion, and only inclusion, 
represents just education for disabled children coupled with the positioning of special 
school provision as an injustice and something that should be dispensed with is not an 
accurate representation of justice in education for all disabled children. But, and 
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perhaps more importantly, neither are these particularly useful perspectives with 
respect to understanding what educational arrangements might constitute a just state 
of affairs for disabled children. Rather, these perspectives in putting regular school 
and special school provision in opposition to each other, create an arbitrary distinction 
between them that makes it less possible to acknowledge that both have merit and 
both can contribute to a more just state of affairs for disabled children. What is set up 
in this situation is an either-or position that creates division among people who 
essentially aspire to the same thing, to create a just state of affairs with regard to 
educational arrangements for disabled children. Moreover, in that division there is 
also the implication that one position, inclusion, is morally superior to the other. The 
effect of this is that those who support special schooling may be excluded from 
participation in any consideration of the broader and more complex matter of how an 
education system that is just for disabled children might be configured. The paradox 
is that in its certainty the promotion of inclusion thus leads to exclusion. 
The fourth conclusion is that, with respect to location, a just state of affairs for 
all disabled children and their families will be that in which educational arrangements 
are such that they: Result in the mitigation of injustice for those children and their 
families in terms of their daily lived experiences in relation to schooling; reflect and 
so respect the many voices and views as to the nature of these arrangements; reflect 
and attend to the multiplicity of needs and aspirations of these children and their 
families and provide what is necessary to support and foster these. 
The final conclusion that emerges here is that what is needed is a more 
nuanced understanding of the nature of just educational arrangements; an approach 
that acknowledges the value of different types of provision but also recognises that 
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what might suit one child and family might not suit another. This is much more likely 
to be productive of a just state of affairs for disabled children. Sen (2009) speaks of 
justice being not about achieving perfectly just social arrangements, even if there was 
agreement about what these might be, but about mitigating manifest injustice. In 
relation to the matter of just education provision for disabled children, inclusion 
presents a theory of a perfectly just arrangement and is wedded to the achievement of 
that. But there is a difficulty here; this idea of a perfectly just arrangement is 
undermined by the fact it is not one that has universal agreement. Some families, 
scholars, teachers, and activists support it; others do not. With respect to those most 
concerned, the children and their families, their views about this are varied and 
diverse. A single conception of what is a perfectly just arrangement will, as has been 
demonstrated earlier, inevitably result in an unjust situation for some and thus can 
only ever be an imperfectly just arrangement.   
Limits and Possibilities 
The scope of this study is bounded within particular limitations and constraints. 
Firstly, the argument made in this work is circumscribed by the characteristics of the 
context in which it is grounded including the nature and characteristics of the disabled 
children and young people of concern. The analysis and ideas proposed here assume 
two specific conditions that obtain in New Zealand but may not in other jurisdictions. 
These conditions, that the right of all disabled children to be educated in the local 
regular school is enshrined in law, and that enrolment in a special school is a freely 
elected choice of the family/whanau and does not occur as a result of a direction by 
any state education body or agency, are fundamental and prior to the argument made 
in this work. Similarly the concerns of this thesis centre only on children and young 
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people with the characteristics and qualities described in Chapter One and no claims 
are made with respect to other children and young people.  
Secondly, the critique and analysis here has been concerned with inclusion 
only as it relates to the matter of location and the way it positions special school 
provision as antithetical to just education for disabled children. But, as noted in 
Chapter One, inclusion is a broad and wide-ranging concept that can refer among 
other things to a radical programme of education reform and to pedagogical practices 
and philosophies focused on improving and educational experiences in schools and 
other educational settings for all children and young people. Nothing in the argument 
presented here is intended as a criticism of the efforts and work being done in relation 
to these aspects of inclusion. 
A number of possibilities for further research are indicated in the light of this 
study. The special school sector in New Zealand is, as noted in Chapter One, an under 
researched area but it is an area that warrants both theoretical and empirical research. 
This thesis has examined matters from a theoretical perspective and demonstrates how 
philosophical thinking and thinking philosophically can illuminate the nuances and 
complexities of educational issues, and give insights that could be used to support 
policy development and thinking more widely. There is a growing international body 
of work (Cigman, 2007a, 2007b; Kittay, 2005, 2009; Norwich 2013, 2014; Nussbaum, 
2006, 2009) that draws on philosophical understanding and perspectives to explore 
matters to do with the disability, justice, education and education policy such as those 
examined here. There is potential for further development in this area in the New 
Zealand educational research context. Such work and critique could contribute to 
greater philosophical clarity and understanding with respect to matters such as those 
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examined here. At the same time, such work would, at a more practical level, provide 
insights that could inform the work and deliberations of those charged with the 
difficult process of policy development and implementation, and thus support the 
development of considered and ethically sound policies and practices.  
Undoubtedly matters of justice and injustice lie at the heart of the broad and 
complex matter of what educational arrangements might best represent a just state of 
affairs for disabled children. But at the pragmatic level of policy development and 
implementation these matters may play out as dilemmas and contradictions that call 
for compromise and resolution. The dilemmas and contradictions of policymaking 
were beyond the scope of this study, however the work here does point to the need for 
research that explores these more pragmatic matters with regard to policymaking and 
the education of disabled children. Ball (1993) points out that policy “is both 
contested and changing, always in a state of ‘becoming’, of ‘was’ and ‘never was’ and 
‘not quite’ ” (p.11) thus any given policy resolution can never be seen to be the 
ultimate and final policy resolution. In order then to best understand the impact, 
effects and contradictions of policy it is important to continue to explore, examine and 
scrutinise education policies from a range of perspectives, and also to  examine the 
ever changing demands of the circumstances with which such policies are concerned.  
There is an absence of any recent empirical research that examines special 
school provision in New Zealand and so a need for research that will provide greater 
understanding of the sector and how it operates, and the nature and quality of the 
experiences of children in these schools. As noted earlier the debates in New Zealand 
with respect to inclusion are somewhat one-sided, until there is more research into 
special school provision this is unlikely to change. Finally, but most importantly, this 
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thesis demonstrates that there is a need for more work that examines the experiences 
and views of the children and families who have been involved with special schools 
and also those who work in the schools including principals, teachers and others. 
These voices have been relatively silent in the debates and discussions about these 
matters; it is time their stories were heard.  
Final Thoughts 
This thesis has been an exploration of a matter that puzzled me. T.S. Eliot’s words are 
germane here, for I find that at the end of all my exploring I must return to where I 
started, that is to Harry and his brother. Children and young people such as Harry and 
his brother, and their families are at the heart of the matters discussed here. All these 
children and their families are entitled to expect just educational arrangements, that is, 
that they should have access to education provision that affords them respect and 
dignity and enables them to flourish. Certainly for some disabled children this will be 
achieved in a regular school setting, but this is not the case for all. For Harry and Jack 
and their family, it was the special school setting that provided them with an 
education which afforded them dignity and respect, and enabled them all to flourish.  
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